The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel B. Kent, United States District Judge.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER
VENUE AND ORDERING SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL-OF-RECORD
On June 6, 2001, Defendant Jacintoport Corporation filed a Rule 12
(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer for Improper
Venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a).
Defendant's Motion contends that venue in the Galveston Division of the
Southern District of Texas is improper, but that venue in the Houston
Division of this Court is proper. Accordingly, Defendant seeks a
dismissal or, alternatively, a transfer to the Houston Division of this
Court's Judicial District.
Manifestly, any person with even a correspondence-course level
understanding of federal practice and procedure would recognize that
Defendant's Motion is patently insipid, ludicrous and utterly and
unequivocally without any merit whatsoever. Worse, it is just plain
blatantly wrong in light of the unambiguous language of a decades old
federal statute and veritable mountains of case law addressing venue
propriety. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; see also, e.g., Lowery v. University
of Houston — Clear Lake, 50 F. Supp.2d 648, 649 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
The federal venue statute hopelessly incorrectly interpreted and cited by
Defendant provides that venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial DISTRICT where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same
State, (2) a judicial DISTRICT in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is
situated, or (3) a judicial DISTRICT in which any
defendant may be found, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) (emphasis added, as it is apparently needed by
As the heightened letters above indicate, the venue statute speaks in
terms of districts not divisions. Thus, if venue is proper in the Houston
Division of the Southern District of Texas it is ipso facto proper in the
Galveston Division — as well as in the Divisions of Corpus
Christi, Victoria, Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo. Whether a case might
be more conveniently prosecuted in one Division versus another is a
question left to analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). Defendant's
obnoxiously ancient, boilerplate, inane Motion is emphatically DENIED.
Moreover, Defendant's present counsel-of-record, Mr. Eric G. Carter is
determined to be disqualified for cause from this action for submitting
this asinine tripe. In his place, the Court hereby ORDERS that Mr.
Brandon Mosley of Mr. Carter's lawfirm be SUBSTITUTED as
attorney-in-charge for Defendant. Mr. Carter shall appear no further in
the present matter.
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