Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
STACY FAMILY ENTERPRISES, INC. APPELLANT
TARRANT APPRAISAL DISTRICT APPELLEE
FROM THE 48TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
LEE GABRIEL JUSTICE
Appellant Stacy Family Enterprises, Inc. appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Tarrant Appraisal District (TAD). We affirm.
Stacy is a furniture retailer that maintains its inventory in three locations within TAD's jurisdiction. TAD appraised the market value of Stacy's inventory for its ad valorem taxes in 2007, 2008, and 2009. In September 2011, Stacy filed a motion to correct the tax rolls for 2007, 2008, and 2009 with the Tarrant Appraisal Review Board (TARB). See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(c)(1) (West Supp. 2013). Stacy argued that TAD relied on Stacy's good-faith estimates of its inventory's market value and did not conduct an independent evaluation. Additionally, Stacy complained that TAD made no deductions for depreciation as it should have in accordance with the tax code's cost-method formula. See id. § 23.011 (West 2008). TAD's method, according to Stacy, inflated the appraised market value of the inventory. Following a hearing, TARB upheld TAD's appraisal values and denied Stacy's motion.
In December 2011, Stacy filed suit against TAD and TARB, seeking judicial review of TARB's decision. See id. § 42.01(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2013) (permitting a taxpayer to seek judicial review of "a determination of an appraisal review board on a motion filed under Section 25.25"). TAD filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing that Stacy's complaint regarded a substantive re-evaluation that was not reviewable by a motion to correct under section 25.25 of the tax code. See id. § 25.25(c)(1). Stacy responded to TAD's motion and filed a no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing that TAD's "failure[s] to compute or calculate the market value of [Stacy's] inventories . . . [were] clerical errors." The trial court granted TAD's motion for summary judgment and denied Stacy's motion. Stacy now brings two issues on appeal.
A. Summary Judgment
In its first issue, Stacy maintains that the trial court erred by denying its no-evidence summary judgment motion. However, Stacy's entire argument on appeal centers on the grant of TAD's summary judgment. Out of an abundance of caution, we will address both the denial of Stacy's no-evidence motion for summary judgment and the grant of TAD's traditional motion for summary judgment. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. 2004) ("[C]ourts of appeals [should] construe the Rules of Appellate Procedure reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of a rule.") (quoting Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Tex. 1997)); see Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. 2008).
1. Standard of review
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review both parties' summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented. Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848; see Myrad Props., Inc. v. Lasalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2009). The reviewing court should render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848.
2. The trial court properly denied Stacy's no-evidence motion for summary judgment
Rule of civil procedure 166a(i) permits a party to move for "summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial." Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i). Thus, only a party without the burden of proof may move for no-evidence summary judgment. See id.; Burges v. Mosley, 304 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. App.—Tyler ...