United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
D. STICKNEY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of
the District Court, this case has been referred to the United
States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:
filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986 and 1988. He is proceeding pro se, and
the Court has granted him leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Defendants are Dallas County Judge Clay
Jenkins, Dallas County, and unknown defendants. The Court has
not issued process pending judicial screening.
alleges that on February 14, 2017, he sent a request for
information to Dallas County officials to obtain, "the
records of ALL Police Officers that have been placed on the
BRADY LIST, aka DO NOT SUPPORT LIST, or any other name that
refers to the policy of training and compliance with said
policy." (Compl. at 5.) He asserts defendants' reply
was nonresponsive and that no information was produced. He
claims Defendant Jenkins allowed the suppression of this
information and ensured or condoned insufficient training by
prosecutors and that Jenkins "embraced lawless violence
as an engine of plunder, ensuring abuse of Police power,
jeopardizing the community standard, likewise created
tortuous (sic) liability for the County, a hazard to the
people He sworn (sic) to protect and serve, per His fiduciary
Court takes notice that, as used in Petitioner's
complaint, Brady refers to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), under which a
constitutional violation may accrue if material evidence
favorable to a defendant is suppressed by the state.
district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed in
forma pauperis, such as the complaint filed by
Plaintiff, if the Court at any time determines that the
(I) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
(iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
28U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).
action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either
law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989); see also Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d
764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009) ("A claim may be dismissed as
frivolous if it does not have an arguable basis in fact or
law."). A complaint is without an arguable basis in law
if it is grounded upon an untenable, discredited, or
indisputably meritless legal theory, including alleged
violations of a legal interest that clearly does not exist.
See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27; Berry v.
Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig.,495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must
plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face, " Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those
facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, " id. at
555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement, ' but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is
implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded ...