United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
a complaint received March 2, 2017, Plaintiff Lawrence C.
Hill initiated this pro se action in the Dallas Division of
the Northern District of Texas, invoking, among other
authority, the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments
to the United States Constitution, see Dkt. No. 3 at 2-3, and
seeking “to settle the dispute with facts and law, and
an order for the federal or state comptroller to settle the
alleged debt, ” Id. at 1.
then filed Claimant's Notice of Filing Notice of Removal
(the “Notice”), a pleading indicating Hill's
intent to “remove” to this Court, presumably
through this action, an action in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. See Dkt.
No. 8 (“[U]pon the filing of the Notice of Removal with
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, and filing copies thereof with
the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court for Tarrant
County, Texas, the Claimant has effected removal and the
Bankruptcy Court shall proceed no further in this action
unless and until the case is remanded.”); see also Dkt.
No. 9 (filed Mar. 22, 2017, further indicating his intent to
“remove” his Fort Worth bankruptcy case through
action has been referred to the United States magistrate
judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
and a standing order of reference from Chief Judge Barbara M.
undersigned issues the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation that, for the reasons
explained below, the Court should transfer this case to the
Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Standards and Analysis
in a civil action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
See Davis v. Louisiana State Univ., 876 F.2d 412, 413 (5th
Cir. 1989). This statute provides that venue is proper in a
judicial district: (1) where any defendant resides; (2) where
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred; or (3) if there is no district where the
action may otherwise be brought, in any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Court also may transfer a case to any proper judicial
district or division “for the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, ”
Id. § 1404(a); see also Hardwick v. Brinson,
523 F.2d 798, 800 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975), and a district court
may raise the issue of venue sua sponte, see Mills v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989); see
also Empty Barge Lines II, Inc. v. DREDGE LEONARD
FISHER, 441 F.Supp.2d 786, 789 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(“A transfer of venue may be made upon the motion of
any party or by the court sua sponte.”
appears to be a resident of Fort Worth, Texas. And the Notice
filed by Hill clarifies his rather confusing complaint by
indicating that this action in some way relates to a
bankruptcy proceeding that was pending before United States
Bankruptcy Judge Russell F. Nelms. See Dkt. No. 8
(referencing “17-40679-rfn7”). The undersigned
takes notice that Judge Nelms dismissed that action on March
21, 2017, after documenting the following:
On February 21, 2017, Lawrence Hill Estate filed this chapter
7 case in this court. Lawrence Hill filed this case for
Lawrence Hill Estate, as shown by the driver's licenses
presented in both cases.
I ordered Lawrence Hill to appear and show cause why this
case should not be dismissed and [United States Bankruptcy
Judge Harlin D. Hale's] order barring his individual
ability to file bankruptcy should not be extended for an
additional five years. Lawrence Hill did not appear as
ordered, so I issued a bench warrant. The U.S. Marshals
brought Lawrence Hill before me on March 13, 2017.
Based upon the testimony and evidence at the March 13, 2017
hearing, I find that Lawrence Hill has filed a fraudulent
bankruptcy case in the name of the non-existent Lawrence Hill
Estate, and that he did so to circumvent Judge Hale's
order barring his individual filing. I also find that
Lawrence Hill modified the official bankruptcy forms and
completed them falsely, presented a fake money order to pay
the filing fee for this case, used a false Employer
Identification Number, and listed a false address on the
petition. These egregious actions are cause for dismissal and
In re Lawrence Hill Estate, Case No.
17-404679-rnf-7, Dkt. No. 31 (N.D. Tex. Bankr. Mar. 21,
undersigned observes that Hill also attempted to initiate
this action by presenting seemingly fake money orders that
the Clerk did not tender. See Dkt. Nos. 3-1 &
3-2. And the undersigned finds that, particularly because the
Notice (signed March 14, 2017) was filed after the hearing
before Judge Nelms, there is a substantial likelihood that
this action is being pursued in an attempt to evade Judge
Nelm's dismissal of the ...