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Charboneau v. Box

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

March 29, 2017

DR. JANINE CHARBONEAU
v.
TERRY BOX, ET AL.

          NOWAK JUDGE

          MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          AMOS L. MAZZANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Came on for consideration the reports of the United States Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter having been heretofore referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. On February 5, 2016, the report of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #42) was entered containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations that Defendant the SPCA of Texas's (“the SPCA”) 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (“SPCA Motion to Dismiss”) (Dkt. #39) be granted. On February 16, 2017, the report of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #54) was entered containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations that (1) Defendants Collin County Sheriff's Department's, Danny Davis's, Russell Driver's, Misty Brown's, James Kirk's, and Chris Ware's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Collin County Motion to Dismiss”) (Dkt. #41) be granted; (2) Plaintiff's First Motion to Quash and Motion for Emergency Protective Order (“Motion to Quash”) (Dkt. #52) be denied; and (3) all other named, but unserved, Defendants be dismissed. Having received the reports and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #42; Dkt. #54), having considered each of Plaintiff's objections (Dkts. #45-46; Dkts. #59-60), and having conducted a de novo review, the Court is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and adopts the Magistrate Judge's reports (Dkt. #42; Dkt. #54) as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

         BACKGROUND

         I. Introduction

         Plaintiff Janine Charboneau filed this suit on November 18, 2013, asserting myriad constitutional and statutory claims against numerous persons and entities allegedly involved in events related to Plaintiff's animal cruelty conviction (Dkt. #1; Dkt. #38 (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint)). The Court substantially adopts the Magistrate Judge's findings of fact herein.[1] Given the number of named Defendants and Plaintiff's diffuse allegations, the Court has attempted to identify at the outset certain groups of Defendants against whom Plaintiff raises the same or similar claims and who are discussed herein.

         II. Plaintiff's Allegations

         A. Collin County and the Individual County Defendants

         Plaintiff alleges various persons and entities associated with or employed by Collin County were involved in the events giving rise to her claims here. Plaintiff identifies Collin County Animal Control Officers Danny Davis (“Davis”) and Misty Brown (“Brown”), as well as Collin County Sheriff Terry Box (“Box”), Collin County Sheriff's Department, Collin County Animal Control Services, and the City of Lucas specifically in her factual allegations. Plaintiff also names the following Defendants but fails to allege their involvement in any of these events: Russell Driver, James Kirk, Chris Ware, Nathan Holton, Matt Shaheen, Chris Hill, Duncan Webb, Cheryl Williams, Sarah Fox, and Brandon Wannacott. Defendants Davis, Driver, Brown, Kirk, and Ware make clear through their Motion to Dismiss that Holton, Shaheen, Hill, Webb, Williams, Fox, and Wannacott each are (or were) employed by or representative of Collin County. Accordingly, the Court hereinafter and collectively refers to Holton, Shaheen, Hill, Webb, Williams, Fox, Wannacott, Davis, Driver, Brown, Kirk, and Ware as the “Individual County Defendants.” Plaintiff alleges that, in November 2011, Davis received an anonymous phone call about potential animal cruelty involving horses at 2120 Estates Parkway, Lucas, Texas (the “Property”)-Plaintiff's mother's home (Dkt. #38). Plaintiff asserts Davis visited the Property and later in the day caused Collin County, Collin County Animal Services, and certain Collin County enforcement officials to seize a number of dogs from the Property (Dkt. #38 at 15-17). Plaintiff alleges Collin County Sheriff's Department and certain of its representatives took part in this seizure.[2]

         B. The Church Defendants

         The next day, Plaintiff claims Jim Kaya (“Kaya”) and Cheryl Reeves (“Reeves”), members of the Church of Latter-Day Saints (the “Church”) came to the Property, presumably with a Collin County Animal Control officer (Dkt. #38 at 18-19, 38). Certain unidentified individuals then seized Plaintiff's horses on behalf of Collin County (Dkt. #38 at 18-19). Plaintiff alleges that Collin County officials and certain members of the Church entered the Property the same day and removed and/or moved her personal property from or around the Property, which Plaintiff allowed, purportedly under threat of condemnation (Dkt. #38 at 20). Plaintiff also claims that Pamela Paxton (“Paxton”), a member of the Church, drove her to Collin County Animal Services to sign a “release” with Brown and that Paxton encouraged Plaintiff to sign it (Dkt. #38 at 20).

         Regarding other persons and entities associated with the Church, Plaintiff further alleges Bishop Scott Graham (“Graham”) and other members of the Church conspired with Affordable Dumpster Company (“Affordable”) to conduct the collection and disposal of large amounts of Plaintiff's personal property from the Property (Dkt. #38 at 27-33). Throughout the Amended Complaint Plaintiff refers to these and other related Defendants as “the [M]ormons, ” whom she alleges associated themselves with this conspiracy to deprive her of her animals and personal property (e.g., Dkt. #38 at 27-29). Plaintiff also has identified Craig Paxton, Ron Haas, and Janice Haas as Defendants here, but does not ever detail these persons' involvement with the alleged scheme in the Amended Complaint. For ease of reference, the Court hereinafter and collectively refers to Kaya, Paxton, Graham, Reeves, Craig Paxton, Ron Haas, Janice Haas, the Church, and Affordable as the “Church Defendants.”

         C. Animal Rescue Defendants

         Following the alleged seizure, Plaintiff asserts, various animal rescue entities and associated persons sold the dogs “without clear title” and without compensation (Dkt. #38 at 21-22). Plaintiff identifies Defendants Sheree's Dog Rescue, Lynda Van Asveld, Texas Sporting Dog Rescue, Inc., Mazie's Mission, and Erin Shults in reference to these allegations. Alongside Defendants T.S. Cannon (and the Cannon Veterinary Clinic), whom Plaintiff alleges improperly treated one of her dogs (Dkt. #38 at 36-37), the Court hereinafter and collectively refers to these Defendants as the “Animal Rescue Defendants.”

         III. Conviction and Procedural History

         Subsequently, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with cruelty to non-livestock animals (Dkt. #38 at 18). See Charboneau v. State, No. 05-13-340-CR, 2014 WL 7476392, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.).[3] Following a trial, Plaintiff was convicted and a jury assessed punishment at 365 days' confinement and a $2, 000 fine. Charboneau, 2014 WL 7476392, at *2. The jury recommended that the sentence be suspended, and the trial court placed Plaintiff on community supervision for twenty-four months, assessed ten days' confinement in jail, and, among other conditions, ordered that Plaintiff could not thereafter “possess any animals” (Dkt. #41, Exhibit 1).[4] Plaintiff appealed and the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Dallas, Texas, affirmed her conviction. Charboneau, 2014 WL 7476392, at *2. Plaintiff appealed her conviction no further and, as a result, the Fifth District Court of Appeals issued its Mandate on March 11, 2015.

         Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed the instant action on November 18, 2013, prior to the Fifth District Court of Appeals' affirmance of her conviction, asserting causes of action for (1) violations of her Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conspiracy to interfere with her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (3) abuse of process; (4) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and/or the Americans with Disabilities Act's amended counterpart (collectively, “ADAA”); and (5) conversion against approximately fifty-seven (57) Defendants (Dkt. #1; Dkt. #38). On January 7, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but ordered that issuance of service to Defendants be determined at a later date (Dkt. #6). The Court stayed the case pending the outcome of Plaintiff's then-pending state court appeal of her conviction (Dkt. #7). During the pendency of the stay, and on April 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed an identical, second lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division, asserting the same factual allegations and causes of action against the same defendants. See Dkt. #1 in Eastern District of Texas Case No. 4:14-cv-385. That case was later consolidated with the instant litigation and also stayed (Dkt. #21). On April 17, 2015, certain Defendants filed a Motion to Lift Stay and Notice of Finality of Criminal Conviction of the Plaintiff, notifying the Court that Plaintiff's conviction was final as of March 11, 2015 (Dkt. #35). Accordingly, on April 24, 2015, the Court lifted the stay and ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint (Dkt. #37). On May 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which is the live pleading in this action (Dkt. #38).

         On June 16, 2015, the SPCA filed the SPCA Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #39). Defendants Collin County Sheriff's Department, Davis, Driver, Brown, Kirk, and Ware filed the Collin County Motion to Dismiss on January 18, 2016 (Dkt. #41). The Magistrate Judge entered a report and recommendation on February 5, 2016, recommending the SPCA Motion to Dismiss be granted (Dkt. #42). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Dkt. #43) on February 18, 2016, which the Court construes as a response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Also on February 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed her objections to the February 5, 2016 report and recommendation (Dkt. #45). On February 29, 2016, Defendants Collin County Sheriff's Department, Davis, Driver, Brown, Kirk, and Ware filed a Reply (Dkt. #47). Plaintiff filed a Surreply (Dkt. #50) and the Motion to Quash (Dkt. #52) on March 22, 2016. The Magistrate Judge entered a report and recommendation on February 16, 2017, recommending the Collin County Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #41) be granted, Plaintiff's Motion to Quash (Dkt. #52) be denied, and all other named but unserved Defendants be dismissed (Dkt. #54). Plaintiff filed her objections to the February 16, 2017 report and recommendation on March 17, 2017 (Dkt. #59).

         The Court notes certain Defendants and/or groups of Defendants have been served, while others have not. Specifically, Davis, Driver, Kirk, Brown, and Ware are each Individual County Defendants who have been served. Collin County Sheriff's Department, a Collin County entity, has been served. The SPCA also has been served. No other Defendant has been served. In particular, Holton, Box, Shaheen, Hill, Webb, Williams, Fox, and Wannacott are each Individual County Defendants who have not been served. Neither Collin County nor Collin County Animal Services has been served. None of the Animal Rescue Defendants nor the Church Defendants have been served. And the State of Texas has not been served. Because the Court finds Plaintiff's claims against each and every Defendant fail under the exacting standard applied when screening an in forma pauperis complaint for frivolousness, the Court will proceed herein to examine Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants under this standard. See, e.g., DeMarsh v. City of Denton, No. 4:16-cv-89, 2016 WL 5402946 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5369493 (Sept. 26, 2016) (determining pro se plaintiff's claims should be dismissed under Section 1915 standard for frivolousness notwithstanding that defendant also had filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).[5]

         PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS

         A party who files timely written objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation is entitled to a de novo review of those findings or recommendations to which the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2)-(3). As a threshold matter, the Court notes no party specifically objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings that Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), abuse of process, and conversion claims should be dismissed (see Dkt. #54 at 26-30). Neither do any of the Parties object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Plaintiff's Motion to Quash (Dkt. #52) should be denied (see Dkt. #54 at 30).[6] In light of the Parties' failure to object to these findings, and after de novo review of the record, the Court holds these findings are correct. The Court now turns to Plaintiff's objections, which the Court discerns are as follows: (1) the Magistrate Judge lacks authority to hear and consider Plaintiff's claims because all Parties have not consented to such (Dkt. #45 at 1, 6; Dkt. #46; Dkt. #59 at 6-12, 35); (2) the Magistrate Judge improperly relies upon Charboneau, 2014 WL 7476392, in the February 5, 2016 report and recommendation; (3) the Magistrate Judge improperly finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim against (a) the Church Defendants, (b) Collin County and the City of Lucas, and (c) the SPCA such that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) is appropriate against those Defendants (Dkts. #45-46; Dkt. #59 at 14-18, 22-23, 36); (4) the Magistrate Judge improperly finds the Individual County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (Dkt. #59 at 17, 19-38); (5) the Magistrate Judge improperly finds Plaintiff fails to state an ADAA claim against any Defendant; (6) the Magistrate Judge erroneously concludes Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Plaintiff's claims that Collin County took without compensation Plaintiff's horses and personal property (Dkt. #59 at 41); (7) the Magistrate Judge improperly considers the SPCA's Motion to Dismiss because the SPCA has no attorney of record and/or because the SPCA has not been served in this case (Dkts. #45-46); and (8) the Magistrate Judge erroneously characterizes certain of Plaintiff's alleged facts (Dkt. #45 at 10-11; Dkt. #46 at 7; Dkt. #59 at 5, 7-8, 41-42). Plaintiff also raises new claims and/or arguments in her objections, namely (a) the Collin County Motion to Dismiss and the SPCA Motion to Dismiss were untimely filed and, accordingly, Plaintiff should receive default judgment against all Collin County Defendants, [7] (b) the Collin County Defendants consented to suit when they sought to transfer and/or consolidate Plaintiff's second-filed action in the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division, with the present case, and (c) the Magistrate Judge should be recused or disqualified for demonstrating bias against Plaintiff (Dkt. #59 at 5-7, 9-10, 32). The Court considers the objections in turn.

         Objection 1: Use of Magistrate Judge

         Plaintiff objects to the Court's use of the Magistrate Judge in this case, asserting she has given no permission “for the Magistrate to sign and order or even handle any part of this case” (Dkt. #59 at 35; see also Dkts. #45-46). The SPCA, for its part, argues federal law permits the Court to refer matters to a magistrate judge for consideration and recommendations, and that the Court makes the ultimate determination on any such dispositive matters (Dkt. #49).

         The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, permits “a [full Article III] judge [to] designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except [certain dispositive motions]” and further “permits a judge [to] designate a magistrate judge to . . . submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any [of those excepted] motion[s] . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). The Court's Local Rules also provide district judges wide latitude in referring matters and motions for a magistrate judge's review. E.D. Tex. Local Rule CV-72(d). A magistrate judge may, therefore, recommend disposition of a motion to dismiss to the district judge, who will then conduct a de novo review of those portions of the recommendation to which parties raise specific, timely objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly recognized the statutory authority to designate a magistrate judge for such purpose and has clearly upheld the requirement to file such timely, specific objections. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

         Here, the Magistrate Judge made recommendations as to the SPCA Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #42), the Collin County Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Motion to Quash, and all other named Defendants (Dkt. #54). The Magistrate Judge acted within the bounds of statutory authority in issuing such reports and recommendations, Douglass, 700 F.3d at 1417, and the Court now properly reviews those portions of the Magistrate Judge's reports and recommendations to which Plaintiff raises specific, timely objections. The Court overrules this objection.

         Objection 2: Magistrate Judge's Reliance on Charboneau v. State

         Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's reliance in the February 5, 2016 report and recommendation (Dkt. #42) on the facts as reported in Charboneau v. State, a state court appellate opinion relating to Plaintiff's animal cruelty conviction (Dkts. #45-46). See also Charboneau, No. No. 05-13-340-CR, 2014 WL 7476392, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.). Plaintiff asserts reliance on another legal opinion's recitation of facts violates the rule against hearsay.

         Here, the Magistrate Judge found in an order made within the February 16, 2017 report and recommendation that a court's reliance on another legal opinion to establish facts (other than the fact that the proceeding underlying that opinion occurred) would generally violate the rule against hearsay (see Dkt. #54 at 10-11). The Magistrate Judge accordingly “decline[d] to take notice of the discrete facts articulated in the Fifth District Court of Appeal's (“Fifth Court”) Charboneau opinion, but [did] take notice of the fact of the [existence of the] judgment, conviction, and underlying proceedings” in that case (Dkt. #54 at 11-12). Indeed, in the February 16, 2017 report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge relies upon the Fifth Court's opinion only to show “such proceedings occurred and to provide procedural background[, ]” as well as to explain that the resulting sentence from the underlying criminal proceedings related wholly to her conviction for cruelty to non-livestock animals (Dkt. #54 at 2 n.1, 3 & n.5). The Magistrate Judge also refers to the Fifth Court's opinion in the February 5, 2016 report and recommendation, but again only to establish that Plaintiff had been convicted on (non-livestock) animal cruelty charges and to describe the punishment Plaintiff received incident to that conviction (Dkt. #42 at 1-2).

         The Court finds no improper reliance by the Magistrate Judge upon review of the record. Moreover, such reliance is appropriate, as neither the procedural history of the case nor the sentence imposed are disputed. See Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1998) (A court may take notice of another court's judgment “for the limited purpose of taking as true the action of the [other] court in entering judgment . . . .”); Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 362 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (granting motion to take judicial notice “of public court records and information . . . not in dispute”). The Court overrules Plaintiff's objection.

         Objection 3: Failure to State a Claim Findings

         Plaintiff also variously objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the Church Defendants, Collin County and the City of Lucas, and the SPCA (Dkts. #45-46; Dkt. #59). Because the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants be dismissed either under Rule 12(b)(6)-where the Defendant has moved for dismissal-or under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (“Section 1915”)-where the Defendant has not-the Court begins by outlining the standards governing Rule 12(b)(6) and Section 1915 dismissals.

         A party may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint where the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12. Further, Rule 8 requires that each claim in a complaint include “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The claims must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts contained in a plaintiff's complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-nonmovant. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Taken as true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[, ]” in order for the plaintiff to survive the motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that, under Twombly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 603 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “It follows [that], ‘where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “shown”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”'” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court established a two-step approach in Iqbal for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the 12(b)(6) context. First, the Court identifies conclusory allegations and proceeds to disregard them, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary claims or elements.” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App'x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009). This evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a district court may generally not “go outside the complaint.” Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).

         Relatedly, district courts have authority under Section 1915 to dismiss a complaint sua sponte where the complaint, inter alia, “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[] . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997); Kenechukwu v. Holder, No. 9:15-CV-62, 2016 WL 3961714, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. June 10, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3926576 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 2016). A court may dismiss a complaint under this standard “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Siglar, 112 F.3d at 193; see Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining the distinction between factual and legal frivolousness in in forma pauperis complaints). Although courts construe pro se filings liberally in this context, see, e.g., Flanagan v. LaGrone, No. 9:16-CV-59-MHS, 2016 WL 4163557, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4140751 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2016), dismissal is appropriate where the claims have no chance of success, cf. Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting dismissal of claims with “some chance” of success is inappropriate at screening stage but affirming dismissal where pro se plaintiff's claim “[was] based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory”). And though the Section 1915 standard demands more than the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in certain circumstances, see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989), where “the plaintiff is not entitled to relief” on the claims presented, the standards largely are the same, Kenechukwu, 2016 WL 3961714, at *1-2 (citing Newsome v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). See also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328 (“To the extent that a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915[(e)] both counsel dismissal.”). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss the Church Defendants, Collin County, the City of Lucas, and certain of the Individual County Defendants under Section 1915, as the Court withheld service to those Defendants in order to ...


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