from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas
BARKSDALE, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge
Guzman-Reyes appeals his sentence for possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine and illegal reentry into the
United States. Specifically, Guzman challenges the district
court's assessment of the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)
enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of
drug distribution, as well as the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement
for Guzman's aggravating role in the offense. We affirm.
August 2015, the Fort Worth Police Department received
information from a confidential source that Guzman planned to
deliver a large quantity of methamphetamine to a location in
Arlington, Texas. Officers located Guzman's car and began
surveillance, following him to an auto shop. Police observed
Guzman exiting his car and making a phone call. Shortly
thereafter, a second person-later identified as John
Campbell-arrived at the shop. Campbell greeted Guzman and
unlocked the front door of the shop. The two then entered the
building together. Guzman soon left the shop with a large
bag, which he placed in his car, and then drove away. After
officers initiated a traffic stop, a search of Guzman and his
car revealed $3, 600 in cash, several cellphones, a pistol,
and multiple bags containing approximately 2, 035.7 grams of
methamphetamine. The officers learned that Guzman was from
Mexico and that he had entered the United States illegally
after a 2012 deportation, which itself followed convictions
for illegal reentry and possession of a controlled substance.
later returned to the auto shop to question Campbell, who
stated that he was the owner of the shop and admitted that
methamphetamine and firearms were stored inside. Campbell
directed officers to the bottom desk drawer in his office,
where they found a Tupperware container holding approximately
547.15 grams of methamphetamine. Officers located an
additional 70.87 grams of methamphetamine in a second
Tupperware container on a shelf above the desk. Officers also
discovered eleven firearms in the shop, three of which had
been reported stolen, and a large supply of ammunition.
Campbell admitted that he stored methamphetamine for Guzman
at the shop over the span of three months in exchange for
about one ounce of methamphetamine per month, a value of
approximately $1, 000. According to Campbell, Guzman did not
have keys to the shop, but contacted Campbell whenever he
November 2015, Guzman pleaded guilty, without a plea
agreement, to one count of possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and one count of illegal reentry
into the United States. For his methamphetamine conviction,
the Pre-sentence Report (PSR) applied a two-level enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises
for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine and a
two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) for Guzman's
aggravating role in the offense. Guzman objected to both
enhancements. The district court overruled both objections
and sentenced Guzman to a total of 360 months of
imprisonment, based on consecutive imprisonment terms of 240
months on the methamphetamine conviction and 120 months on
the illegal-reentry conviction, the statutory maximums for
each offense. The district court also imposed three years of
supervised release. Guzman now appeals the district
court's application of the two sentencing enhancements.
first argues that the district court erred in applying the
§ 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement for maintaining a premises
for drug distribution. "A district court's
application of § 2D1.1(b)(12) is a factual finding
reviewed for clear error." United States v.
Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 744 (5th Cir. 2015). Thus, the
question before us is whether the district court's
determination "is plausible in light of the record read
as a whole." See United States v. Villanueva,
408 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2005).
2D1.1(b)(12) provides a two-level enhancement of a
defendant's offense level if the defendant
"knowingly maintains a premises (i.e., a building, room,
or enclosure) for the purpose of manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance, including
storage of a controlled substance for the purpose of
distribution." § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17 (emphasis added).
"Manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance
need not be the sole purpose for which the premises was
maintained, but must be one of the defendant's primary or
principal uses for the premises, rather than one of the
defendant's incidental or collateral uses for the
used the auto shop for "storage of a controlled
substance for the purpose of distribution" and that
purpose was his "primary or principal use for the
premises." Guzman insists, however, that he did not
"maintain" the premises within the meaning of
§ 2D1.1(b)(12). Although the term "maintains"
is not expressly defined in the Guideline, the application
note for § 2D1.1(b)(12) explains that "[a]mong the
factors the court should consider in determining whether the
defendant 'maintained' the premises are (A) whether
the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or
rented) the premises and (B) the extent to which the
defendant controlled access to, or activities at, the
premises." § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17.
further interpretive guidance of the term "maintain,
" many of our sister circuits have drawn on parallel
caselaw examining a similar statutory provision, 21 U.S.C.
§ 856 (commonly known as the "stash house"
statute), which makes it unlawful to "knowingly . . .
maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily, for
the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any
controlled substance[.]" See, e.g., United
States v. Carter, 834 F.3d 259, 261-63 (3d Cir. 2016);
United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 531-
32 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Johnson, 737
F.3d 444, 446-47 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 705-06 (8th Cir. 2012). This
approach makes good sense, because § 2D1.1(b)(12) was
based in large part on § 856.
§ 856 context, we have explained that "whether a
defendant has 'maintained' a place is necessarily a
fact-intensive issue that must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis." United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849,
857 (5th Cir. 1997). Similar to interpreting § 2D1.1, we
"typically consider whether a defendant (1) has an
ownership or leasehold interest in the premises, (2) was in
charge of the premises, or (3) exercised 'supervisory
control' over the premises." United States v.
Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing
United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 346 (5th
Cir. 1997)). These factors are not necessarily determinative
alone, but should be considered together. See United
States v. Chagoya, 510 F.App'x 327, 328 (5th Cir.
2013). We have also suggested that "not just any showing
of dominion and control will suffice to support a maintenance
finding" under § 856. Morgan, 117 F.3d at
856. Instead, the evidence should support "that the