Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin
COUNTY COURT AT LAW NUMBER ONE OF HAYS COUNTY NO. 14-0783-C,
HONORABLE ROBERT UPDEGROVE, JUDGE PRESIDING
Chief Justice Rose, and Justices Pemberton and Bourland.
appeal challenges a final summary judgment in a
landlord-tenant dispute centering on the condition of carpet
in the premises. Before we can reach those issues, however,
we must confront some limitations deriving from the
appeal's procedural posture, beginning with the text of
the judgment itself-it explicitly grants a
"Defendants' Motion for No-Evidence Summary
Judgment" that had already been superseded by
appellees' filing of a "Defendants' First
Amended Motion for No-Evidence Summary Judgment and
Defendants' Motion for Traditional Summary
Judgment." In similar circumstances, at least two of
our sister courts have reversed summary judgments as having
been erroneously founded on a superseded or "dead"
motion. And while the rule of Cates would
arguably enable us potentially to consider the
summary-judgment grounds appellees presented in their amended
and combined motion as alternative support for the final
judgment,  appellees have not preserved their
traditional summary-judgment grounds on appeal, but professed
to rely solely on the no-evidence grounds presented in their
amended motion. More critically, at least some of these
"no-evidence" grounds (if even they can properly be
considered that) reflect inversions of the summary-judgment
review standard or are otherwise plainly
unavailing. Under these circumstances, the no-evidence
grounds would not be dispositive of the appeal, and
addressing them now would do more to hinder than advance
judicial economy and the ultimate resolution of this
presented to us, we reverse the trial court's final
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
 Tex.R.Civ.P. 65 (upon substitution of
amended pleading for earlier version, latter "shall no
longer be regarded as part of the pleading in the record of
the cause"); see, e.g., KSWO Television Co.
v. KDFA Operating Co., 442 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2014, no pet.) ("[A]n amended motion for
summary judgment supersedes and supplants the previous
motion, which may no longer be considered." (citations
omitted)); Retzlaff v. Texas Dep't of Crim.
Justice, 135 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (op. on reh'g) ("[A]n amended
motion for summary judgment completely supersedes an original
motion for summary judgment and becomes the controlling
[motion]."); see also King v. Regions Bank, No.
02-15-00201-CV, 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 4791, at *6 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth May 5, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("It is
clear that an amended motion for summary judgment completely
supersedes any prior motion for summary judgment and becomes
the controlling motion." (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 65;
Retzlaff, 135 S.W.3d at 737)).
 See King, 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS
4791, at *5-8; Santos v. Holzman, No.
13-08-00043-CV, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 1172, at *6-8 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem.
 See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v.
Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Tex. 1996) (holding that
in appeal from final summary judgment disposing of all of
non-movant's claims, appellate courts "should
consider all summary judgment grounds the trial court rules
on and the movant preserves for appellate review that are
necessary for final disposition of the appeal, " and
"may consider other grounds that the movant preserved
for review and trial court did not rule on in the interest of
judicial economy"); see also Baker Hughes, Inc. v.
Keco R&D, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Tex. 1999)
(explaining that Cates rule "does not depend on
the number of motions filed, when they were presented to the
trial court, or when the trial court ruled").
 Cf. Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626
("appellate court may consider other grounds that
the movant preserved for review . . .") (emphasis
 E.g., appellees'
arguments regarding the condition of the carpet at the
conclusion of the lease, as it bears upon Larivee's claim
for bad-faith withholding of his security deposit.
"no-evidence" ground challenging Larivee's
proof of any failure to disclose owner information as
required by Section 92.201 of the Property Code, which hinges
on the legal assertion that appellees needed only provide the
contact information for the property-management company.
But cf. Tex. Prop. Code § 92.201(a) ("A
landlord shall disclose to a tenant" name and street
address of both property-management company, if there is ...