Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO.
LIVINGSTON, C.J.; KERR and PITTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
ELIZABETH KERR JUSTICE
an appeal from a juvenile court's order committing
Appellant J.B., Jr. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department
after he violated the terms of his probation. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05 (West Supp. 2016). J.B.,
Jr.'s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a
motion to withdraw and a brief in support of that motion.
Counsel states that he has reviewed the record and believes
the appeal is frivolous. Counsel's brief and motion meet
the requirements of Anders v. California by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief.
See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967); see also
In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that Anders procedures apply to
juvenile appeals). J.B., Jr.'s appellate counsel notified
J.B., Jr., by mailing him a letter in care of his mother,
that he had the right to file a pro se response to
counsel's Anders brief. We also notified J.B.,
Jr. and his mother of J.B., Jr.'s right to file a
response to counsel's Anders brief. J.B., Jr.
has not filed a response. The State submitted a letter
stating that it would not be filing a brief.
appellant's court-appointed attorney files a motion to
withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and
fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is
obligated to independently examine the record. See
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). When analyzing whether any
grounds for appeal exist, we consider the record, the
Anders brief, and any pro se response. In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(orig. proceeding). Only then may we grant counsel's
motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
82-83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
carefully reviewed counsel's brief and the appellate
record, and we have discovered a clerical error in the
commitment order. The order states that J.B., Jr. was born on
the "2ND day of November, 1901, " but the record
reflects that he was born in 2001. Accordingly, we reform the
commitment order to reflect that J.B., Jr. was born on the
"2ND day of November, 2001." See Bray v.
State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005,
no pet.) (en banc) (holding that appellate courts have
authority to reform judgments in Anders appeals and
to affirm judgments as reformed); see also Ferguson v.
State, 435 S.W.3d 291, 293-94 (Tex. App.-Waco 2014, pet.
struck) (collecting cases holding same). We otherwise agree
with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without
merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might
support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d
824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.B., No.
02-11-00097-CV, 2012 WL 1868518, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court's order as modified.
upon finding that the appeal is frivolous, we would grant
counsel's motion to withdraw. But in In re P.M.,
a termination of parental rights appeal, our supreme court
held--in reliance on family code section 107.013 providing
that appointed counsel continues to serve in that capacity
until the date all appeals are exhausted or waived--that the
mere filing of an Anders brief in the court of
appeals does not warrant the withdrawal of that counsel for
purposes of proceeding in the supreme court. No. 15-0171,
2016 WL 1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (order). The
Juvenile Justice Code contains a similar provision: when, as
in this case, the trial court finds a child's family
indigent and appoints counsel, that counsel must continue to
represent the child "until the case is
terminated, the family retains an attorney, or a new
attorney is appointed by the juvenile court." Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 51.101 (West Supp. 2016) (emphasis added).
The record does not show that either of the latter two events
have occurred here, and under the reasoning of In re
P.M., this case has not "terminated" because
not all appeals have been exhausted. See 2016 WL
1274748, at *2 & n.5, *3. Accordingly, even though we
have affirmed the trial court's order as modified, we
nevertheless deny counsel's motion to withdraw. See
id. at *3; In re A.C., Nos. 01-15-00931-CV,
01-15-00932-CV, 01-15-00933-CV, 2016 WL 1658777, at *1 (Tex.
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citing P.M. in denying counsel's motion to
withdraw in frivolous juvenile appeal).
See Tex. R. App. P.