Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court Dallas County,
Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-09665-I.
Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Evans
appellant Sulma Gonzales raises three issues in this appeal
of a post-judgment turnover order. Specifically, she challenges
the trial court's dismissal of her underlying lawsuit
alleging an unequal tax assessment, complains about the trial
court's imposition of attorney's fees against her in
the underlying suit, and contends the trial court improperly
signed findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by
the opposing counsel in both the underlying suit and with
respect to the turnover order. We affirm the trial
court's turnover order.
matter arises out of a lawsuit Gonzales filed against The
Dallas County Appraisal District, the Appraisal Review Board,
and Lyons Equities, Inc. alleging her property was unequally
taxed as compared to the taxation of property owned by Lyons.
After hearings on the District's and Board's pleas to
the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss filed by Lyons under
rule of civil procedure 91a, the trial court dismissed
Gonzales's lawsuit. The trial court concluded it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear her claims concerning the
tax code because she did not own the property in question.
The trial court also awarded Lyons attorney's fees under
rule 91a(7) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Gonzales
appealed the trial court's dismissal and Lyons's
award of attorney's fees to this Court. We affirmed the
trial court's judgment. Gonzales v. The Dallas Cty.
Appraisal Dist., No. 05-13-01658-CV, 2015 WL 3866530
(Tex. App.-Dallas June 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Among
other things, we noted the record revealed that Gonzales
lacked standing to bring the lawsuit because she had sold the
land in question to Lenola Corporation in 2009. Id.
at *3. We concluded that even in light of Gonzales's
statement that she owned 100% of Lenola's verified stock,
she did not own land after she sold it to Lenola because the
corporation was a separate legal entity from Gonzales.
Id. We further concluded that the trial court did
not err by granting Lyons's motion to dismiss under rule
91a and awarding attorney's fees under that rule.
Id. at *5-*6. Our mandate in the appeal issued on
September 2, 2015.
September 23, 2015, Lyons filed a motion for turnover order
asserting the judgment for attorney's fees of $3, 821.15
was now final and due. Lyons requested the trial court to
order Gonzales to turn over all of her stock certificates for
Lenola alleging Gonzales admitted that she was the sole owner
of Lenola stock and the property cannot be readily attached
or levied on by ordinary legal process. The trial court
signed an order granting turnover relief on November 30,
2015. Gonzales then filed this appeal.
review the trial court's ruling on a request for a
turnover order under an abuse of discretion standard. See
HSM Dev. Inc. v. Barclay Props., Ltd., 392 S.W.3d 749,
751 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.). A trial court abuses
its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary
manner or without reference to any guiding rules or
first and second issues, Gonzales attacks the trial
court's underlying judgment dismissing her claims and
awarding Lyons attorney's fees. We have already addressed
the merits of the arguments under these issues in
Gonzales's direct appeal of the underlying judgment.
See Gonzales, 2015 WL 3866530 *3-*6. Our opinion and
judgment from the prior appeal affirming the trial
court's underlying judgment are now final and we lack
jurisdiction to revisit these issues in this appeal.
See Tex. R. App. P. 19.1 (our plenary power expires
sixty days after date of our judgment absent timely motion
for rehearing or en banc reconsideration). Moreover,
Gonzales's attempt to assail the merits of the trial
court's underlying final judgment in this appeal from a
turnover order constitutes an improper collateral attack.
See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.
2005) (defining collateral attack). Only void judgments are
subject to collateral attack. Id. A judgment is void
only if the trial court rendering a judgment lacks
jurisdiction over the parties or property, lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter, has no jurisdiction to enter the
specific judgment, or has no capacity to act. Id.
Although Gonzales asserts the trial court erred in rendering
the underlying judgment, she has not demonstrated the
judgment is void. Accordingly, we dismiss appellant's
first and second issues for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
third issue, Gonzales complains the trial court improperly
signed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
proposed judgment submitted by opposing counsel without
providing Gonzales the opportunity "to object to the
text." In order to present an issue for our
review, an appellant's brief must contain a clear and
concise argument for the contentions made with appropriate
citations to authorities and the record. Tex.R.App.P.
38.1(i). We have no right or obligation to search through the
record and conduct legal research to find facts and law
supporting an appellant's contentions because such
actions would transform this Court from a neutral tribunal to
a party advocate. See Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep.
Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010,
asserts the trial court erred in signing proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and the turnover order without
giving her an opportunity to object to the text, but provides
no discussion or any legal authority to support her
contention of error. Moreover, she has failed to explain how
these asserted errors probably caused the rendition of an
improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1.
Accordingly, Gonzales's third issue is inadequately
briefed and presents nothing for our review. See
Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 895-96.
affirm the trial court's November 30, ...