United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Texarkana Division
MEMORANDUM ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GILSCRAP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Murray, an inmate confined within the Bureau of Prisons,
proceeding pro se, filed the above-styled petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Court referred this matter to the Honorable Caroline M.
Craven, United States Magistrate Judge, at Texarkana, Texas,
for consideration pursuant to applicable orders of this
court. The Magistrate Judge has submitted a Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge concerning
this case. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the petition
for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed.
Court has received and considered the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge, along with
the records, pleadings and all available evidence. Petitioner
filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. The Court
must therefore conduct a de novo review of the
objections in relation to the pleadings and the applicable
being convicted of possessing methamphetamine with the intent
to distribute, petitioner was found to be a career offender
for the purposes of § 4B1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. He asserts that based on recent
decisions from the Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, he should no longer be
considered a career offender. However, the Magistrate Judge
concluded that as petitioner is contesting the sentence he
received for his conviction, rather than his conviction
itself, his ground for review is not cognizable in a petition
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
has asserted three objections to the Report and
Recommendation. First, petitioner objects to the Magistrate
Judge's statement that a challenge to the validity of a
career offender enhancement is not the type of claim that
warrants relief under § 2241 because it challenges the
punishment imposed for the conviction, rather than the
conviction itself. He asserts this statement obscures the
true scope of the miscarriage of justice he has suffered. He
states he is not merely asserting that the Guidelines were
misapplied in his case. Instead, he contends his sentence was
based on a miscarriage of justice and deprivation of due
process which rises to the “equivalent of a nonexistent
offense” and that the authorities relied upon by the
Magistrate Judge do not reflect the evolving body of doctrine
addressing the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In
his second objection, petitioner states that for the reasons
set forth in his first objection the Magistrate Judge
mistakenly concluded that the remedy provided for in §
2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to challenge the
legality of his detention. In his third objection, petitioner
contends that for the reasons set forth in his first
objection, the Magistrate Judge erroneously recommended his
petition be dismissed.
prisoner may only utilize § 2241 to challenge a federal
criminal conviction if the remedy provided for in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 is ineffective or inadequate to test the legality
of his detention. The remedy provided for in § 2255 has
been found to be ineffective to challenge the legality of a
prisoner's detention only where the prisoner is asserting
a ground for review that: (1) is based on a Supreme Court
decision that applies retroactively on collateral review and
establishes he may have been convicted of a nonexistent
offense and (2) was foreclosed by applicable circuit law at
the time it could have been asserted at trial, on direct
appeal or in a first motion to vacate filed pursuant to
§ 2255. Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243
F.3d 893, 894 (5th Cir. 2001).
Court acknowledges the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has held that § 2241 may be used to
challenge a sentence, as opposed to a conviction, when a
retroactively applicable decision of the Supreme Court
establishes that a defendant has received a sentence that
exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for his offense.
Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1274 (11th Cir.
2013). The Court observes that even if Bryant set
forth the standard applicable to petitioner's case, it
would be of no value to petitioner because he is not
asserting that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum
sentence for his offense.
petitioner's case is governed by the decision of the
Fifth Circuit in Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d . 209
(5th Cir. 2000). In Kinder, the petitioner was
determined to be a career offender under §4B 1.1 of the
Guidelines. He sought relief under § 2241 based on the
argument that as a result of intervening case law, he should
no longer be considered a career offender. However, the Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument, stating that a claim that a
defendant is actually innocent of being a career offender is
not the type of claim that warrants review under § 2241.
222 F.3d at 213.
petitioner is attempting to use § 2241 to challenge the
sentencing court's conclusion that he was a career
offender, Kinder controls the resolution of this
matter. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge's statement
that a challenge to the validity of a career offender
determination is not that type of claim that warrants relief
under § 2241 is correct. Petitioner's first
objection is therefore without merit. For the same reason,
petitioner's second objection is without merit because
the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded petitioner has not
demonstrated § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to
challenge the legality of his detention. Finally,
petitioner's third objection is without merit because
Kinder establishes the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation that his petition be dismissed was correct.
petitioner's objections are OVERRULED. The findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the Magistrate Judge are
correct and the report of the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED. A
final judgment will be ...