United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division
JAMES W. MYART, JR., Plaintiff,
ALAN WARRICK, ET AL., Defendants.
RODRIGUEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
date, the Court considered Defendants Chase Bank and its 10
John and Jane Does' Motion to Dismiss. Docket no. 10.
After careful consideration, the Motion is GRANTED and
Plaintiff James Myart's claims against these defendants
January 26, 2017, pro se Plaintiff James Myart filed
his original petition in the 37th Judicial District Court of
Bexar County. Docket no. 1-1 at 1. The case was removed to
this Court on January 30, 2017. Docket no. 1. Myart's
complaint incorporates allegations that he made in four
lawsuits previously filed in this Court that have since been
dismissed. See Docket no. 1-1 at 2 (referencing Case
Nos. 5:16-CV-455, 5:16-CV-736, 5:16-CV-819, and 5:16-CV-824).
The complaints from these cases allege that Myart was beaten
and assaulted by San Antonio Police Department officers.
Myart brings various causes of action for violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, negligence and negligent supervision
under the Texas Tort Claims Act, assault, and official
oppression. The current complaint contains a shortened
version of these allegations and also mentions other
misconduct by city officials. Id. at 3. The caption
of the current complaint references numerous defendants,
including at least eight named defendants and 70 Doe
defendants. Id. at 1-2.
Chase Bank nor any of its employees were named as defendants
in the prior actions, but Myart's complaint in this
action lists “Chase Bank and its John and Jane Does
10” as defendants. Id. Myart's complaint
alleges that “[a]ll Chase Defendants conspired with
Melton and Monnihan, SAPD officers, to injure and did injure
Plaintiff Myart.” Docket no. 1-1 at 2. Another document
contained in the state court file (titled “FURTHER
STATEMENT OF FACTS AGAINST NEWLY NAMED DEFENDANTS AS ABOVE
STYLED”) states that “Myart was injured at the
Defendant Chase's location haven [sic] been the victim of
racial discrimination and conspiracy between Defendant Police
Officers and Defendant Chase Bank employees.” Docket
no. 1-1 at 109.
April 11, 2017, the Chase Defendants filed a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, arguing that Myart's complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docket no. 10 at 4.
Myart has not responded to the motion, and his deadline to
respond has expired.
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim for relief must contain: (1) “a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction”; (2) “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to the
relief”; and (3) “a demand for the relief
sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). In considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations from the
complaint should be taken as true, and the facts are to be
construed favorably to the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montez v.
Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
only two documents that mention the Chase defendants are
Myart's complaint in this action and the “further
statement of facts against newly named defendants as above
styled.” None of the complaints from the previous
actions, which Myart incorporated into his current complaint,
make allegations against the Chase Defendants. A joint
reading of the documents that mention the Chase Defendants
indicates that, at most, Myart was allegedly assaulted by
police at a Chase Bank location and that Chase employees
somehow conspired with law enforcement to racially
discriminate against and injure Myart. Myart does not
identify a specific cause of action against these defendants.
complaint does not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted as to the Chase Defendants. The complaint barely
mentions them at all, and to the extent that it does, its
allegations are unclear and conclusory. Myart does not
explain what actions of the Chase Defendants constitute a
conspiracy with police, nor does he explain how the Chase
Defendants injured him. He does not provide the Chase
Defendants with fair notice of the claims being brought
against them, and, as noted, he does not tie his vague
allegations to any specific causes of action. In short,
Myart's allegations against the Chase Defendants are akin
to “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation” that the Supreme Court has stated does not
satisfy federal pleading standards. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Accordingly, the Chase Defendants' motion to
dismiss is granted.
Chase Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket no. 10) is
GRANTED. Myart's claims as to these defendants
(“Chase Bank and its John and Jane Does 10”) are
DISMISSED. This case is to remain open pending the resolution
of Myart's claims against all other defendants.