Appeal from the County Court at Law Austin County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2014L-6013
consists of Justices Jennings, Huddle, and Lloyd.
clerk's record filed in this Court reflects that
appellants, Karen McAndrews and John Lowe, are parties to a
suit affecting the parent-child relationship regarding
Lowe's children and McAndrews's grandchildren.
Appellants have filed a notice of appeal, attempting to
appeal a "Rule 11 Agreement, " the trial
court's order for issuance of a writ of attachment, and
the trial court's ruling on a contest to an affidavit of
inability to pay costs. We dismiss the appeal for want of
appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from
final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39
S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). An appellate
court also has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an
interlocutory order if a statute explicitly provides
jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352,
352-53 (Tex. 1998); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 51.014 (West Supp. 2016) (authorizing
appeals from certain interlocutory orders). The clerk's
record does not show that the trial court has signed an
appealable interlocutory order or a final judgment.
the Clerk of this Court notified appellants that the appeal
was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless they
filed a written response showing how this Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.
42.3(a). Appellants responded that "the Rule 11
Agreement, dated 8-27-15[, ]"was not
"'intrinsically interlocutory, '"
"dispos[ed] of all parties legally before [the trial
court] and of all issues made by the pleadings between such
parties, " and "serves as the 'final
rule 11 agreement signed by the parties and filed with a
court is not in itself a court order . . . ."
Schoendienst v. Haug, 399 S.W.3d 313, 320 (Tex.
App.- Austin 2013, no pet.); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 11
("[N]o agreement between attorneys or parties touching
any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing,
signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or
unless it be made in open court and entered of
record."); Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142
S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. 2004) (stating filing agreement with
trial court was "requirement for enforcement" but
was not "request for enforcement or any other
affirmative action by the trial court"). However,
"nothing in the rules of procedure prohibits a Rule 11
agreement" from being a judgment "so long as the
agreement meets the requirements for a final judgment."
In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex.
2014). A judgment is final if it disposes of all claims and
parties before the court or states with unmistakable clarity
that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.
Id. (citations omitted); Aldridge, 400
S.W.2d at 895.
the Rule 11 Agreement does not meet the requirements of a
final judgment. The agreement is signed by appellants,
appellee Jody Lowe, and counsel, and reflects their agreement
regarding, among other things, the children and the trial
court proceedings, including a hearing set for September 24,
2015, and appellee Phyniss Donald Lowe's request
"that his intervention be non-suited." The
agreement includes the trial court's filemark, indicating
that the agreement was filed in the trial court record on
August 25, 2015. However, the agreement is not signed by the
trial court. See S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892
S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995) (citations omitted)
("Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially
announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum
filed with the clerk."); see also In re M.D.G.,
No. 08-16-00004-CV, 2017 WL 382950, at *4 (Tex. App.-El Paso
Jan. 27, 2017, no pet.) ("The signing of a formal order
or judgment is essential to trigger the appellate timetable .
. . ."). And, the agreement does not dispose of the
claims and parties before the trial court or state that it is
a final judgment. See In re Vaishangi, 442 S.W.3d at
260 (holding parties' rule 11 agreement to dismiss all
claims was not final judgment, although signed by trial
court, because agreement contained "no decretal language
typically seen in a judgment (i.e., 'ordered, adjudged,
and decreed').") The Rule 11 Agreement does not
constitute a final judgment, and we have no jurisdiction over
the attempted appeal from the agreement.
notice of appeal also states that they seek to challenge a
June 3, 2015 order for issuance of a writ of attachment to
take McAndrews into custody. This Court has jurisdiction to
consider an appeal from an interlocutory order only if a
statute specifically provides jurisdiction. See
Stary, 967 S.W.2d at 352-53; see also Pina v.
Shaw, No. 01-03-00088-CV, 2004 WL 306096, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 19, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citing Johnson v. Parish, 547 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ)) (stating temporary
orders in suit affecting parent-child relationship are
interlocutory and no statutory provision authorizes appeal of
orders). The order for issuance of the writ of attachment is
not an appealable order. See In re Cantu de
Villarreal, No. 13-08-00408-CV, 2009 WL 888467, at *6
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 2, 2009, orig. proceeding)
appellants' notice of appeal states that they seek to
challenge the trial court's ruling on the court
reporter's contest to McAndrews's affidavit of
inability to pay costs. On November 16, 2015, the court
reporter filed a contest to "the affidavit of inability
to pay costs which alleges that Karen McAndrews is unable to
pay costs in this case filed by Karen McAndrews."
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1, the court
reporter asked the trial court "to set [the] matter for
hearing and take evidence and require Karen McAndrews to
prove her alleged inability by competent evidence other than
by the affidavit." The clerk's record includes the
trial court's docket sheet that indicates that, on
November 24, 2015, the trial court held a hearing and states
"Request for free record-DENIED."
court's "docket-sheet entry ordinarily forms no part
of the record that may be considered; rather, it is a
memorandum made for the trial court and clerk's
convenience." In re Bill Heard Chevrolet, Ltd.,
209 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,
orig. proceeding) (citations omitted). A docket-sheet entry
generally is insufficient to constitute a judgment or order
of the court. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the
docket sheet entry does not constitute a written order of the
court sustaining the court reporter's contest to
McAndrews's affidavit of inability to pay costs.
even were the docket-sheet entry an order sustaining the
contest, appellants did not timely seek appellate review of
the order. Under the rule applicable at the time the court
reporter filed the contest, appellants had to seek review of
any trial court order sustaining the contest "by filing
in the appellate court a motion challenging the order, within
ten days after the order sustaining the contest [was]
signed." Clinkscale v. Corp. Auto Servs., Inc.,
No. 01-15-00938-CV, 2016 WL 1106871, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Tex.R.App.P. 20.1(j)(1), (2), 75 Tex. B.J. 228, 229 (Tex.
2012), amended effective Sept. 1, 2016). Appellants did not
file a motion to contest the ruling in this Court and did not
file their notice of appeal until October 11, 2016, nearly
one year after the trial court's docket-sheet entry.
on the foregoing, we conclude that this Court does not have
jurisdiction over this attempted appeal and dismiss the
appeal for want of ...