United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. BOYLE, United States district judge
the Court is Defendants Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(SPS) and U.S. Bank, N.A.'s (U.S. Bank) Motion to
Dismiss. Doc. 9. For the reasons that follow, the Court
GRANTS Defendants' Motion.
a foreclosure case. In October 2005, Plaintiff purchased
property located at 3328 Silver Creek, Mesquite, Texas
75181(the Property). Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s Orig. Pet. 3; Doc.
10, Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 1
[hereinafter Defs.' Br.]. Plaintiff executed a promissory
note (Note) in the amount of $132, 288.00 in favor of Concord
Mortgage Company. Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s Orig. Pet. 3; Doc. 10,
Defs.' Br. ¶ 2. Plaintiff also executed a Purchase
Money Deed of Trust that encumbered the Property in favor of
Concord Mortgage Company. Id. The Note and Purchase
Money Deed of Trust were later assigned to Defendant U.S.
Bank. Id. And Defendant SPS is the “loan
servicer” on Plaintiff's loan. Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s
Orig. Pet. 3.
was eventually unable to make his mortgage payments due to
financial setbacks. Id. at 4. Plaintiff attempted to
modify his loan in order to reduce the monthly payments, but
he was unsuccessful. Id. In an attempt to avoid
foreclosure, Plaintiff states that he listed the house for
sale with Texas Premier Realtors, owned by Shirley Simmons.
Id. at 4-5. According to Plaintiff, Simmons entered
into negotiations with Defendants to short sale the Property.
Id. at 5. In January 2015, Defendants allegedly
agreed to a short sale, but conditioned their agreement on
Simmons satisfying two liens. Id. Plaintiff states
that Simmons satisfied the two liens immediately.
Id. In August 2015, Defendants released the liens,
and Simmons was therefore free to move forward with closing
on the short sale. Id. When Simmons tried to move
forward on the short sale, though, “the bank”
allegedly cancelled the agreement to the short sale without
any explanation and initiated foreclosure proceedings
11, 2016, Defendants notified Plaintiff that the Property
would be sold at a Successor Trustee's sale on August 2,
2016. Id. After learning about the sale, Plaintiff
filed this action in state court at the end of July 2016.
Doc. 10, Defs.' Br. ¶ 5. Plaintiff asserted claims
for detrimental reliance and violations of the Texas Property
Code. Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s Orig. Pet. 5-7. Plaintiff also
sought a temporary restraining order, declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and damages. Id. at 6-7.
removed the state court action to this Court in August 2016.
Doc. 1, Notice of Removal. Defendants then filed the present
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9). Plaintiff failed to respond.
the Motion is ripe for the Court's review.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes
a court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court accepts all
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid
Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). The court
will “not look beyond the face of the pleadings to
determine whether relief should be granted based on the
alleged facts.” Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d
772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999).
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. When well-pleaded facts fail to achieve this
plausibility standard, “the complaint has alleged-but
it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
Plaintiff's Original Petition, he alleges a
“detrimental reliance” claim. Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s
Orig. Pet. 5. Plaintiff contends that: (1) he and Defendants
entered into an agreement for a short sale of the Property
that was conditioned on the removal of two liens; (2) Plaintiff
relied on this agreement; (3) Simmons arranged for the
liens' removal; (4) Defendants ...