Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Brown.
Cheri Vega, filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to
vacate the respondent trial judge's "Order on Motion
to Compel Payment of Amicus Fees, Awarding Attorney's
Fees and Sanction" and the "Order on Motion to
Disqualify Amicus Attorney, " in the underlying
post-divorce proceeding. This Court's orders had requested a
response to the petition from any real parties in interest.
This Court received responses from Karleana Farias, the
amicus attorney, and Arturo Lira, relator's ex-husband.
to be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must establish
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that
she lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator bears the burden of
proving both of these two requirements. See Walker v.
Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).
may take judicial notice of our own records involving the
same parties and subject matter." Douglas v. Am.
Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 877 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citation omitted). On January 20,
2017, relator filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial
court's "Order on Third Motion to Compel Payment of
Amicus Fees, " signed by the respondent on December 21,
2016, in the same underlying trial court cause number
2008-11473. This order, among other things, granted real
party in interest Farias's motion for $7, 269.10 in
amicus attorney's fees because relator had failed to pay
Farias's amicus fees even after being ordered to so on
several prior occasions, and permitted Farias to be removed
as amicus attorney due to lack of payment. The district clerk
assigned relator's appeal to this Court and the Clerk of
this Court assigned it to appellate cause number
March 1, 2017, the district clerk filed a clerk's record
in this Court under appellate cause number 01-17-00054-CV.
Included in the clerk's record is an "Agreed Order
in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship, " signed on
February 9, 2017. This February 9, 2017 Agreed Order is a
final order because it stated that, among other things,
"IT IS ORDERED that all relief requested in this case
and not expressly granted is denied. All other terms of the
prior orders not specifically modified in this order shall
remain in full force and effect." See, e.g.,
In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex.
2014) ("A judgment is final 'if and only if either
it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before
the court, regardless of its language, or it states with
unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all
claims and all parties.'") (quoting, inter
alia, Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191,
192-93 (Tex. 2001)).
the Agreed Order was signed by the associate judge, it was a
final order because it was an agreed order signed by both
relator and Lira, and they approved and consented to it as to
both form and substance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 201.007(a)(14)(A) (West 2007) ("Except as limited
by an order of referral, an associate judge may: . . . (14)
without prejudice to the right of appeal under Section
201.015, render and sign: (A) a final order agreed to in
writing as to both form and substance by all parties.");
cf. Gerke v. Kantara, 492 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (noting that
"[a]ssociate judges do not have the power to render
final judgment outside the context of certain limited
exceptions listed in section 201.007 of the Family
Code.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
because a final agreed order has issued and relator has filed
a notice of appeal, which remains pending under appellate
cause number 01-17-00054-CV, relator has an adequate
appellate remedy to challenge the respondent's orders
that were the subject of this petition. See Walker,
827 S.W.2d at 840 (mandamus relief is not available when
adequate appellate remedy exists); see also In re
Esparza, No. 14-16-00748-CV, 2016 WL 5947445, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 13, 2016, orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) ("Except in unusual
circumstances, not applicable here, mandamus relief is not
available after a final judgment has been issued because
relator then has an adequate remedy by direct appeal.");
see, e.g., In re Portillo, No.
14-11-00520-CV, 2011 WL 5118982, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 27, 2011, orig. proceeding) (granting
motion to dismiss mandamus petition after final order
superseded order that was subject of petition, rendering
we deny the petition for writ of mandamus
because relator has an adequate appellate remedy.
See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
 The underlying case is Cheri Vega
v. Arturo Lira, Cause No. 2008-11473, pending in the
309th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable