IN THE INTEREST OF A.N. AND K.N., CHILDREN
the 249th District Court Johnson County, Texas Trial Court
Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins
N. appeals from a judgment that terminated the parent-child
relationship between him and his children, A.N. and
After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found by
clear and convincing evidence that Jeremy (1) knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in
conditions or surroundings that endanger the children, (2)
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with
persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the children,
(3) had been convicted or placed on community supervision,
including deferred adjudication community supervision, for
being criminally responsible for the death or serious injury
of a child under section 22.04 of the Penal Code Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001 (b) (1) (D) (E) (L) (West Supp.
2016). The trial court further found by clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the
children. We affirm.
is the father of J.N.; twin boys, M.N. and M.N.; and twins
A.N. and K.N. A.N. and K.N were born on November 23, 2015. On
January 23, 2016, Jeremy was convicted for injury to a child
and sentenced to seventy-five years confinement for injuries
M.N. received as a result of being shaken. This Court
affirmed Jeremy's conviction on May 17, 2017 in Cause No.
10-16-00222-CR. Jeremy's parental rights were terminated
to J.N. and M.N., and M.N., and this Court affirmed the trial
court's order of termination for those children on
February 22, 2017 in Cause No. 10-16-00234-CV.
was incarcerated for the offense of injury to a child at the
time A.N. and K.N. were born, and he remained incarcerated
during the pendency of the case. Jeremy was never allowed
visitation with A.N. and K.N. The children were removed from
the parents while they were still in the hospital and have
been in foster care since being released from the hospital.
eight issues Jeremy argues that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court's
findings on each of the grounds for termination. Only one
predicate act under section 161.001 (b) (1) is necessary to
support a judgment of termination in addition to the required
finding that termination is in the child's best interest.
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.2003). In
conducting a legal sufficiency review in a parental
[A] court should look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable
trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to
the factfinder's conclusion and the role of a court
conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means
that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder
resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a
reasonable factfinder could do so. A corollary to this
requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found
to be incredible. This does not mean that a court must
disregard all evidence that does not support the
finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support
the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear
and convincing evidence.
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005) (per
curiam) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex.2002)) (emphasis in J.P.B.).
factual sufficiency review,
[A] court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence
that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear
and convincing.... [T]he inquiry must be "whether the
evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a
firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's
allegations." A court of appeals should consider whether
disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could
not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited
in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction,
then the evidence is factually insufficient.
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266-67 (Tex.2002)
(quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.2002))
(internal footnotes ...