Court of Appeals of Texas, Twelfth District, Tyler
VAN ZANDT HEALTH CARE PROPERTY, INC., D/B/A ANDERSON NURSING CENTER, APPELLANT
MARY REDD AND RODNEY REDD, APPELLEES
from the County Court at Law of Van Zandt County, Texas
(Tr.Ct. No. CV05010)
consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
Zandt Health Care Property, Inc., d/b/a Anderson Nursing
Center (Van Zandt) appeals the trial court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of Rodney and Mary Redd.
In one issue, it argues that the trial court erred in
granting the Redds' motion for summary judgment. We
dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
October 2013, Van Zandt sued the Estate of Arietta Turner and
Turner's heirs, the Redds. In its petition, Van Zandt
alleged that it had a contract to provide nursing care and
maintenance for Turner and that the contract was breached
when payments were not made in accordance with the
their answer, the Redds asserted a counterclaim for
conversion. They also moved for summary judgment, alleging
that Van Zandt's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations because suit was required to be brought within
six months of Van Zandt's appointment as dependent
administrator of Turner's estate. The Redds argued that
this Court previously determined that Van Zandt's claim
was untimely and that, consequently, the current suit was
also barred under res judicata. Following a hearing, the trial
court granted the summary judgment. This appeal followed.
we address Van Zandt's sole issue, we first consider the
Redds' argument that the summary judgment order is not a
final and appealable order and that this Court does not have
jurisdiction over Van Zandt's appeal.
of Review and Governing Law
jurisdiction is never presumed. Beckham Group, P.C v.
Snyder, 315 S.W.3d 244, 245 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no
pet.). Unless the record affirmatively shows the propriety of
appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. See
id. This court's jurisdiction is established
exclusively by constitutional and statutory enactments.
See, e.g., TEX. CONST, art. V, § 6; Tex.
Gov't Code Ann. § 22.220(c) (West Supp. 2016).
Unless one of the sources of our authority specifically
authorizes an interlocutory appeal, we only have jurisdiction
over an appeal taken from a final judgment. See Lehmann
v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001);
N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893,
895 (Tex. 1966).
judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for
purposes of appeal if and only if either (1) it actually
disposes of all claims and parties then before the court,
regardless of its language, or (2) it states with
unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all
claims and all parties.'" Farm Bureau Cty. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015)
(quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192-93). "An
order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely
because it is entitled 'final', or because the word
'final' appears elsewhere in the order, or even
because it awards costs." Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at
205. "Rather, there must be some other clear indication
that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose
of the entire case." Id.
case, there is no unmistakably clear statement on the face of
the trial court's summary judgment order indicating that
the trial court intended the order to be a final judgment as
to all claims and parties. See Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at
163; see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Rather, the
order simply states that Van Zandt's claim is without
merit and "the Motion for Summary Judgment of Rodney
Redd and Mary Redd ...