Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin
Rosser B. Melton, Jr., Appellant
The State of Texas, Appellee
THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 201ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-16-002564, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE
Chief Justice Rose, Justices Field and Bourland
K. Field, Justice.
B. Melton, Jr. has filed a pro se appeal from the trial
court's final summary judgment awarding the State of
Texas $4, 259.09 in "administrative penalties and
administrative investigative and court costs" and $16,
756 in attorney's fees. Melton's appellate brief does
not describe the judgment being appealed or address why the
trial court erred in rendering the judgment, other than
making vague assertions that all lawyers and their bar
associations violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. The brief
does not include citations to the record; instead, it merely
refers us to the clerk's record generally and asks us to
visit two websites for more information. Moreover, the brief
does not cite to legal authorities, other than the Sherman
Antitrust Act, or explain how the law and the facts of this
case entitle him to relief from the trial court's
we conclude that any issues Melton may have are inadequately
briefed and present nothing for our review. See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(i); Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246
S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. dism'd
w.o.j.) ("An issue on appeal unsupported by argument or
citation to any legal authority presents nothing for this
Court to review."). We will not comb through the record
looking for legal errors Melton has not identified and
explained. See Amir-Sharif, 246 S.W.3d at 270
("This Court has no duty to perform an independent
review of the record and applicable law to determine whether
the error complained of occurred."). To do so would be
placing ourselves in the role of Melton's advocate.
See Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.) ("An appellate court has no
duty-or even right-to perform an independent review of the
record and applicable law to determine whether there was
error. Were we to do so, even on behalf of a pro se
appellant, we would be abandoning our role as neutral
adjudicators and become an advocate for that party.")
(citation omitted); see also Holland v. Scroggie,
No. 03-16-00601-CV, 2017 WL 1832491, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin
May 4, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
Melton has not adequately briefed any issue on appeal, we
will affirm the trial court's final summary
judgment. However, in its brief, the State asks us
"for an order in remittitur" reducing the trial
court's attorney's fee award. The State asserts that
the final summary judgment failed to reduce the
attorney's fee award by the $2, 100 that Melton had
already paid to the State. The record before us supports the
State's assertion. Ordinarily, we would suggest a
remittitur. See Tex. R. App. P. 46.3. However,
because the State has conceded that the attorney's fee
award was excessive and has asked us to reduce the amount, we
construe this request as accepting the suggested remittitur.
Accordingly, we will modify the trial court's judgment to
reduce the attorney's fee award by $2, 100. See
id. R. 46.5 ("If the remittitur is timely filed and
the court of appeals determines that the voluntary remittitur
cures the reversible error, then the court must accept the
remittitur and reform and affirm the trial court judgment in
accordance with the remittitur."); Maya Walnut, LLC
v. Lopez-Rodriguez, No. 05-16-00750-CV, 2017 WL 1684679,
at *7 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 3, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.)
(noting that appellee conceded that damages award was
excessive and requested that the court of appeals reform the
trial court's judgment and stating, "We construe
this request as accepting the suggested remittitur. We,
therefore, modify the trial court's judgment to reflect
an award of $450 for past lost wages. As modified, we affirm
the trial court's judgment."); Mesquite Elks
Lodge No. 2404 v. Shaikh, No. 05-08-01372-CV, 2011 WL
989037, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 22, 2011, no pet.) (mem.
op. on reh'g) ("We conclude appellees' voluntary
remittitur cures the reversible error, and we accept it. We .
. . modify the trial court's judgment to reflect the
remittitur . . . and affirm the trial court's judgment as
modify the trial court's final summary judgment to reduce
the award of attorney's fees by $2, 100. We affirm the
judgment as modified.
and, as Modified, Affirmed.
 The following verbatim excerpts show
the major themes of Melton's brief:
Lawyer judges all must recuse themselves for evident
institutional bias; Lawyers and judges, via their Bar
Association/s are anticompetitive, criminal monopolies which
violate the ...