United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division
AMENDED ORDER [*]
PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court in the above-entitled matter is Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Motion to Compel
Arbitration. (Dkt. 41). Having considered the filings,
relevant legal standards, and the entire case file, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff's Motion should be and is hereby
Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP
(“Plaintiff” or “ADJT”) is a law firm
specializing in appellate representation. (Compl., Dkt. 1,
¶ 7). Defendant Susan Vance (“Defendant” or
“Ms. Vance”) was a non-equity partner at ADJT
until her employment was terminated on November 16, 2016.
(Id. ¶ 1). On February 22, 2017, ADJT filed
suit against Ms. Vance pursuant to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the Texas
Theft Liability Act. (Id. ¶¶ 17-30). On
March 15, 2017, Ms. Vance filed an Original Answer and
Counterclaims, advancing claims for conversion, negligence,
breach of contract, and violations of the anti-discrimination
and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. (Answer, Dkt. 13, ¶¶ 95-120).
then filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, which sought to
compel all claims in this matter to arbitration and to stay
or dismiss this proceeding. (Mot. Compel, Dkt. 24). On May
22, 2017, the Court issued an order (1) concluding that ADJT
had failed to establish that Ms. Vance received sufficient
notice to create a valid agreement to arbitrate and (2)
denying the Motion to Compel. (Order, Dkt. 38). ADJT filed
the instant Motion to Reconsider on May 26, (Dkt. 41), and
Ms. Vance filed her Response in Opposition on June 2, (Dkt.
54(b) allows a court to revise an interlocutory order at any
time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not, however, specifically provide for motions for
reconsideration. See Shepherd v. Int'l Paper
Co., 372 F.3d 326, 328 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Motions for
reconsideration from interlocutory orders are generally
governed by the standards for Rule 59(e) motions.
Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d
367, 371 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998); Magallanes v. Ford Motor
Co., No. EP-13-CV-00175-DCG, 2014 WL 12588335, at *1-2
(W.D. Tex. June 19, 2014).
motion under Rule 59(e) must “clearly establish either
a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly
discovered evidence.” Ross v. Marshall, 426
F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Simon v. United
States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). Relief is
also appropriate where there has been an intervening change
in controlling law. See Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp.
Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). Motions under
Rule 59(e) “cannot be used to raise arguments which
could, and should, have been made before the judgment
issued.” Id. While a district court has
“considerable discretion” to grant or deny a
motion under Rule 59(e), reconsideration is an extraordinary
remedy that courts should use sparingly. Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004);
see also In re Goff, 579 F. App'x 240, 245 (5th
Cir. 2014) (“A motion for reconsideration should only
be granted in extraordinary circumstances.”).
preliminary matter, the Court notes that ADJT's motion
includes no discussion of the applicable legal standard.
(See generally Mot. Reconsideration, Dkt. 41).
Therefore, while the Court applies Rule 59(e) in reviewing
the Motion, it does so without the benefit of any argument
from ADJT that it has met the substantial burden described
grounds its Motion for Reconsideration in its claim that it
“has discovered new evidence that unequivocally
establishes that Ms. Vance had actual, express notice of the
mandatory, binding arbitration agreement prior to the
effective date of the policy.” (Mot. Reconsideration,
Dkt. 41, at 1). That evidence includes the declarations of
ADJT employee Kennon Welch and ADJT partners Amy Warr and
Charles T. Frazier, Jr. (Id.; Dkt. 41-1; Dkt. 41-2;
Dkt. 41-3). ADJT's motion does not explain why the
proffered declarations constitute new evidence. (See
generally Mot. Reconsideration, Dkt. 41). Indeed, the
declarations themselves detail conversations that took place
in 2016. (Welch Decl., Dkt. 41-1, at 2; Warr Decl., Dkt.
41-2, at 2; Frazier Decl., Dkt. 41-3, at 2). The Court
therefore concludes that ADJT's motion provides no newly
discovered evidence and that the requested relief should be
stated above, reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that
courts should use sparingly. Templet v. HydroChem
Inc.,367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). For the reasons
stated herein, the Court is not satisfied that such relief is
warranted here. Plaintiffs Motion for ...