Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
THE 324TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO.
WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
T.A.R. (Mother) and Appellee E.S.H. (Father) are S.H.'s
biological parents. In 2014, Mother initiated an original
suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), and
Father filed a counterpetition. Following a bench trial, the
trial court signed its final order, which (1) grants Father
the exclusive right to designate S.H.'s primary
residence; (2) grants Father the exclusive right to make
educational decisions concerning S.H.; (3) restricts
S.H.'s residence with Father and Mother to within a
ten-mile radius of Father's then-current residence; and
(4) establishes a week-on, week-off possession schedule. In
what we construe as four issues, Mother argues that each of
these four orders constitutes an abuse of discretion. We
initiated this SAPCR on April 9, 2014. On June 26, 2014, the
trial court signed temporary orders appointing Father and
Mother as temporary joint managing conservators of S.H. and
granting Mother the exclusive rights to designate S.H.'s
primary residence within Tarrant County and to make decisions
concerning her education. The case proceeded to a final bench
trial on the merits on July 23, 2015, and August 21, 2015.
After both parties finished their closing arguments, the
trial court did not render judgment but instead informed the
parties that it would send a rendition of judgment to them
once it had reached a decision.
August 25, 2015, the trial court sent its rendition of
judgment to the parties, which included an order that Father
and Mother would have a week-on, week-off possession
schedule. Mother filed a request for findings under section
153.258 of the family code on the ground that the week-on,
week-off possession order substantially deviated from the
standard possession order set forth in the family code.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.258 (West 2014).
The trial court entered its findings. Mother now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mother's issues concern matters of conservatorship and
custody and are therefore subject to an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d
611, 616 (Tex. 2007); Halleman v. Halleman, 379
S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). Under
that standard, we will not disturb the trial court's
conservatorship or custody determinations unless it acted
without reference to any guiding rules or principles in
making them-unless, in other words, those determinations were
arbitrary or unreasonable. See J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at
616; Halleman, 379 S.W.3d at 447.
determining issues of conservatorship and custody, the trial
court's primary consideration must be the best interest
of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002
(West 2014); In re J.F., No. 02-14-00324-CV, 2015 WL
6556969, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.). In our review of a trial court's
conservatorship and custody determinations under an
abuse-of-discretion standard, challenges to the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support those
determinations do not present independent grounds for review;
rather, legal and factual sufficiency are simply factors we
consider in determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion. See J.F., 2015 WL 6556969, at *1; In
re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005,
no pet.). To determine whether a trial court abused its
discretion because the evidence is legally or factually
insufficient to support a trial court's conservatorship
or custody determination, we consider (1) whether the trial
court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its
discretion and (2) whether it erred in its application of
that discretion. In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d 846, 849
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); W.M., 172
S.W.3d at 725. The traditional sufficiency review is involved
in answering the first question, and whether the trial court
made a reasonable decision is involved in answering the
second. M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d at 849; W.M.,
172 S.W.3d at 725.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
rendition, the trial court found that the following orders
were in S.H.'s best interest:
1. [Mother] and [Father] are appointed as joint managing
2. . . . [Father] is ordered to have the exclusive right to
make educational decisions [for S.H.] after consultation or
reasonable efforts to consult with [Mother].
3. Neither party is ordered to have the right to establish
the primary residence of [S.H.]; however, [S.H.'s]
residences are to be located within a ten (10) mile radius of
[Father's] current residence unless the parties mutually
agree otherwise in writing.
findings for variance from standard possession order, the
trial court made the following findings:
1. The Court finds that it is in [S.H.'s] best interest
that the parties should be named as joint managing
conservators of [her].
2. The Court finds that the rights as set forth in
§151.001 of the Texas Family Code should be equally
allocated between [Father and Mother].
3.The Court finds that the parties sharing equally the rights
as set forth in §151.001 would encourage and cause the
parties to accept a positive relationship between [S.H.] and
the other parent.
4. The Court finds that [Father and Mother] participated in
the rearing of [S.H.] before the filing of this suit.
5. The Court finds that it would be in the best interest of
[S.H.] for [Father and Mother] to have a geographical
restriction in the establishment of a residence so as to
insure the continued participation of both [Father and
Mother] in the parenting of [S.H.].
6. The Court finds that the geographical restriction as set
forth in its rendition letter is an appropriate restriction
to insure the continuing participation of [Father and Mother]
in the parenting of [S.H.].
7. Under [section 153.134(b)(1) of the family code], it is
mandatory that, absent an agreed parenting plan, the Court
designate the conservator who has the exclusive right [to]
determine the primary residence of [S.H.]. The court finds,
and only because of this statute, that [Father] should have
that exclusive right[, ] as the Court has found that it is in
the best interest of [S.H.] for him to have the exclusive
right to make educational decisions for [S.H.] after
consultation or reasonable efforts to consult with [Mother].
8. The Court finds that [Mother] did not consistently
encourage a co-parenting relationship with [Father] during
the pendency of this case.
9. The Court finds that [Mother] attempted to deprive
[Father] of possession of [S.H.] on more than one occasion
during the pendency of this case and, without good cause,
prevented access by [Father] with [S.H.].
10. The Court finds that there are concerns that [Mother]
will not encourage a positive relationship between [S.H.] and
[Father] if she should have more rights or more possession
time of [S.H.] than does [Father].
11. The Court finds that there are concerns that [Mother], if
she perceives that she has a superior position to [Father]
insofar as [S.H.] is concerned, will withhold possession of
[S.H.] from [Father] if he should disagree with her on day to
day issues regarding [S.H.].
12.The Court finds that the parties will more likely foster a
good co-parenting relationship if neither party is awarded
what either would consider to be a superior position to the