United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
OPINION AND ORDER
MELINDA HARMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court in the above-referenced cause is
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Doc. 111. Having
considered the Motion, Defendant City of Madisonville's
(“City”) Response in Opposition, Doc. 112, this
Court's previous Opinion and Order, Doc. 110, the record,
and the relevant law, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff's Motion should be denied.
facts of this case were recited extensively in this
Court's prior Opinion and Order, Doc. 110, and need not
be repeated here except to the limited extent necessary to
understand the context of the present Motion.
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that her ex-husband, Defendant
Jeffrey Covington, violated § 1983 by acting under color
of state law and conspiring with other municipal officials in
securing Plaintiff's false arrest. See Doc. 1.
According to Plaintiff, the City was aware of, but
“intentionally disregarded, ratified, protected, and
directly allowed, ” Covington's actions. Doc. 98
¶ 408. Plaintiff also alleges that the City is liable
because it demonstrated deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing to supervise
its officers and wrongfully hiring Covington. Id.
City responded to Plaintiff's allegations by filing a
Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 103. In its Motion, the City argues
that Plaintiff's claims against it must be dismissed
because she alleged no cognizable Fourteenth Amendment
claims, her official-capacity claims against individual
defendants and her claims against the police department are
duplicative of her claims against the City, and there are no
factual allegations that the City caused any deprivation of
Plaintiff's rights or was deliberately indifferent.
Id. ¶¶ 1-6.
thorough consideration of the parties' arguments and
relevant case law, on February 16, 2017, this Court granted
the City's Motion and dismissed Plaintiff's claims
against the City because “Plaintiff's allegations
against the City cannot support the second or third element
of a claim for municipal liability.” Doc. 110 at 19.
Specifically, Plaintiff failed to allege “an official
policy” that was “the moving force behind the
violation of a constitutional right.” Id. at
11. (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d
838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)). Furthermore, because Plaintiff had
“already been afforded an opportunity to amend her
claims against the City and has again failed to state claims
capable of surviving the City's motions to dismiss,
” the Court concluded that granting her leave to amend
yet again would be futile and denied her request to do so.
Doc. 110 at 21.
March 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed her pending Motion for
Reconsideration urging the Court to reconsider its dismissal
of her claims against the City or, alternatively, allow her
to further amend her complaint to clarify her allegations.
Doc. 111 at 1. The City filed its Response in Opposition on
April 6, 2017. Doc. 112. Plaintiff's Motion is now ripe
motion for reconsideration “calls into question the
correctness of a judgment.” In re Transtexas Gas
Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002). “[S]uch
a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence,
legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or
raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet v.
Hydro Chem., Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159
(5th Cir. 1990)). Rather, it merely serves to allow “a
party ‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.'” Waltman v.
Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co.,
561 F.Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd,
735 F.2d 1367 (7th Cir. 1984)). A motion for reconsideration
may also be used to bring an intervening change in the
controlling law to the court's attention. Schiller v.
Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567- 68 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing In re Benjamin Moore & Co.,
318 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002)). Nevertheless,
“[r]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”
Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citing Clancy v.
Emp'rs Health Ins. Co., 101 F.Supp.2d 463, 465 (E.D.
case, Plaintiff's Motion does not identify any manifest
error of law or fact in the Court's prior Opinion and
Order. See Doc. 111. Nor does it bring the
Court's attention to any change in the controlling law.
See Id. Rather, Plaintiff simply rehashes her
previous arguments and takes issue with the Court's
alleged failure to specifically address all of her
“critical allegations establishing municipal
liability.” Id. at 1. Such arguments are not a
legitimate ground for relief under a Rule 59(e) motion for
reconsideration. See Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745,
763 (5th Cir. 2005) (providing examples of proper and
improper use of motion for reconsideration). The Court need
not specifically respond to every one of Plaintiff's
allegations in order to conclude that she failed to meet the
pleading standard for municipal liability. Accordingly, the
Court stands by its previous Opinion and Order.