Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
The 323RD District Court of Tarrant County Trial Court No.
WALKER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and PITTMAN, JJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
an appeal from a juvenile court's order committing
Appellant T.S. to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department after previously adjudicating him delinquent for
committing the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of
a child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.03 (West
2014) (setting forth requisites of adjudication hearing),
§ 54.04 (West Supp. 2016) (setting forth requisites of
disposition hearing); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021
(West Supp. 2016).
court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw and a brief in support of that motion, in which he
states that he has reviewed the record and believes the
appeal is frivolous. Counsel's brief and motion meet the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a
professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there
are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S.
738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d
296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (holding
Anders procedures apply to juvenile appeals).
counsel notified Appellant's mother by mail of the right
to file a pro se response to counsel's Anders
brief, and this court further notified both Appellant and his
mother by mail of the right to file a response to
counsel's Anders brief. Appellant's mother
filed a pro se response. The State declined to file a brief.
appellant's court-appointed attorney files a motion to
withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and
fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is
obligated to undertake an independent examination of the
record. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d
920, 922-23 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). When
analyzing whether any grounds for appeal exist, we consider
the record, the Anders brief, and any pro se
response. Cf. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408-09
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
carefully reviewed counsel's brief, Appellant's
mother's pro se response,  and the appellate record. Finding
no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal
is without merit. See In re K.C., No.
02-09-00150-CV, 2010 WL 323532, at *1 (Tex. App.-- Fort Worth
Jan. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, we affirm the
trial court's order of commitment.
upon finding that the appeal is frivolous, we would grant
counsel's motion to withdraw. But in In re P.M.,
a termination of parental rights appeal, our supreme court
held--in reliance on family code section 107.013 providing
that appointed counsel continues to serve in that capacity
until the date all appeals are exhausted or waived--that the
mere filing of an Anders brief in the court of
appeals does not warrant the withdrawal of that counsel for
purposes of proceeding in the supreme court. No. 15-0171,
2016 WL 1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (order). The
Juvenile Justice Code contains a similar provision: when, as
in this case, the trial court finds a child's family
indigent and appoints counsel, that counsel must continue to
represent the child "until the case is
terminated, the family retains an attorney, or a new
attorney is appointed by the juvenile court." Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 51.101(a) (West Supp. 2016) (emphasis
added). The record does not show that either of the latter
two events have occurred here, and under the reasoning of
In re P.M., this case has not "terminated"
because not all appeals have been exhausted. See
2016 WL 1274748, at *2 & n.5, *3. Accordingly, even
though we have affirmed the trial court's judgment, we
nevertheless deny counsel's motion to withdraw. See
id. at *3; In re A.H., No. 02-16-00320-CV, 2017
WL 1573735, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Apr. 27, 2017, no
pet.) (citing P.M. in denying counsel's motion
to withdraw in frivolous juvenile appeal); In re
A.C., Nos. 01-15-00931-CV, 01-15-00932-CV,
01-15-00933-CV, 2016 WL 1658777, at *1 (Tex. App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
See Tex. R. App. P.
T.S. entered into a written stipulation
agreement, in which he stipulated to the facts underlying the
offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. In the
stipulation, T.S. also waived any and all pretrial motions
filed on his behalf ...