IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF ANDRZEJ ADAMSKI AND OKSANA ADAMSKI
Appeal from the 328th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 12-DCV-199667
consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and Donovan.
Hill Jamison Justice.
Adamski appeals from the final decree of divorce dissolving
his marriage to Oksana Adamski. In three issues, Andrzej
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1)
ordering Andrzej to make monthly child support payments above
statutory guidelines, (2) ordering a division of the marital
estate and awarding attorney's fees that did not conform
to the parties' premarital agreement, and (3) refusing to
set aside a default judgment. Because the record does not
support Andrzej's contentions, we affirm.
and Oksana were married in 1999 and have one minor child
together. Andrzej filed his Original Petition for divorce in
July 2012, and Oksana filed an answer and counter-petition.
According to the Final Decree of Divorce, a jury trial was
held from May 12 to May 19, 2015, and the trial judge heard
remaining issues from October 12 to October 14,
2015. Andrzej was represented by counsel during
the jury trial but represented himself during the bench
trial. Oksana was represented by counsel throughout the
proceedings below. An amicus attorney was also appointed by
the court and participated in both phases of the trial.
According to Andrzej, he failed to appear on the third day of
the bench trial, and the trial court entered a default
judgment against him. Andrzej has not filed a reporter's
record in this appeal, but the trial court's docket sheet
reflects that he failed to show on the third day of the bench
trial, which proceeded in his absence.
November 13, 2015, Andrzej filed a motion requesting a
continuance or, in the alternative, a new trial. In this
motion, Andrzej suggested that he had missed the third day of
the bench trial due to a medical emergency brought on by the
stress of the proceedings. He further alluded to potential
physical abuse of the child by the mother. In support,
Andrzej attached to the motion photographs of the child with
what appears to be a medical walking boot on her foot as well
as a police report. According to the record, no hearing on
the motion was requested or conducted, and the trial court
made no express ruling.
final decree entered February 2, 2016, the trial court, among
other things, appointed Andrzej and Oksana as joint managing
conservators of their child and named Oksana as the parent
with the exclusive right to designate the child's primary
residence. The court further ordered that the social security
benefits Andrzej receives be transferred to Oksana as
custodial parent, and if Andrzej "is not receiving
social security disability payments for the child, " the
court ordered him to pay child support of $750 per
month. The court additionally awarded certain
property and accounts to Andrzej and certain property and
accounts to Oksana, including, for Oksana, real property in
Polk County, Texas. The court further awarded Oksana a
judgment of $9, 900 for fraud on the community by Andrzej,
and the court ordered Andrzej to pay Oksana's
attorney's fees, expenses, and costs incurred in the
lawsuit, which the court determined to be $30, 000.
first issue, Andrzej contends that the trial court erred in
ordering him to pay above guideline child support without
entering the requisite findings in support of the order.
Generally, child support is calculated by applying statutory
guidelines to the obligor's monthly net resources.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.062(a); In re
Marriage of Butts, 444 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). For one child, the
guidelines provide that child support should equal twenty
percent of the obligor's net resources. Tex. Fam. Code
§ 154.125(b). The trial court may deviate from the
guidelines if evidence rebuts the presumption that
application of the guidelines is in the best interest of the
child. Id. § 154.123. If the guidelines are not
followed, a trial court must make specific findings as to (1)
the net resources of the obligor and the obligee, (2) the
percentage applied to the obligor's net resources, and
(3) if applicable, the specific reasons for the deviation
from the guidelines. Id. § 154.130(a)(3), (b);
Butts, 444 S.W.3d at 153.
support of his contention that the trial court deviated from
the statutory guidelines, Andrzej points to his tax returns
for the three year period prior to trial, which he had
attached to his inventory and appraisement of property filed
with the trial court. Andrzej argues that the trial court
erred in not using the returns to establish his net
resources. As mentioned above, however, the appellate record
does not contain a reporter's record for either the jury
portion of the trial or the bench proceedings. Consequently,
we are unable to tell whether the referenced tax returns were
admitted into evidence at trial. We are further unable to
determine whether any other evidence regarding Andrzej's
net resources was admitted. In the absence of such
information, we are unable to determine whether the trial
court deviated from the statutory guidelines, and we further
cannot say that the trial court erred in failing to make the
findings required when a court so deviates. In fact, in the
absence of a reporter's record, we presume that the
evidence at trial supported the trial court's
determination regarding the amount of child support. See,
e.g., Allen v. Porter, No. 01-16-00823-CV, 2017 WL
2255751, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2017,
no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (and cases cited therein). Because the
record does not support Andrzej's contentions, we
overrule his first issue.
of Marital Estate and Attorney's Fees
second issue, Andrzej contends that the trial court erred in
ordering a division of the marital estate and awarding
attorney's fees that did not conform to the parties'
premarital agreement. According to Andrzej, the parties
entered into a premarital agreement that, among other things,
(1) identified real property in Livingston, Texas as his
separate property, (2) provided that the couple's joint
accounts would be divided equally upon dissolution of the
marriage, and (3) contained an agreement that neither party
would provide support to the other upon dissolution of the
marriage. In support, he cites a copy of a purported
agreement filed in the clerk's record. Andrzej asserts
that the trial court violated each of these provisions in the
final judgment, by (1) awarding the lot in Livingston to
Oksana, (2) awarding over half of the funds in the
joint accounts to Oksana, and (3) ordering Andrzej to pay
Oksana's attorney's fees.
law recognizes the general enforceability of premarital
agreements. See generally Tex. Fam. Code
§§ 4.001-.010 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act);
Beck v. Beck, 814 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. 1991). Such
agreements are presumptively valid but may be determined to
be unenforceable if not voluntarily signed or unconscionable.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 4.006(a); Sheriff v.
Moosa, No. 05-13-01143-CV, 2015 WL 4736564, at *4 (Tex.