Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
LUIS R. COLON APPELLANT
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, D/B/A CHRISTIANA TRUST, NOT INDIVIDUALLY BUT AS TRUSTEE FOR PRETIUM MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST APPELLEE
COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO.
SUDDERTH, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
four points in this forcible detainer appeal, Appellant Luis
R. Colon appeals the trial court's judgment of possession
for Appellee Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, D/B/A
Christiana Trust, Not Individually but as Trustee for Pretium
Mortgage Acquisition Trust (Wilmington). We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
obtained a mortgage, secured by a deed of trust, on the
property at issue, 12634 Bay Avenue, Euless, Texas, 76040.
After Colon defaulted on the mortgage, Wilmington purchased
the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
issued notices to vacate and then filed a petition for
forcible detainer in the justice court after Colon failed to
vacate the premises. In response, Colon filed a plea in
abatement and an original answer subject to that plea. In his
plea in abatement, Colon complained that Wilmington's
petition did not comply with rule of civil procedure
510.3(a), that Wilmington could not prove that it was
properly in the property's chain of title, that
Wilmington was not entitled to treat him as a tenant at
sufferance, and that there was a title dispute that deprived
the justice court of jurisdiction.
trial de novo in the county court at law, Wilmington offered,
and the trial court admitted into evidence, a certified copy
of the deed of trust signed by Colon,  a certified copy
of the substitute trustee's deed reflecting the sale of
the property to Wilmington, and a business records affidavit
attached to the notices to vacate sent to each borrower by
both regular and certified mail and to all occupants by first
class mail. The trial court awarded possession of the
property to Wilmington. After a hearing, the trial court
denied Colon's motion for new trial, and this appeal
first point, Colon contends that Wilmington's pleading
was not a valid pleading on which judgment could have been
granted because it was not "sworn to by the
plaintiff" as required by rule of civil procedure
510.3(a). In making this argument, Colon urges this court to
revisit our decision in Norvelle v. PNC
Mortgage, 472 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2015,
no pet.). In Norvelle, we held,
[T]he petition filed in the justice court contained a
verification sworn to by the Bank's counsel, stating her
authority to make the affidavit and swearing that the facts
contained in the pleading were both within her personal
knowledge and true and correct. As she acted as the
Bank's corporeal agent for purposes of instituting the
action, this was sufficient to meet rule 510.3(a)'s
Id. at 449. Wilmington's amended petition for
forcible detainer was signed by its counsel and contained a
verification by her, stating her authority to make the
petition and verification and swearing that the facts
contained within the amended petition for forcible detainer
were within her personal knowledge and true and correct.
Declining Colon's invitation to reconsider
Norvelle, we overrule his first point.
remaining points, Colon argues that Wilmington's pleading
was invalid because Wilmington lacked standing to prosecute
its claim, that Wilmington was not entitled to rely on the
deed of trust's tenancy-at-sufferance language because it
was not in privity of contract with ...