United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KENNETH M. HOYT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ricardo Enriquez Sanchez is an inmate in the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). He filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans With
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) alleging violations of
his civil rights.
complaint named three defendants: Lorie Davis, the Director
of the TDCJ's Correctional Institutions Division; Senior
Warden Jones of the TDCJ's Huntsville Unit; and
Corrections Officer Pittman of the Huntsville Unit. On
January 9, 2017, this Court sua sponte dismissed
Sanchez's claims against Davis and Jones under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. See Dkt. No. 21.
February 17, 2017, Pittman filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court concludes that Pittman's
motion should be granted, and the case dismissed with
alleges that he was suffering from pain in his foot and heel
from a condition that predated his admission to TDCJ. TDCJ
medical staff provided him with some custom footwear, a
steroid injection, and pain medication for his condition.
at the Huntsville Unit, Sanchez was assigned to work in the
textile factory. Defendant Pittman was his supervisor.
alleges that he told Pittman of pain in his foot and heel,
but that Pittman ordered him to climb a ladder to perform
some tasks. Sanchez fell from the ladder, causing injuries.
Standard of Review
reviewing a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), the
complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the
plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be
taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781
F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.1986). The standard of review under
rule 12(b)(6) has been summarized as follows: "The
question therefore is whether in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf,
the complaint states any valid claim for relief." 5
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1357, at 601 (1969).
to the level of a constitutional violation, prison officials
must exhibit deliberate indifference to the prisoner's
serious medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” is
more than mere negligence, Gamble, 429 U.S. at
104-06, but “something less than acts or omissions for
the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Rather,
deliberate indifference requires that the defendant be
subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to
the inmate and recklessly disregard that risk. Id.
at 829, 836.
alleges that Pittman is a Corrections Officer; he does not
allege that Pittman is a medical professional. While Sanchez
alleges that he told Pittman that his foot hurt, Pittman
notes that Sanchez does not allege that he was ever medically
unassigned from working in the textile factory, or from any
other prison job. In fact, Sanchez specifically states that