Appeal from the 11th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2012-21471
Justices Christopher, Jamison, and Donovan.
Sammy Veal sued his former apartment complex, appellees
CBREI/USA Hollister DST d/b/a Wynhaven at Hollister LP and
Riverstone Residential SC, LLC d/b/a Riverstone Residential
Group, LLC (collectively "Wynhaven"), for breach of
contract, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"), unlawful lockout, wrongful eviction,
wrongful interruption of utilities, and
retaliation. The trial court granted summary judgment
in Wynhaven's favor, dismissing all of Veal's claims.
In eight issues,  Veal argues that the trial court erred by
excluding evidence and granting Wynhaven's motions for
summary judgment. We affirm.
Factual and procedural background
was a residential tenant at the Wynhaven at Hollister
apartments from July 24, 2010, through August 25, 2011, as
set forth by the terms of a lease agreement. The lease
agreement further provided that either party give at least 60
days' written notice of termination or intent to move
Lease Term. The initial term of the Lease begins on 24th day
of July (month), 2010 (year), and ends at midnight the 25th
day of August (month), 201 (year). This Lease will
automatically renew month-to-month unless either party gives
at least 60 days' written notice of termination or intent
to move out as required by Par. 37.
the time Veal was a tenant, he complained about the condition
of the apartment, specifically the carpet and the blinds.
Additionally, during his tenancy, Veal was issued several
notices of lease violations for offenses such as excessive
noise and having a prohibited animal (snake). He also was
issued notices to vacate for non-payment/late-payment of
rent, utilities, or other sums.
apartment was burglarized on June 24, 2011. After the
burglary, Veal inquired with Wynhaven personnel about repairs
to his door, and was told that after police finished their
report the door would be repaired. Veal was notified in
writing by Wynhaven on July 1, 2011, that it would not renew
his lease, which expired on August 25, 2011. This gave Veal a
55-day advance notice of non-renewal.
August 25, 2011, Veal had not yet vacated his unit. Wynhaven
gave him until the close of business on August 26, 2011, to
vacate the premises. At the close of business day on August
26, 2011, Veal still had not moved out. Veal was informed he
either had to vacate the apartment or pay additional rent.
Veal did not pay additional rent and removed the rest of his
items into the hallway of the building. After the items were
removed, the locks to the apartment were changed.
April 21, 2012, Veal filed suit against Wynhaven, alleging
causes of action for breach of contract, DTPA, negligence,
fraud, unlawful lockout, wrongful eviction, and retaliation.
Veal amended his petition, adding a claim for wrongful
interruption of utilities. Wynhaven served Veal with a
request for disclosure in May 2012.
the next few years, the parties propounded discovery as well
as filed dispositive motions, including Wynhaven's
no-evidence motion for partial summary judgment and a traditional
motion for final summary judgment. In September 2014, the case
was called to trial and Veal filed his third motion for
continuance. Wynhaven opposed the continuance and objected
under Rule 193.6 to any evidence of damages from Veal because
Veal had failed to timely disclose his damages. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. The court granted the motion for
continuance to give Veal the opportunity to amend his
disclosures to set forth his claimed damages.
later, on September 20, 2015, Veal served Wynhaven with
supplemental disclosures regarding damages. During pretrial
conference conducted on October 20 and 21, Wynhaven objected
to any evidence of damages from Veal because his supplemental
disclosures were untimely.
October 23, 2015, the case was called to trial. After setting
aside multiple prior orders, the trial court reconsidered the
entire record and granted Wynhaven's motion to exclude
evidence of damages as well as an affidavit Veal filed in
response to a summary judgment. The trial court granted
Wynhaven's motions for summary judgment, ordered Veal
take nothing on all claims, and awarded Wynhaven its court
costs. The trial court memorialized its actions in
"uncharacteristic detail" in a five-page
single-spaced final judgment. The trial court denied
Veal's motion for a new trial; this appeal timely