Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Petty v. Great West Casualty Co.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

October 26, 2017

THOMAS PETTY d/b/a Tom Petty Trucking Company, Plaintiff,



         This pro se action filed by Plaintiff Thomas Petty in Rockwall County has been removed to this Court by Defendant Great West Casualty Company, see Dkt. No. 1, and referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of reference from United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay, see Dkt. No. 11.

         Great West moves to dismiss Petty's complaint (the Amended Petition filed in state court) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 5. Petty has filed an Objection to Motion to Dismiss (which is construed as a response), see Dkt. No. 8, and Great West has filed a reply brief, see Dkt. No. 9. Petty also has filed a motion for leave to amend. See Dkt. Nos. 15 & 16.

         The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should grant the motion to dismiss and deny the motion for leave to amend without prejudice to Petty's filing, within a reasonable time to be set by the Court, an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies that the undersigned identifies below.

         Applicable Background

         Through the Amended Petition, Petty begins by alleging that “[t]his case arises out of two accidents cover[ed] under [a Great West insurance] policy.” Dkt. No. 5-1 at 2. He then describes the accidents, which occurred on February 12, 2016 and June 28, 2016, see Id. at 2-3, and asserts that Great West “fail[ed] to communicate when [the estate of the decedent in the second accident] brought a cause of action forth in [Petty's] name, ” id. at 3. Petty continues by alleging that, “as a result of these accidents, two fatalities accrued, [Petty] received mental injuries that are permanent, and cannot operate the trucking company or drive a commercial vehicle again.” Id. Petty seeks damages based on his losses and for mental distress and anguish. See id.

         Legal Standards and Analysis

         To begin, the motion for leave to amend [Dkt. No. 15] should be denied. Petty initially failed to include with that motion a proposed amended complaint as required by the Court's local rules. See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 15.1. But, on October 25, 2017, he submitted a proposed amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 16. That complaint, however, suffers from the same shortcomings that afflict the Amended Petition, discussed below. The Court should therefore deny the current motion seeking leave to amend as futile. See, e.g., Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2016) (“When an amended complaint would still ‘fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, ' it is not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion'” for leave to amend. (quoting Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014))). And Petty should be afforded one more opportunity to amend his complaint after receiving the benefit of the Court's discussion of the applicable pleading standards set out below.

         In deciding whether a claim should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “A claim for relief is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

         While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. But, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff need only “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that the plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); accord N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief - including factual allegations that, when assumed to be true, raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).

         The Supreme Court of the United States “has made clear that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations' in the complaint.” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 347), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted, ” Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 346.

         That rationale has even more force in this case, as the Court “must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, ” Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006), “to prevent the loss of rights due to inartful expression, ” Marshall v. Eadison, 704CV123HL, 2005 WL 3132352, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 2005) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)); see United States v. Ayika, 554 Fed.Appx. 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (a court has a “duty to construe pro se [filings] liberally so that a litigant will not suffer simply because he did not attend law school or find a suitable attorney”); but see Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (“[L]iberal construction does not require that the Court or a defendant create causes of action where there are none.”).

         A court cannot look beyond the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Documents “attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)).

         Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has not articulated a test for determining when a document is central to a plaintiff's claims, the case law suggests that documents are central when they are necessary to establish an element of one of the plaintiff's claims. Thus, when a plaintiff's claim is based on the terms of a contract, the documents constituting the contract are central to the plaintiff's claim.” Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D. Tex. 2011). “However, if a document referenced in the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.