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Kramer v. Kastleman

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

November 3, 2017

Lisa Kramer, F/K/A Lisa Kastleman, Appellant
v.
Bryan Kastleman, Appellee

         FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-FM-09-002598, HONORABLE ORLINDA NARANJO, JUDGE PRESIDING

          Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Puryear and Goodwin

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Melissa Goodwin, Justice

         Following remand from the Texas Supreme Court, we consider the merits of this appeal filed by Lisa Kramer, F/K/A Lisa Kastleman, (Kramer) from the trial court's corrected final decree of divorce granted to her and Bryan Kastleman (Kastleman). In four issues, Kramer contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion to set aside the parties' informal settlement agreement, (2) rendering a decree that contains terms not agreed to by the parties, (3) denying her motion for new trial, and (4) awarding attorney's fees to Kastleman as sanctions against Kramer for filing a motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's final corrected decree of divorce.

          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         Kramer filed for divorce in 2009. The parties attended mediation on August 12, 2011, but reached no agreement. They continued to negotiate informally and on August 15, 2011, reached an agreement concerning custody of their child. Further informal settlement discussions resulted in a property settlement agreement on August 18, 2011, which recited that the parties had reached an agreement on all issues; adopted the terms of the agreement concerning child issues, which was attached as an exhibit; and included releases of all claims by all parties.[1] The settlement agreement provided in large, bold print that it was not subject to revocation and was binding on all parties. The settlement agreement also provided that Kastleman would appear in court at the first available time to present evidence and secure rendition of judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement, which he did on August 19, 2011. At the hearing, he testified that the property division was fair and equitable and that the parenting plan was in the best interest of the child. The trial court granted the divorce.

         In July 2012, prior to the trial court's signing a divorce decree, Kramer filed a motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement, and in September 2012, she filed a first amended motion to set aside, alleging in the motions that Kastleman had committed fraud by failing to disclose assets and by forging her name on documents. Kastleman filed a motion for sanctions against Kramer contending that all of the issues raised in Kramer's motion were known to her at the time she signed the settlement agreement and seeking attorney's fees under Rule 13 and chapter 10. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 10.001-.006. On October 8, 2012, the trial court denied Kramer's first amended motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement and granted Kastleman's motion for sanctions, awarding attorney's fees as requested for the work performed on behalf of Kastleman and his two companies in the amount of $32, 215.88, and conditional sanctions in the event of an unsuccessful appeal.[2] On October 11, 2012, the trial court heard Kastleman's Motion to Sign Decree of Divorce. After ruling on the parties' requests for various clarifications and modifications to the settlement agreement, the trial court signed the divorce decree. Kramer requested, and the trial court entered, findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the divorce decree, the denial of Kramer's motion to set aside the settlement agreement, and the sanctions order. Kramer subsequently filed motions to set aside the sanctions order and the divorce decree; a motion for new trial; and a motion to modify, correct, and reform the judgment. After hearing the motions, the trial court signed a corrected divorce decree, denied the motions to set aside the decree and for new trial, and signed an amended order granting sanctions in the same amount as previously ordered. At Kramer's request, the trial court entered revised findings of fact and conclusions of law to include findings and conclusions in support of the corrected divorce decree and amended sanctions order. In December 2012, Kramer filed a second motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.

         Kramer filed an appeal with this Court. Kastleman filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Kramer had accepted the benefits of the judgment she was appealing. We agreed and dismissed the appeal. Kramer appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which reversed our judgment, holding that Kramer's acceptance of marital assets did not preclude her appeal, and remanded for further proceedings on the merits of Kramer's appeal. See Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211, 213, 232 (Tex. 2017). We turn, then, to Kramer's four issues on remand.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         We review most family law issues, including the issues raised in this appeal, for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of C.A.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.)). A court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support its decision." In re A.E.R., No. 05-15-00019-CV, 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 8597, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 9, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In family law cases, legal and factual sufficiency challenges do not constitute independent grounds for asserting error but are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of C.A.S., 405 S.W.3d at 383. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court's decision, we consider whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Id. A trial court's findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence under the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury's answer. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827-28 (Tex. 2005) (describing legal sufficiency standard of review); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (describing factual sufficiency standard of review). We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo to determine their correctness and will uphold conclusions if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). Further "we will not reverse an erroneous conclusion if the trial court rendered the proper judgment." City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 779 n.10 (Tex. 2012) (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794).

         "The party attacking the property division bears the heavy burden of showing that the trial court's property division was not just and right." Pletcher v. Goetz, 9 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). Thus, it was Kramer's burden to show not only that "an inequality in the division of the community property was manifestly unjust . . . but also that such inequality is of such substantial proportions that it constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion." See King v. King, 661 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ). As for the custody issues, there is no bright-line rule for determining what is in a child's best interest, and each case must be determined on its unique set of facts. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 18-19 (Tex. 2002); Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.). When reviewing both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Helping Hands Home Care, Inc. v. Home Health of Tarrant Cty., Inc., 393 S.W.3d 492, 505 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, pet. denied).

         DISCUSSION

         Trial Court's Denial of Motion to Set Aside Informal Settlement Agreement

         In her first issue, Kramer contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement. First, Kramer argues that, contrary to the trial court's "impression, " the parties' agreement was not a "mediated settlement agreement" under sections 6.602(b) and 153.0071(d) of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.602(b) (providing that mediated settlement agreement in dissolution of marriage is binding on parties if it provides in prominently displayed statement that is in boldface type, in capital letters, or underlined that agreement is not subject to revocation and is signed by each party and each party's attorney who is present), (c) (providing that if agreement meets requirements of subsection (b), party is entitled to judgment on mediated settlement agreement), 153.0071(d), (e) (providing same in context of suit affecting parent-child relationship). Rather, Kramer contends that the agreement was an informal settlement agreement and an agreed parenting plan under sections 6.604(b) and 153.007 of the Family Code. See id. §§ 6.604(b) (providing that informal settlement agreement in dissolution of marriage is binding on parties if it provides in prominently displayed statement that is in boldface type, in capital letters, or underlines that agreement is not subject to revocation and is signed by each party and each party's attorney who is present), (d) (providing that if court find terms of informal settlement agreement just and right, terms are binding on court), 153.007(a) (providing that parties may enter into written agreed parenting plan concerning conservatorship and possession of child), (b) (providing that trial court shall render judgment in accordance with agreed parenting plan if it finds that plan is in child's best interest). Kramer argues that because the agreement was an informal settlement agreement, no evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact numbers 1-3, which refer to a "Mediated Settlement Agreement"; finding of fact number 8 and conclusion of law number 8, which state that the parties complied with section 6.602(b) of the Family Code concerning mediated settlement agreements; and finding of fact number 10 and conclusion of law number 11, which state that the agreement was binding at the time it was signed.

         Initially, we observe that, as Kramer points out, Kastleman does not contend that the agreement was a mediated settlement agreement within the meaning of section 6.602 of the Family Code. See id. § 6.602; Lee v. Lee, 158 S.W.3d 612, 612-14 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that mediated settlement agreement under section 6.602 requires mediation). Further, in finding of fact number 1, the trial court found that the parties signed a "Mediated/Informal Settlement Agreement" and thereafter referred to the agreement as the "Settlement Agreement." Other references were to "the Mediated Settlement Agreement for the Child, " and, as indicated, referred to the agreement concerning the parties' child, which was titled "Mediated Settlement Agreement." In addition, the trial court found that the agreement complied with both sections 6.602(b) and 6.604(b) of the Family Code. While section 6.602 deals with mediated settlement agreements, and section 6.604 deals with informal settlement agreements, the provisions in subsection (b) of the two sections-which set out when an agreement is binding on the parties-are identical except for the references to "[a] mediated settlement agreement" in section 6.602(b) and to "[a] written settlement agreement reached at an informal settlement conference" in section 6.604(b). See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.602(b), .604(b). Presumably, the trial court included both sections in its findings and conclusions because the agreement originated in mediation and was finalized in informal conferences. In fact, the agreement itself recited that the parties "mediated this case" and then "continued as an informal settlement conference" and "as a result thereof have reached an agreement on all issues." On this record, we cannot conclude that there was no evidence to support these findings and conclusions.

         Kramer next argues that because the agreement was an informal settlement agreement and agreed parenting plan, the trial court was required to make findings that the property division was just and right and that the parenting plan was in the best interest of the child prior to entering judgment on the informal settlement agreement. See id. §§ 6.604(d), 153.007(b). Kramer contends that there is no evidence to support these required findings. In the alternative, she urges a factual sufficiency challenge as to the property division finding. Kastleman responds that Kramer did not raise legal or factual sufficiency challenges to the evidentiary support for the trial court's final judgment in her original briefing in this Court and has not preserved this argument for consideration on remand. We conclude that, read liberally, Kramer's original brief contained arguments sufficient to preserve sufficiency arguments on remand. Nonetheless, we do not find them persuasive.

         Legal sufficiency

         In arguing that there was no evidence that the property division was just and right, Kramer relies, in part, on a footnote in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in this case in which the court noted that the settlement agreement did not assign values to the allocated property and no evidence of value was presented at the prove-up hearing. See Kramer, 508 S.W.3d at 214 n.6. However, the Texas Supreme Court was not addressing the issue of whether the property division was just and right; it merely observed that it could not discern if the division was intended to be equal, a question that is not relevant to whether the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of whether the division was just and right. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981) (stating that court has wide discretion and that community property need not be equally divided); In re A.E.R., 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 8597, at *14-15 ("A court has wide discretion in dividing the property; the division need not be equal, but it must be equitable.").

         On the issues of both whether the property division was just and right and whether the parenting plan was in the best interest of the child, the trial court had before it the parties' stipulations as testified to by Kastleman. Kramer argues that the settlement agreement was not offered into evidence at the prove-up hearing and that Kastleman's testimony was not competent evidence because his statements were "conclusory" opinions devoid of any factual support. See, e.g., Gardner v. Abbott, 414 S.W.3d 369, 386 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, no pet.) ("If a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness's testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.") (internal quotation and citation omitted). She further argues that the parties' stipulation as to the property division "cannot substitute for the trial court's independent finding" that the division was just and right and that the parties did not stipulate that the terms of the parenting plan were in the child's best interest. Because she contends that neither Kastleman's testimony nor the parties' stipulations were evidence, Kramer challenges finding of facts numbers 20 and 29-that there was no disputed evidence presented at the prove-up hearing and that there was no disputed evidence regarding the property division-as inaccurate.[3] She contends that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court independently determined that the property division was just and right and that the parenting plan was in the best interest of the child. She further contends that even if the trial court had attempted to determine whether the property division was just and right, the agreement did not support such a finding because there were no values assigned to the allocated property.

         However, the parties stipulated that the property division was fair and just, and, contrary to Kramer's assertion, also stipulated that the parenting plan was in the best interest of the child.[4] In addition, the settlement agreement designated Kastleman as the party to present and "prove up" the agreement. Thus, Kramer stipulated to the required findings, agreed to Kastleman's testimony in support of the findings, and did not attend the hearing to dispute his testimony or present evidence to the contrary. In short, Kastleman's testimony was presented at a prove-up hearing for an agreed property settlement and parenting plan and was supported by the stipulations in the parties' signed informal settlement agreement as testified to by Kastleman and by Kramer's consent to Kastleman's presenting the agreement for approval by the trial court without opposition. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law included express determinations that the settlement terms were fair, equitable, just and right and in the best interest of the child based on the evidence presented to the trial court by agreement, and nothing in the record suggests that the trial court did not review the terms of the agreement, which was introduced into evidence at the hearing on the motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement, prior to entry of the findings and conclusions. See Comerio v. Comerio, No. 04-13-00493-CV, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 5939, at * 4-5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that section 6.604 does not require trial court to make express finding of just and right on record and that there was nothing in record to indicate trial court had not reviewed terms of settlement agreement or had not found them to be just and right). In this context, we cannot conclude that Kramer met her burden to prove that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's findings that the agreement was just and right and in the best interest of the child. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827-28; Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 18-19; Pletcher, 9 S.W.3d at 446; King, 661 S.W.2d at 255.

         Factual sufficiency

         In her alternative argument that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the property division finding, Kramer argues that the "overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrates that the property division was not equitable" and challenges findings of fact numbers 5, 11, and 31 that the property division was just and right. Kramer argues that she revoked her consent and that the only competent evidence showed that the property division was "grossly disproportionate." However, the agreement stated in bold capital letters that it was binding and not subject to revocation, and it was signed by the parties and their attorneys. Consequently, as an informal settlement agreement under section 6.604(b), it was binding on the parties as to the property division. See Tex. Fam. Code § 6.604(b); In re M.A.H., 365 S.W.3d 814, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding that agreement concerning dissolution of marriage that met requirements of section 6.604(b) was binding on parties, and rejecting appellant's argument that she had repudiated agreement before rendition of judgment); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 154.071(a) (providing that written settlement agreement is enforceable in same manner as any other contract).

         As to the parenting plan, while it was not binding on the parties under section 153.007, it is binding on Kramer because the trial court approved it and granted the divorce before Kramer attempted to revoke her consent. While as a general rule, a party may revoke consent to a settlement agreement at any time before judgment is rendered on the agreement, once judgment is rendered, she may not attack that judgment. See S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Mailhot v. Mailhot, 124 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Skidmore v. Glenn, 781 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ). "Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk." S & A Rest., 892 S.W.2d at 857. "The words used by the trial court must clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the words are expressed." Id. at 858. Here, at the conclusion of the prove-up hearing on August 19, 2011, the trial court approved the settlement agreement and stated, "I grant the divorce." And in the corrected decree, the trial court stated that the divorce had been "judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED in court at Austin, Texas, Travis County, Texas, on August 19, 2011, and further noted on the court's docket sheet on the same date . . . ." On this record, we conclude that the trial court clearly indicated its intent to render judgment on August 19, 2011, and Kramer's subsequent attempt to withdraw consent was ineffective. See id.; Oliverez v. Oliverez, No. 13-07-00348-CV, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 4501, at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 19, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that trial court expressed intent to render judgment when it stated, "Then the divorce is granted."); In re Marriage of Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 885, 887, 892 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (holding that trial court rendered judgment by oral pronouncement that "your divorce is granted"); see also Comerio, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 5939, at *7-8 (holding that trial court intended to render judgment when it stated, "Granted and rendered"); Skidmore, 781 S.W.2d at 675 (reading pronouncement in context, and concluding that trial court rendered judgment when it stated, "I'll enter an order approving the agreement."). Thus, the settlement agreement was binding on the parties as to the property division under section 6.604 of the Family Code and as to both the property division and the parenting plan under the common law rule that a party cannot revoke consent to a settlement agreement after rendition of judgment. See Tex. Fam. Code § 6.604(b); S & A Rest., 892 S.W.2d at 858; Oliverez, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 4501, at *6; Joyner, 196 S.W.3d at 885, 887, 892; cf. In re M.A.H., 365 S.W.3d at 820 (holding that agreement concerning unmediated agreements on child support, conservatorship, and possession was not binding on appellant where she revoked consent before trial court rendered orders on agreement).

         The fact that a party can appeal from a judgment to which she has consented if she alleges and proves fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation, see Hicks v. Hicks, 348 S.W.3d 281, 289 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Boufaissal v. Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d 160, 161 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.), does not save Kramer's argument that she withdrew consent. In her motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement, Kramer alleged fraud, specifically that certain assets were not disclosed or were misrepresented. However, the record supports the conclusion that the disputed assets either were shown to have ceased to exist or have no value, were known to Kramer and listed on her inventory of property, had been addressed in prior hearings, had been produced in discovery, or were covered by the settlement agreement. At the conclusion of the hearing on Kramer's motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement, the trial court questioned Kramer about how she could claim that she was unaware of these assets in light of the facts, and Kramer responded that the production of documents had been so voluminous that she had not had time to review them all before the mediation and settlement discussions. This record does not support the conclusion that Kramer alleged and proved fraud so as to permit her to challenge the judgment to which she agreed. See Hicks, 348 S.W.3d at 289; Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d at 161.

         Further, the evidence does not support Kramer's argument that the property division was "grossly disproportionate." Kramer cites evidence that she entered the marriage with a significantly higher net worth than Kastleman, that she loaned separate property money to the community estate, that Kastleman managed the assets and grew their joint net worth fifteenfold, that Kramer did not work after the marriage, that the settlement agreement did not contain values, and that her inventory did not contain values for some of Kastleman's separate property. She also cites her testimony at the hearing on the motion to set aside the settlement agreement and in an affidavit that the division assigned Kastleman 70% of the community estate, while she received only 30%. However, the "testimony" to which she refers was actually comments she made at the hearing while not under oath after interrupting the proceeding, firing her attorney, and expressing her frustration until the trial court ultimately stopped her. And the affidavit to which she refers was attached to her motion to set aside the divorce decree and motion for new trial, filed after the hearing on her motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement, and was not before the trial court in ruling on Kramer's motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). In light of the parties' stipulation that the division was fair and just and Kastleman's testimony to that effect with Kramer's consent, we cannot conclude that Kramer has met her burden to show that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that the property division was fair and just. See Ortiz, 917 S.W.2d at 772; In re A.E.R., 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 8597, at *3; Pletcher, 9 S.W.3d at 446; King, 661 S.W.2d at 255.

         Finally, Kramer contends that the property division was not just and right because it was procured through economic duress. She argues that although the settlement agreement recites that it was signed by each party "freely and without duress after having consulted with the legal and tax professionals of his or her choice, " the testimony in her affidavit-attached to her motion to set aside the divorce decree and motion for new trial-details the economic duress she faced when she signed the agreement. In her affidavit she asserted, among other things, that during the course of the divorce proceeding, Kastleman eliminated her access to community funds other than what he was ordered to pay her, cancelled her credit cards, and essentially "seize[d] complete control of the community assets"; obtained a reduction from $20, 000 per month to $10, 000 per month in the amount of attorney's fees he was to pay her and often delayed in making those payments; failed to timely produce documents, requiring her to file numerous motions to obtain them, and then produced voluminous documents that were not organized or Bates stamped; and sought to have her pay litigation costs incurred by various business entities, her own health insurance, and the mortgage and utilities for the family home. She also asserted her belief that Kastleman was hiding marital estate assets in a "complex web of shell corporations" and had to spend her separate property money to "attempt[] to sort out the web of obfuscation created by [Kastleman]"; was running out of money and could not liquidate funds without incurring penalties or facing capital gains tax; had borrowed all the funds she could from family members; and by the time of mediation had "no alternative but to take whatever deal was on the table."

         The record before us does not support the contention that Kramer was under economic duress prior to settlement. "In Texas, the term 'duress' rather than 'coercion' is generally used when parties are seeking to avoid a contract." Lujan v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 433 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (internal quotations omitted); accord Wright v. Sydow, 173 S.W.3d 534, 543-44 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) ("Generally, when one coerces another to execute a contract by taking undue or unjust advantage of the person's economic necessity or distress, the contract may be invalid or unenforceable. This legal theory is called economic duress.") (internal citation omitted). To meet her burden to show that the property division was not just and right because of economic duress, Kramer had to establish that she was experiencing economic necessity or distress. See Lujan, 433 S.W.3d at 706; Pletcher, 9 S.W.3d at 446; King, 661 S.W.2d at 255. On the record before us, Kramer has not met that burden.

         The record shows that under the trial court's temporary orders, Kramer was receiving $1, 200 per month in child support; $6, 000 per month in spousal support, less the amount for the monthly mortgage payment, which Kastleman was to pay directly; and $10, 000 in interim monthly attorney's fees, following three initial payments totaling $68, 304. The temporary orders also reflect that Kastleman was to provide medical support for the child as additional child support, provide coverage for the child under his health insurance, and pay Kramer's health insurance premiums and 50% of all her unreimbursed health care expenses. The record contains no evidence that Kramer filed any motions complaining that Kastleman had failed to pay any of these amounts and seeking to enforce the orders. Also under the temporary orders, during the pendency of the divorce proceeding, Kramer was given the exclusive use of the family home-on which Kastleman was to pay the second lien and cost of all repairs necessary if the home was to be sold-and two family cars, a 2000 Lexus and a 2005 Lexus. In addition, Kramer's second amended inventory, submitted approximately two weeks before mediation, listed as her separate property almost $900, 000 in assets in bank and brokerage accounts, including an IRA. On this record, we cannot conclude that Kramer established that she was under economic duress when she signed the informal settlement agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kramer's motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement. See Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109; In re A.E.R., 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 8597, at *2; In re Marriage of C.A.S., 405 S.W.3d at 382; In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d at 95. We overrule Kramer's first issue.

         Terms of the Divorce Decree and Kramer's Motion for New Trial

         We consider together Kramer's second and third issues, in which she argues that the trial court's judgment should be reversed because the Corrected Divorce Decree contained terms not agreed to by the parties (Issue 2) and that the trial court therefore erred in denying her motion for new trial on that basis (Issue 3). Kramer contends that even if this Court concludes that the informal settlement agreement was valid, the trial court improperly modified the agreement by adding terms not agreed to and by omitting agreed terms. When parties reach a settlement agreement, a final judgment based on that agreement must be in "strict or literal compliance with that agreement." Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Vickery v. American Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976) (per curiam)). The law does not require that the parties agree to all of the terms necessary to effectuate the purposes of the agreement; it is necessary only that the parties reach an agreement as to all material terms. McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). A judgment is not in "strict or literal compliance" with the terms of the agreement if it improperly removes or adds material terms. See Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d at 98 (citing Vickery, 532 S.W.2d at 292). However, a trial court may modify the terms of a settlement agreement as long as the modifications do not add terms the parties have not agreed to, significantly alter ...


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