United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
PAUL G. STEWART Plaintiff,
AUTOREVO, LTD., and AUTOREVO RC LLC, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. BOYLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 17. For
the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS
case arises out of alleged disability and race-based
employment discrimination. Plaintiff Paul Stewart was
employed as one of three national dealer consultants at
Defendant AutoRevo from January through May 2014. Doc. 1,
Pl.'s Compl., ¶¶ 20, 37. As a national dealer
consultant, Stewart telemarketed AutoRevo's products to
car dealerships. Id. On May 7, 2014, Stewart
presented AutoRevo with a note from his doctor, which stated
that Stewart “would benefit from being able to work
from home especially while he is being treated for an acute
musculoskelatal issue that requires sedating
medications.” Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s Compl., Ex. A.
AutoRevo claims it explained to Stewart that it was concerned
about the sedative nature of Stewart's medication and
that the company had never allowed employees to work from
home indefinitely. Doc. 18, Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot.
to Dismiss, 5. According to Stewart, AutoRevo refused to
accommodate his request to work from home and “regarded
his taking ‘sedative medications' as so physically
or mentally impairing that he could not make telephone calls
or drive a car.” Doc.1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 33.
AutoRevo terminated Stewart on May 8, 2014. Id.
filed this action on January 3, 2017, alleging five counts of
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and one count of discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. AutoRevo
filed its Motion to Dismiss on April 21, 2017, which asks the
Court to dismiss Stewart's claims for failure to state a
claim under Rules 12(b)(6) and (8)(a). Doc. 17, Defs.'
Mot. to Dismiss. Defendants' Motion is ripe for review.
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes
the Court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Id. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he [C]ourt accepts all
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). The
Court will “not look beyond the face of the pleadings
to determine whether relief should be granted based on the
alleged facts.” Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d
772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999).
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. When well-pleaded facts fail to meet this
plausibility standard, “the complaint has alleged-but
it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
pleads five claims under the ADA: AutoRevo failed to
participate in an interactive process to identify reasonable
accommodations (Count I); Stewart was regarded as disabled
and AutoRevo failed to accommodate his disability and treated
him less favorably than non-disabled employees (Counts II and
IV), and Stewart was actually disabled and AutoRevo failed to
accommodate his disability and treated him less favorably
than non-disabled employees (Counts III and ...