United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
for consideration the report of the United States Magistrate
Judge in this action, this matter having been heretofore
referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636. On September 19, 2017, the report of the Magistrate
Judge (Dkt. #12) was entered containing proposed findings of
fact and recommendations that Plaintiff Hilda Parris's
Motion to Remand (Dkt. #11) be granted and this cause be
remanded to the 211th Judicial District Court, Denton County,
Texas. Having received the report and recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge, having considered Defendant's
objections (Dkt. #19), and having conducted a de novo review,
the Court is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions
of the Magistrate Judge are correct and adopts the Magistrate
Judge's report as the findings and conclusions of the
29, 2014, Plaintiff Hilda Parris filed a divorce with
children action in the 211th Judicial District Court, Denton
County, Texas (“State Court”) (Dkt. #1, Exhibit
A). On October 29, 2015, the State Court entered a Final
Decree of Divorce and an Order Withholding from Earnings for
Child Support (Dkt. #1, Exhibit A). On January 11, 2016,
Defendant Jason Parris filed a Motion to Enter a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) (Dkt. #1,
Exhibit A). On March 3, 2016, the State Court canceled the
hearing on the Motion to Enter QDRO and ordered the file sent
to Records Management for storage (Dkt. #1, Exhibit A).
Thereafter, on or about June 20, 2017, Defendant received a
notice letter from the Office of the Attorney General
regarding his alleged nonpayment of child support (Dkt. #1,
Exhibit B), as well as a Notice of Levy (Dkt. #1, Exhibit C).
On July 19, 2017, Defendant purported to remove the divorce
action and issue of support payments to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman
Division, asserting federal jurisdiction under “28
U.S.C. §§ 1443 and 1446(b), and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367” (Dkt. #1 at p. 1).
Although Defendant labeled himself as
“Petitioner” in the caption of his Notice of
Removal, the Court found that Defendant sought removal of the
State Court proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443
(Dkts. #1 at p. 4; #12 at p. 2) (“this is a removal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1443”).
September 19, 2017, the Magistrate Judge entered a report and
recommendation (Dkt. #12) recommending that Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand be granted and this case be remanded to the
211th Judicial District Court, Denton County, Texas.
Defendant filed his “Objections to Unauthorized
Magistrate Report and Recommendations with Conditional
Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law”
(Dkt. #19) on October 10, 2017.
who files timely written objections to a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation is entitled to a de
novo review of those findings or recommendations to which the
party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2)-(3). In his forty-eight page
Objections, Defendant lodges multiple complaints, many of
which are repetitive.
initial matter, Defendant argues the report and
recommendation “is NOT amongst the available
types of dispositive actions that federal magistrate judges
may ever address without the consent of the parties.”
(Dkt. #19 at p. 2) (emphasis in original). But the Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, permits “a [full
Article III] judge [to] designate a magistrate judge to hear
and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,
except [certain dispositive motions]” and further
permits a judge [to] designate a magistrate judge to . . .
submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court,
of any [of those excepted] motion[s] . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A)-(B). The Court's Local Rules also
provide district judges wide latitude in referring matters
and motions for a magistrate judge's review. E.D. Tex.
Local Civil Rule 72(d). A magistrate judge may, therefore,
recommend disposition of a motion to remand to the district
judge, who will then conduct a de novo review of those
portions of the recommendation to which parties raise
specific, timely objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly recognized the statutory
authority to designate a magistrate judge to consider a
motion to remand. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). Here, the Magistrate Judge recommended
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand be granted. The Magistrate
Judge acted within the bounds of statutory authority in
issuing such report and recommendation, and the Court now
properly reviews those portions of the Magistrate Judge's
report and recommendation to which Defendant raises specific
also makes the following arguments in his objections:
• “The State of Texas must surpass pre-deprivation
‘serious parental unfitness' due process hurdles,
and that by clear and convincing evidence, before it may
then, and only then, remove the custodial rights of any
parent to his or her own natural child” (Dkt. #19 at p.
7). As a summary of this argument, Defendant asserts
“the State of Texas family court system is wildly
unconstitutional, perpetrating routine, daily frauds upon
basic constitutional and due process rights of at least
one-half of all the natural parents involved within domestic
relations cases over child custody betwixt two competing
parents, and it is incumbent on this Court to strike down the
same facially repugnant mess.” (Dkt. #19 at pp. 11-12).
• “State family court judges are barred from any
involvement in Title IV-D child support matters of their own
given respective counties due to the pecuniary conflicts of
interests to such county officers within the Title IV-D
system” (Dkt. #19 at p. 12). Defendant requests the
Court “strike down the same facially repugnant mess by
declaring an appropriate injunction against the State of
Texas, its family court system leaders, and/or the
corresponding judicial officers, forbidding such further
conflicts of interest and/or other entanglements, and making
the same permanent.” (Dkt. #19 at pp. 14-15).
• “Causes of action over federal torts are well
established as perfectly proper federal subject matter
jurisdiction even if regarding state domestic relations
cases” (Dkt. #19 at p. 15). According to Defendant, he
is within his rights to bring a federal court tort action for
civil damages “over the original several years of
interference with the parenting time I was supposed
to have equally with my offspring, because such
federal tort actions have been very well established for
decades” (Dkt. #19 at p. 18) (emphasis in original).
Defendant argues “[a]ny frivolous attempt by any
officer or party herein to willfully, intentionally and
knowingly defraud this District Court into avoiding
jurisdiction over federal tort claims brought by this
Petitioner (let alone over the removal action and direct
facial challenge to state statutes itself), simply because
the issues are intertwined with a state domestic relations
case, are abhorrently not in compliance with well-established
federal jurisprudence . . . .” (Dkt. #19 at p. 18).
• “Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 is timely
filed within thirty days of the aggrieved litigant first
ascertaining the existence of his or her right ...