United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
JAIME ALEJANDRO RAMIREZ (BOP Registration No. 47007-177), Movant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KINKEADE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jaime Alejandro Ramirez, a federal prisoner, proceeding
pro se, has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence.
See Dkt. No. 2. Because his Section 2255 motion is
barred by the statute of limitations, for the reasons set
forth below, the Court DISMISSES the motion
pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
See United States v. Ramirez, 3:13-CR-0324-K-(01)
(N.D. Tex.), Dkt. No. 26. The Court sentenced him to 70
months in prison. See United States v. Ramirez,
3:13-CR-0324-K-(01) (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. No. 32. That judgment
was entered on April 16, 2014. See Id. Ramirez did
2016, Ramirez sought permission from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to file a second or
successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See In re
Ramirez, No. 16-10931 (5th Cir. 2016). The Fifth Circuit
transferred his Section 2255 motion to this Court because, as
it was his first, he did not need authorization before filing
it. The Fifth Circuit noted that Ramirez's Section 2255
motion would deemed filed on June 27, 2016-“the date
the motion for authorization was received in this
court.” See In re Ramirez, No. 16-10931 (5th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2016). The government responds that his Section
2255 motion is untimely, see Dkt. No. 8 at 3-5, and
Ramirez has not filed a reply.
2255 establishes a ‘1-year period of limitation'
within which a federal prisoner may file a motion to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence under that section.”
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 356 (2005). It
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under
this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Here, under Section 2255(f)(1),
Ramirez's limitations period began to run when his
judgment of conviction became final. His conviction became
final on April 30, 2014, when his time to file a direct
appeal expired. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i)
(stating that an appeal in a criminal case must be filed
within fourteen days of the entry of judgment); see also
United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
2008) (holding that, where a federal prisoner does not file a
direct appeal, his conviction becomes final when his time to
do so expires). His limitations period expired one year
later, on April 30, 2015.
extent that Ramirez attempts to rely on Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) to reset the statute of
limitations under Section 2255(f)(3), his reliance is
misplaced. In his initial application for authorization,
Ramirez indicated-by checking two boxes on a form
pleading-that he was challenging a conviction for violating
the Armed Career Criminal Act, and a sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, as unconstitutional after
Johnson. Johnson held “that imposing
an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act, ” 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii)-which clause defines a “violent
felony” as one ...