United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MCBRYDE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
for consideration the motion of defendants Lawanda Shead
("Shead"), Aminia Baruti ("Baruti"),
James Riley ("Riley"), Ronald White
("White"), Chris Zagotti ("Zagotti"), and
Rodney Chandler ("Chandler")(collectively
"movants") to dismiss. The court, having considered
the motion, the response of plaintiff, Travis Blank, the
reply, the record, and applicable authorities, finds that the
motion should be granted in part.
a prisoner at FMC-Fort Worth, complains of treatment he
received while incarcerated there, Plaintiff asserts claims
against United States of America under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and claims against movants under Bivins v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff
complains of medical treatment provided by Shead and Baruti
and sues the other movants for failing to address a pigeon
infestation at the facility, all of which he alleges caused
him grievous harm. Doc. 3.
plaintiff alleges that he has Crohn's disease and takes
medication that weakens/compromises his immune system. He
says that he is designated as a "Care Level 3
inmate." Doc. 3 at 11, ¶ 21, Plaintiff developed a
rash common to hundreds of inmates at the facility. His
doctor, Baruti, was deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff's medical needs. Shead, a nurse, knowingly
caused him to undergo treatments that were ineffective and
caused plaintiff extreme pain. Riley, White, Zagotti and
Chandler were aware of and consciously disregarded a pigeon
infestation at the facility that caused inmates, including
plaintiff, to be exposed to dangerous conditions. Plaintiff
developed histoplasmosis as a result of the exposure and
continues to suffer as a result.
of the Motion
allege that plaintiff has failed to state plausible claims
against them. They alternatively argue that they are entitled
to qualified immunity.
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
a general way, the applicable standard of pleading. It
requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, " Fed, R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), "in order to
give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests, " Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted). Although a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, the "showing"
contemplated by Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do more than
simply allege legal conclusions or recite the elements of a
cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3.
Thus, while a court must accept all of the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, it need not credit bare
legal conclusions that are unsupported by any factual
underpinnings. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009) ("While legal conclusions- can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the facts pleaded must allow the court to infer that the
plaintiff's right to relief is plausible. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. To allege a plausible right to relief, the
facts pleaded must suggest liability; allegations that are
merely consistent with unlawful conduct are insufficient.
Id. In other words, where the facts pleaded do no
more than permit the court to infer the possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has not shown that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Id. at 679. "Determining
whether a complaint states a ...