COURT'S OWN MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE
NINTH COURT OF APPEALS MONTGOMERY COUNTY
to Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code, a jury found
Appellant Michael Wayne Bohannan to be a sexually violent
predator. The trial court in that case adjudicated Appellant
as a sexually violent predator and ordered him to be civilly
committed for treatment. Appellant appealed the judgment of
civil commitment, and while the appeal was pending he
violated the civil commitment order. The court of appeals
eventually reversed the judgment of civil commitment.
Appellant was charged and convicted of violating the civil
commitment order, and he was sentenced to life in prison.
Because Appellant was required to follow the terms of the
civil commitment order while the appeal of the judgment of
civil commitment was pending, the court of appeals correctly
affirmed his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the court
1982, Appellant rode his bicycle past K.C.'s home several
times. Bohannan II, 388 S.W.3d at 299. Through a
window, he watched her inside. Id. One evening,
donning a ski mask and carrying a large knife, Appellant
entered K.C.'s home through the rear door. Id.
He walked down the hallway past a room in which a child was
sleeping and entered K.C.'s bedroom, where she was lying
on the bed and reading a newspaper. Id. Appellant
orally and vaginally raped her and then left. Id.
Appellant would later testify in his civil commitment case
that he thought he would get some satisfaction or
self-fulfillment out of raping K.C. Id. In some way,
he also expected K.C. to "like being raped."
three weeks later, Appellant was driving around on his lunch
break when he saw P.H. enter her home. Id. He
stopped, put on his ski mask, picked up his knife, and walked
through the front door. Id. Inside, P.H. was with a
group of children. Id. Appellant forced P.H. to move
the children to another room, and then he orally and
vaginally raped P.H. in her bedroom. Id. As with the
earlier rape of K.C., Appellant thought he would get some
satisfaction from raping P.H. and "maybe . . . feel more
of a man." Id.
was apprehended, and in 1983, he pleaded guilty to two counts
of aggravated rape with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to
twenty years imprisonment. Id. In 1991, Appellant was
released on mandatory supervision. Id. In April
1992, he was charged with attempting to kidnap a nine year
old girl in a K-Mart store. Id. at 299-300. He
pleaded guilty to the new charge in February 1993, his
mandatory supervision was revoked, and he returned to prison.
1998, Appellant was again released on mandatory supervision,
and in 2000, he moved to South Carolina to live with his
mother. Id. at 300. While there, he was convicted of
exposing his genitals to an eight year old girl in a toy
store, and he was sentenced to three years imprisonment.
Id. In 2002, Appellant's mandatory supervision
was again revoked, and he returned to prison in Texas.
2004, Appellant was released on mandatory supervision for a
third time. Id. Two years later in 2006, he was
caught viewing child pornography on a county law library
computer, even though he was enrolled in sex offender therapy
at the time, and his mandatory supervision was again revoked.
Id. After a psychologist reported that Appellant was
a sexually violent predator, the State petitioned for him to
be civilly committed. Id. A civil commitment trial
was held in which the State had two experts testify.
Id. at 301. However, Appellant's designated
expert was not permitted to testify. Id. The jury
determined that Appellant suffered from a behavioral
abnormality, as defined in the sexually violent predator
statute, and the trial court accordingly adjudicated
Appellant as a sexually violent predator and ordered
Appellant to be civilly committed. Id. at 302.
Appellant appealed this decision. See In re Commitment of
Bohannan, 379 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010) (mem.
op.) (Bohannan I).
he was transferred to the supervision of the Council on Sex
Offender Treatment. Bohannan v. State, No.
09-13-00090-CR, 2014 WL 5490936 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Oct. 29,
2014) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(Bohannan III). Under the civil commitment order,
Appellant was required to reside in a secured residential
facility and to comply with the written requirements of the
Council of Sex Offender Treatment and the case manager
assigned to his case. Id., at *1. The written
requirements instructed Appellant to comply with the rules of
the residential facility. Id., at *2. The civil
commitment order also required Appellant to wear a GPS
monitor, be subject to monitoring, and comply with the
written instructions for the monitoring system, which
required Appellant to be tracked twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week. Id. Appellant's tracking
device consisted of three parts: an ankle bracelet, a
miniature tracking device (MTD) that Appellant would carry
with him throughout the day, and a charging station for the
MTD. Rep. R. vol. 3, 45-46, vol. 4, 15. The MTD itself
reported Appellant's GPS location information, and the
bracelet was simply a means of ensuring that the MTD was with
Appellant at all times and that Appellant's tracking data
was accurate. Rep. R. vol. 4, 17-18. If the bracelet and the
MTD were too far apart, a bracelet gone alert would be sent
by the MTD to Appellant's case manager, indicating that
the bracelet and Appellant, who would be wearing the
bracelet, were no longer near the MTD and were not being
tracked. Rep. R. vol. 4, 18-19. Bracelet gone alerts were
considered to be violations of the monitoring system
requirements, which themselves would be violations of the
civil commitment order. Rep. R. vol. 3, 46. The MTD regularly
needed to be recharged in the base charging station, and
while it was charging Appellant would have to stay close to
the MTD or else trigger a bracelet gone alert. Rep. R. vol.
February 14, 2009, the MTD generated a "bracelet
gone" alert. Bohannan III, 2014 WL 5490936, at
*2. Further alerts were generated on March 2, 8, 18, and 27,
2009. Rep. R. vol. 3, 47. Most of the alerts were for a
couple of minutes, and Appellant claimed that he was asleep
during those alerts or that the MTD was malfunctioning. Rep.
R. vol. 3, 49-57. However, the March 18 alert lasted for
seventeen minutes, and Appellant's explanation was that
he left the MTD in his room and went to another part of the
facility. Bohannan III, 2014 WL 5490936, at *2. The
five bracelet gone alerts were alleged as violations of the
civil commitment order. Id.
22, 2010, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of civil
commitment and remanded for a new civil commitment trial.
See Bohannan I, 379 S.W.3d at 300. The court of
appeals found that the trial court erred by excluding
Appellant's expert witness from testifying, and the error
was not harmless. Id. Eight months after the court
of appeals's decision, on March 15, 2011, Appellant's
case manager requested Appellant sign and acknowledge written
civil commitment requirements, but Appellant refused.
Bohannan III, 2014 WL 5490936, at *3.
Appellant's case manager made another attempt on March
17, 2011, but he was again refused by Appellant. Id.
The refusals were alleged as additional violations of
Appellant's civil commitment order. Id.
April 24, 2011, Appellant got into a dispute with the staff
at the facility. Id. He claimed that he was being
denied his medication, and he became argumentative. Rep. R.
vol. 3, 84-85. He pounded on a counter, cursed at personnel,
and refused to return to his room. Bohannan III,
2014 WL 5490936, at *3. Local police responded to the
disturbance, and they later returned to execute a parole
revocation warrant and take Appellant to jail. Id.
This incident was also alleged as a violation of the civil
commitment order. Id.
the State sought review of the court of appeals's
decision reversing the judgment of civil commitment. See
Bohannan II, 388 S.W.3d at 302. On August 31, 2012, the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals. Id. at 307. Nevertheless, a couple of
months later in October of 2012, the State indicted Appellant
of violating the civil commitment order. Bohannan
III, 2014 WL 5490936, at *1. The mandate of reversal was
issued on January 18, 2013. Id., at *3. Still, the
State proceeded with the prosecution, and on February 12,
2013, Appellant was convicted by a jury of violating the
civil commitment order. Id., at *1. Finding
enhancement paragraphs alleging the rape convictions and the
South Carolina indecent exposure conviction to be true, the
jury assessed a sentence of life in prison. Id.
court of appeals upheld Appellant's conviction.
Id., at *7. Appellant filed a pro se petition with
this Court for discretionary review alleging several grounds
of error. On this Court's own motion, we granted review
for one issue: Can a conviction for violating a civil
commitment order be upheld when the underlying commitment
order has been reversed on appeal?
first argues that the conviction cannot be upheld because the
reversal of the civil commitment order deprived the trial
court of jurisdiction. This is so, he contends, because a
valid indictment is necessary for jurisdiction. According to
Appellant, the indictment in this case is invalid because it
does not state an offense, and it does not state an offense
because there is no valid judgment or order of civil
the Texas Constitution, the presentment of an indictment or
information to a court invests that court with jurisdiction
over the case. Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b). To
constitute an indictment or information, an instrument must
charge a person with the commission of an offense. Teal
v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 477 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). The proper test to determine if a charging instrument
alleges an offense, for purposes of jurisdiction analysis, is
whether the allegations in it are clear enough that one can
identify the offense alleged. Teal, 230 S.W.3d at
180. If they are, then the indictment is sufficient to confer
subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. "Stated
another way: can the trial court (and appellate courts who