United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division
PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendant's Third Amended Motion to Dismiss.
(Dkt. 27). Having considered the parties' submissions,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court agrees that
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims is proper under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Jessica Ryburn (“Plaintiff”) brings this action
on behalf of her minor son L.W., who was previously a student
at a middle school within Giddings Independent School
District (“Defendant”). The claims here arise
from an injury L.W. sustained while engaged in an exercise
called “mat drills” at the direction of his
present motion to dismiss comes after several rounds of
amended pleadings. Plaintiff's original complaint
contained only a single claim under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
(“Title IX”). (Dkt. 1, ¶ 61). Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 2), and Plaintiff responded
by filing an amended complaint, (Dkt. 5). Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint kept the Title IX claim and added a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”) based on an alleged violation of L.W.'s
rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
(Dkt. 5, ¶¶ 97-104). Defendant filed another motion
to dismiss, (Dkt. 6), and Plaintiff again amended her
complaint, (Dkt. 11).
Second Amended Complaint retained L.W.'s Title IX and
Section 1983 claims, but modified the latter by adding
several new constitutional violations: L.W.'s
constitutional rights to bodily integrity, medical care, and
education. (Id. ¶¶ 96-121). Defendant
moved to dismiss a third time, (Dkt. 14), and in an order
issued on August 31, 2017 (“August 31 Order”),
the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims without
prejudice. (Dkt. 24). In that order, the Court also granted
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint a third time.
(Id. at 15). Plaintiff accepted the Court's
invitation and filed her Third Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 25),
which is the subject of the present motion to dismiss.
is little in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint that
differs from the second. Plaintiff added some new factual
allegations, but the vast majority of Plaintiff's
allegations are simply recited verbatim from the Second
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also recharacterized some of the
constitutional violations underlying her Section 1983 claim
and added a handful of new facts to her Title IX claim.
Finally, Plaintiff added claims under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
12131, et seq. (“ADA”), and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701
et seq. (“Section 504”).
argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
(Dkt. 27, at 1). Defendant argues that Rule 12(b)(1) requires
dismissal of Plaintiff's Title IX, ADA, and Section 504
claims. (Id. ¶ 7). Defendant argues that
because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her ADA and Section 504
claims, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
those claims. (Id. ¶ 9 (“Because alleged
‘exhaustion' is not explained for the vague ADA and
[Section] 504 claims, those likewise do not confer
jurisdiction.”)). Defendant also states that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Title IX claim
because “Plaintiff has not stated a recognized cause of
action under Title IX.” (Id.). Although
Plaintiff does not address Defendant's 12(b)(1)
arguments, the Court is nonetheless not persuaded to follow
them. Accordingly, the Court will consider
whether dismissal of Plaintiff's claims is appropriate
under Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, the
Court holds that all of Plaintiff's claims should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
Standard of Review
to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not
need detailed factual allegations, ' but must provide the
[plaintiff's] grounds for entitlement to relief-including
factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.'”
Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). That is, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'--that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quotation marks and
Plaintiff's Title IX Claim
Court's August 31 Order, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff's Title IX claim because “Plaintiff's
allegation that L.W. was required to engage in exercises that
female students were not simply does not suffice to state a
plausible claim of actionable discrimination under Title
IX.” (Dkt. 24, at 6). Plaintiff's Third Amended
Complaint introduces a handful of ...