Appeal from the 133rd District Court Harris County, Texas,
Trial Court Case No. 2015-20603
consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Caughey.
April 10, 2017, the trial court dismissed Armando and Rose
Salazar's claims against Worley Parsons Group Inc. and
Worley Parsons Corporation for failure to file a certificate
of merit, as required by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code Chapter 150. On July 7, 2017, the Salazars filed a
notice of appeal. Worley Parsons seeks dismissal of the
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that
the Salazars' notice of appeal was
untimely. Because we agree that the notice of appeal
was untimely, we dismiss the interlocutory appeal for lack of
150.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, entitled
Certificate of Merit, provides, in relevant part, that in
"any action or arbitration proceeding for damages
arising out of the provision of professional services by a
licensed or registered professional, the plaintiff shall
be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of a
third-party licensed architect, licensed professional
engineer, registered landscape architect, or registered
professional land surveyor . . . ." Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 150.002(a) (emphasis added). It
mandates that the third party offering this affidavit hold
"the same professional license or registration as the
defendant" and be "knowledgeable in the area of
practice of the defendant." Id. Furthermore,
the "affidavit shall set forth specifically for each
theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the
negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of
the licensed or registered professional in providing the
professional service, including any error or omission in
providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar
professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for
each such claim." Id. at § 150.002(b).
Code makes clear that where the plaintiff fails to file this
requisite certificate of merit, the complaint must be
dismissed. Id. at § 150.002(e). Moreover, the
"order granting or denying a motion for dismissal is
immediately appealable as an interlocutory order."
Id. § 150.002(f).
appeals authorized by statute are accelerated appeals.
See Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(a). Thus, the deadline to
perfect an interlocutory appeal is 20 days after the court
signs the judgment or order. Tex.R.App.P. 26.1(b) ("[I]n
an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed
within 20 days after the judgment or order is signed.").
the Salazars did not file a timely notice of appeal from the
interlocutory order. On April 10, 2017, the trial court
signed its interlocutory order dismissing the Salazars'
claims under Chapter 150. The deadline to perfect an appeal
of that order was therefore May 1, 2017. The Salazars filed
their July 7, 2017 notice of appeal sixty-seven days after
the deadline. This was too late.
the Salazars' Motion for New Trial does not change this
result. On May 10, 2017, the Salazars filed a "Motion
for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting
Defendant Worley Parsons' Motion to Dismiss, and
Alternatively, Motion for New Trial." Although the
filing of a motion for new trial extends the deadline for
perfecting an appeal in regular appeals, "[f]iling a
motion for new trial does not extend the appellate deadlines
in an accelerated appeal . . . . [T]he deadline for filing a
notice of appeal is strictly set at twenty days after the
judgment is signed, with no exceptions." Spencer v.
Pagliarulo, 448 S.W.3d 605, 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re K.A.F., 160
S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. 2005) and citing Tex.R.App.P. 26.1(b))
(internal punctuations omitted). "Filing a motion for
new trial [or] any other post-trial motion . . . . will not
extend the time to perfect an accelerated appeal."
a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks
jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See
Tex. R. App. P. 25.1. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a),
43.2(f). The dismissal of this interlocutory appeal is
without prejudice to the filing of an appeal from a final
order in the underlying case. We dismiss the Salazars'
motion for voluntary dismissal and any other pending motions
 After Worley Parsons filed its motion
to dismiss, the Salazars also filed a motion to voluntarily
dismiss their appeal in which they assert that the April 10,
2017 order was interlocutory. The Salazars have not paid the
fees for the filing of a clerk's record, but assert that
the parties have not moved to sever, the trial court has not
severed the action, and the trial court has not entered a
final judgment in the severed case. Worley Parsons urges ...