United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Dr. Martha C. Storrie's (“Dr.
Storrie”) Motion to Intervene Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24 (Dkt. #14). After reviewing the relevant
pleadings and motion, the Court finds that the motion should
August 21, 2017, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) initiated this action against Defendant
Denton County. The EEOC alleges that Defendant violated the
Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) by paying Dr. Storrie lower
wages and/or compensation than her male colleagues performing
equal work. On September 26, 2017, Dr. Storrie filed a
Complaint in Intervention (Dkt. #11) asserting the Defendant
violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Further, on October 3, 2017, Dr. Storrie filed a
Motion to Intervene (Dkt. #14). Defendant filed its response
(Dkt. #17) on October 13, 2017, and Dr. Storrie filed her
reply (Dkt. #19) on October 30, 2017.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, intervention is either
permissive or a matter of right. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)-(b). A
party seeking to intervene as a matter of right under Rule
24(a) must satisfy four elements: “(1) the application
for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so
situated that the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must be
inadequately represented by the existing parties to the
suit.” Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,
1204-05 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th
Cir. 1984) (en banc)). “If a party seeking to intervene
fails to meet any one of those requirements then it cannot
intervene as a matter of right.” Kneeland v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 806 F.2d 1285,
1287 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. (1987).
makes several arguments for why the Court should deny Dr.
Storrie's motion. Specifically, Defendant makes
merit-based arguments and intervention arguments. First,
Defendant claims intervention is improper because (a) Dr.
Storrie's proposed Complaint in Intervention exceeds the
scope of the Charge of Discrimination, and (b) Dr.
Storrie's proposed Complaint in Intervention includes
claims which are legally barred. Second, Defendant contends
intervention is inappropriate because Dr. Storrie fails to
satisfy all four requirements for intervention as a matter of
right. In response, Dr. Storrie contends that her Complaint
in Intervention is within the scope of the facts contained in
the Charge of Discrimination, discriminatory actions that are
time-barred may be used by a Title VII plaintiff as
background evidence in support of a timely claim, and she
meets all four requirements to intervene as a matter of
right. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
makes two merit-based arguments. First, Dr. Storrie's
Complaint in Intervention falls outside the scope of the
Charge of Discrimination, and second, Dr. Storrie's
claims are legally barred. The Court addresses each argument
Scope of the Complaint in Intervention and Charge of
argues that Dr. Storrie's Title VII claims are improper
because they fall outside the scope of Dr. Storrie's
Charge of Discrimination. Specifically, Defendant claims that
“the instant lawsuit only involve[s] allegations of pay
discrepancy” under the EPA, not Title VII gender
discrimination (Dkt. #17 at p. 3). In response, Dr. Storrie
contends her complaint is within the scope of the Charge of
Discrimination because in the Charge of Discrimination she
“explicitly states she was discriminated against based
on her sex through Denton County's actions of paying her
less than her male counterpart and stating that her male
counterpart was worth more.” (Dkt. #19 at p. 5).
a charge with the EEOC is a condition precedent to the filing
of a Title VII suit. Stith v. Perot Sys. Corp., 122
F. App'x 115, 118 (5th Cir. 2005). “A suit that
flows from an EEOC complaint is limited by charges of
discrimination ‘like or related to' allegations
contained in the EEOC complaint.” Id.
(citations omitted); accord Danner v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 447 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir. 1971). Stated
differently, “[t]he scope of a Title VII complaint is
limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of