United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MARIO RENE GARCIA-GRANDE (BOP Registration No. 93582-079), Movant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KINKEADE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Mario Rene Garcia-Grande, a federal prisoner, proceeding
pro se, has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See Dkt.
No. 5. Because his Section 2255 motion is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, as explained below, the
Court DISMISSES the motion with prejudice.
pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry and was sentenced to 67
months in prison. His direct appeal was dismissed as
frivolous on March 9, 2016, see United States v.
Garcia-Grande, No. 15-10527 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2016), and
he did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari.
31, 2017, Movant filed a motion to reopen his criminal case.
See United States v. Garcia-Grande, No.
3:14-cr-424-K (01), Dkt. No. 37. The Court construed his
motion as requesting relief under Section 2255 and provided
the warnings required in Castro v. United States,
540 U.S. 375 (2003). See Dkt. No. 1. The Court
further instructed Movant to refile his motion on the
Court's standard Section 2255 form. See Id.
Movant then filed this amended Section 2255 motion.
See Dkt. No. 5. He argues that his guilty plea was
unknowing and involuntary because his counsel did not explain
to him “all the fact(s).” See Id. at 7.
Movant's Section 2255 motion appeared to be barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, the Court ordered him to
show cause why his motion should not be dismissed as
time-barred. See Dkt. No. 6. Movant has not filed a
Section 2255 motion is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations codified in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which the Court may consider
sua sponte. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
198, 209-210 (2006) (addressing a similar provision
applicable to state habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. §
2254). 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) states:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under
this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest
of-(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Movant does not allege any facts that could trigger a
starting date under Sections 2255(f)(2)-(4), so his
limitations period began to run when his judgment of
conviction became final. See § 2255(f)(1). His
conviction became final on June 7, 2016, when the ninety-day
period to file a petition for a writ of certiorari expired.
See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003)
(holding that “[f]inality attaches when this Court
affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies
a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for
filing a certiorari petition expires”). His statute of
limitations expired June 7, 2017, and his Section 2255
motion-filed on July 31, 2017-is time-barred absent equitable
statute of limitations in § 2255 may be equitably tolled
in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances.'”
United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th
Cir. 2000). “The doctrine of equitable tolling
preserves a [party's] claims when strict application of
the statute of limitations would be inequitable.”
Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298
(5th Cir. 1995)). It “applies principally where [one
party] is actively misled by the [other party] about the
cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way
from asserting his rights.” See Coleman v.
Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (quoting Rashidi v. Am.
President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996)). In
the context of a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner,
the Supreme Court has stated that a habeas petitioner is
entitled to equitable tolling ...