United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division
OPINION AND ORDER
O' CONNOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Willis Craig Beauford, a federal prisoner, has filed a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
his federal sentence. See ECF No. 1. Because
Movant's Section 2255 motion is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations, the Court concludes that the motion
should be dismissed with prejudice. See Rule 4(b),
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United
States District Courts.
pleaded guilty to fraud in connection with access devices and
was sentenced to 92 months in prison with two years of
supervised release. See No. 4:14-cr-136-O (02), ECF
No. 73. He filed a direct appeal, but it was dismissed on
November 28, 2014. See United States v. Beauford,
No. 14-11235 (5th Cir.). He did not file a petition for a
writ of certiorari.
October 18, 2017, Movant filed this Section 2255 motion.
See ECF No. 1 at 15. He claims that: (1) the Court
erred in calculating his Guideline sentence by
over-representing the amount of the intended loss; and (2)
his counsel failed to meaningfully challenge the Court's
calculation of the intended loss. See Id. at 6.
Movant's Section 2255 motion appeared untimely, the Court
ordered him to show cause why his motion should not be
dismissed as time-barred. See ECF No. 3; accord
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209-210 (2006) (holding
that the district court may raise the time-bar sua
sponte, but “before acting on its own
initiative” to dismiss a time-barred habeas petition,
“a court must afford the parties fair notice and an
opportunity to present their positions.”). He responds
that the Court should equitably toll the statute of
limitations and that he can overcome it on a showing of
actual innocence. See ECF No. 4 at 1-2.
2255 proceedings are governed by a one-year statute of
limitations. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(the “AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f). The statute provides that the limitations
period shall run from the latest of -
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable
tolling in “rare and exceptional circumstances.”
See, e.g., United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d
796, 800 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002) ...