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Beauford v. United States

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

December 15, 2017

WILLIS CRAIG BEAUFORD, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          REED O' CONNOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Movant, Willis Craig Beauford, a federal prisoner, has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. See ECF No. 1. Because Movant's Section 2255 motion is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the Court concludes that the motion should be dismissed with prejudice. See Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.

         Applicable Background

         Movant pleaded guilty to fraud in connection with access devices and was sentenced to 92 months in prison with two years of supervised release. See No. 4:14-cr-136-O (02), ECF No. 73. He filed a direct appeal, but it was dismissed on November 28, 2014. See United States v. Beauford, No. 14-11235 (5th Cir.). He did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

         On October 18, 2017, Movant filed this Section 2255 motion. See ECF No. 1 at 15. He claims that: (1) the Court erred in calculating his Guideline sentence by over-representing the amount of the intended loss; and (2) his counsel failed to meaningfully challenge the Court's calculation of the intended loss. See Id. at 6.

         Because Movant's Section 2255 motion appeared untimely, the Court ordered him to show cause why his motion should not be dismissed as time-barred. See ECF No. 3; accord Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209-210 (2006) (holding that the district court may raise the time-bar sua sponte, but “before acting on its own initiative” to dismiss a time-barred habeas petition, “a court must afford the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.”). He responds that the Court should equitably toll the statute of limitations and that he can overcome it on a showing of actual innocence. See ECF No. 4 at 1-2.

         Legal Standards

         Section 2255 proceedings are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (the “AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The statute provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of -

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id.

         The one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling in “rare and exceptional circumstances.” See, e.g., United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 800 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002) ...


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