Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Second
District of Texas
interlocutory appeal arises from respondent Taylor Rice's
suit contesting the validity of a sex offender residency
restrictions ordinance enacted by petitioner, the City of
Krum. Krum presents issues regarding Rice's standing to
bring this suit and the trial court's jurisdiction over a
civil challenge to an allegedly penal ordinance. We do not
reach these issues, however, because Rice's claims were
rendered moot during the pendency of the appeal. Accordingly,
we vacate the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial
court, and we dismiss the case as moot.
2014, Rice pled guilty to sexual assault of a
fourteen-year-old. Rice agreed to deferred adjudication
community supervision, the terms of which barred him from
going "within 1, 000 feet of a premise where children
commonly gather, including a . . . playground, " until
2024. Rice also had to register as a sex offender under
Article 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. At the
time, the City of Krum had in place a sex offender residency
restrictions ordinance (SORRO) prohibiting registered sex
offenders who had committed violations involving minors under
the age of sixteen from residing "within 2, 000 feet of
any premises where children commonly gather."
his arrest, Rice lived in Krum with his parents, whose house
is seventy-seven feet from the Krum Municipal Park. Following
his guilty plea, the SORRO barred Rice from living in that
house, and the terms of his community supervision prohibited
him from even going there. Nonetheless, Rice returned to his
parents' house after his release, and he alleges that
Krum police officers ordered him to vacate the residence
under threat of enforcement of the SORRO. Rice sued Krum in
2015, challenging the SORRO's validity on the ground
that, as a general-law city, Krum lacked the authority to
pass such an ordinance. His alleged harm was that he wished to
live with his parents or to "establish his residence at
another location within the City of Krum prohibited by [the]
SORRO." Krum filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing
that Rice lacked standing to sue. The trial court denied
Krum's plea, and Krum filed an interlocutory appeal.
appeal, Krum continued to challenge Rice's standing,
arguing that his claimed injury was not traceable to Krum or
the SORRO because the terms of his community supervision
already prevented him from living at his parents' house.
Krum also argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
hear Rice's civil challenge to the SORRO, which Krum
contended was a penal ordinance. A divided court of appeals
affirmed the order denying Krum's plea to the
jurisdiction. 508 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016). The
court held that Rice had standing because the restriction in
Krum's SORRO (2, 000 feet from a place where children
gather) was broader than that of Rice's community
supervision (1, 000 feet from such a place). Id. at
820. The court concluded that Rice's alleged general
desire to live somewhere in Krum that violated the SORRO was
enough to establish an injury, as the SORRO was the only
restriction in effect between 1, 000 feet and 2, 000 feet
from a place where children gather. Id. Further, the
court interpreted the SORRO as a civil or regulatory
ordinance in its intent and effect despite its penal
language. Id. at 818.
filed a petition for review in this Court reiterating its
jurisdictional arguments.While Krum's petition was pending,
the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 1111, which enables
general-law municipalities to prohibit registered sex
offenders from going near "child safety zones" as
defined in the statute. Act of May 26, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 997, § 3, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4027 (codified
at Tex. Local Gov't Code § 341.906). The
statute's effective date was September 1, 2017.
Id. § 5, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4028.
Among other things, the statute also caps the distance of any
restrictions at 1, 000 feet and requires an exemption for
persons who established residence within a restricted zone
before the effective date of the relevant ordinance. Tex.
Local Gov't Code § 341.906(d), (f). Krum has since
passed an amended SORRO. The amended ordinance prohibits
registered sex offenders from living within 1, 000 feet of a
child safety zone, as defined in section 341.906, and
recognizes the exemption mandated by section 341.906(f).
Krum, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 8, §§ 8.05.001,
.002(a), (f) (2017).
light of these developments, we must consider whether
Rice's challenge to the SORRO is moot. A case is moot
when either no "live" controversy exists between
the parties, or the parties have no legally cognizable
interest in the outcome. Williams v. Huff, 52 S.W.3d
171, 184 (Tex. 2001). "Put simply, a case is moot when
the court's action on the merits cannot affect the
parties' rights or interests." Heckman v.
Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012). A case
may become moot at any time, including while on appeal, and
it may happen as a result of a change in the law. See
id. at 166-67 (recognizing that intervening events like
a repeal of or change in the law may moot a challenge). When
a case becomes moot, the parties no longer have standing,
Huff, 52 S.W.3d at 184, which requires the court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Heckman, 369
S.W.3d at 150-51. In turn, the court should set aside all
previous judgments in addition to dismissing the entire
cause. Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex.
1972); Freeman v. Burrows, 171 S.W.2d 863, 863 (Tex.
that Rice's challenge to the SORRO is moot in light of
the passage of Texas Local Government Code section 341.906
and Krum's amended SORRO. Section 341.906 clearly
empowers general-law municipalities to enact ordinances that
limit the movements of sex offenders. This negates the
substance of Rice's claims, and he identifies no
deficiencies in the amended SORRO that would keep his
challenge alive. Rice does assert that the ordinance fails to
comply with section 341.906's mandatory-exemption
provision, but the SORRO's text negates that assertion on
its face, as it in fact includes the required exemption.
Krum, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 8, § 8.05.002(f)
the alleged basis for Rice's interest in the
proceedings-the gap between the distance requirements of his
community supervision and the prior version of the SORRO-no
longer exists. The restrictions imposed by the SORRO and the
terms of Rice's community supervision are now coextensive
vis-à-vis where in Krum Rice may lawfully reside.
Consequently, any ruling by this Court about the SORRO's
validity would have no effect on Rice's rights because
the community-supervision restriction would still be in
place. Therefore, we hold that Rice's challenge is moot.
Rice's claims have been rendered moot by changes in the
law, the courts lack jurisdiction over those claims.
Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, Tex.R.App.P.
59.1, we grant Krum's petition for review, vacate the
judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court, and
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 General-law municipalities
"possess those powers and privileges that the State
expressly confers upon them." Tex. Dep't of
Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 645
(Tex. 2004). By contrast, home-rule municipalities, which
"derive their powers from the Texas Constitution, "
"possess the full power of self government and look to
the Legislature not for grants of power, but only for
limitations on their power." Town of Lakewood Vill.
v. Bizios, ...