United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division
PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the court in the above-entitled matter is Petitioner's
Motion for Enforcement of Possession or Access and Order to
Appear. (Dkt. 29). For the reasons explained below,
Petitioner's motion is DISMISSED.
2015, Petitioner Francisco Garcia Delgadillo
(“Petitioner”) filed an application for the
return of a child pursuant to the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague
Convention”) in this court. (Dkts. 1, 4). The matter
was assigned to the docket of the undersigned judge, who
scheduled a bench trial commencing January 25, 2016. (Dkt.
20). On January 19, 2016, the parties filed an Agreed
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii). (Dkt. 27). That filing
noted that the parties had “reached a settlement
disposing of all claims, ” (id.); the
settlement agreement was submitted to the Court on the same
day, (Dkt. 26-1). The Court subsequently entered an order
(“Dismissal Order”) dismissing the parties'
claims and closing the case. (Dkt. 28). That order read, in
Before the Court is the parties' Agreed Stipulation of
Dismissal With Prejudice, filed January 19, 2016. By way of
the stipulation, the parties state they seek to dismiss all
claims raised in this action. As the parties have all signed
the stipulation, the Stipulation of Dismissal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that all claims and causes of
action asserted by the parties to this action are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all
pending motions are hereby TERMINATED and the Clerk's
Office is directed to close this case. Each party is to bear
its own attorney's fees and costs.
(Id. (citations omitted)).
additional documents were filed until today, December 19,
2017, when Petitioner filed the instant motion. That motion
alleges that Respondent Dayan Rodriguez Gil
(“Respondent”) has failed to comply with the
Court's prior order by “refus[ing] to allow the
Petitioner to have possession or access to the Child since
the Order was signed.” (Dkt. 29 ¶ 8).
instant motion asserts that “[t]his Court has
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case as a result
of prior proceedings.” (Dkt. 29 ¶ 5). That
assertion is incorrect.
of [a] settlement agreement . . . is more than just a
continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,
378 (1994). Such a proceeding therefore “requires its
own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. The Supreme
Court has held that a court's “‘ancillary
jurisdiction' ‘to manage its proceedings, vindicate
its authority, and effectuate its decrees' provides such
an independent jurisdictional basis . . . only if ‘the
parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement ha[s] been made part of the order of
dismissal.'” Hospitality House, Inc. v.
Gilbert, 298 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-81). A court may make a
settlement agreement part of its dismissal order in two ways:
“either by separate provision (such as a provision
‘retaining jurisdiction' over the settlement
agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement
agreement in the order.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at
381. When, as here, the dismissal was made pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(ii), the court is authorized to retain jurisdiction
over the settlement only when the parties agree on that term.
Id. at 381-82.
Dismissal Order at issue in the instant case neither included
a provision specifying that the Court would retain
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement nor incorporated
the terms of the settlement agreement into its own text.
Moreover, neither the parties' Notice of Settlement
Agreement nor their Agreed Stipulation of Dismissal with
Prejudice indicate an agreement that this Court would be
authorized to retain jurisdiction over the settlement. This
Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to take action pursuant to
Petitioner's Motion for Enforcement. See, e.g.,
SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 463 (5th
Cir. 2010) (explaining that a district court's
enforcement of a settlement in a case dismissed pursuant to
Rule 41 (a)(1) (A) (ii) requires that “all parties . .
. agree to such jurisdiction”).
reasons explained above, Petitioner Francisco Garcia
Delgadillo's Motion for Enforcement of Possession or
Access and ...