IN THE INTEREST OF W.R.C., H.J.C., AND A.J.C., CHILDREN
Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins.
the 85th District Court Brazos County, Texas, Trial Court No.
appeals from a judgment that terminated the parent-child
relationship between him and his children, W.R.C., H.J.C.,
and A.J.C. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court
found by clear and convincing evidence that Eric engaged in
conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who
engaged in conduct that endangers the children. Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001 (b) (1) (E) (West Supp. 2017). The
trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence
that termination was in the best interest of the children.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (b) (2) (West Supp. 2017).
and Amanda were married on June 19, 2004, and they are the
parents of the three children. They divorced on September 5,
2013 by decree of the Circuit Court of Russell County,
Alabama. Amanda married Adam in November 2013, and they moved
to Texas with the three children in December 2013. Amanda
filed a Petition for Termination and Adoption of Stepchildren
on February 22, 2016.
first two issues, Eric argues the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court's
findings on termination. Only one predicate act under section
161.001 (b) (1) is necessary to support a judgment of
termination in addition to the required finding that
termination is in the child's best interest. In re
A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.2003). In conducting a
legal sufficiency review in a parental termination case:
[A] court should look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable
trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to
the factfinder's conclusion and the role of a court
conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means
that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder
resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a
reasonable factfinder could do so. A corollary to this
requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found
to be incredible. This does not mean that a court must
disregard all evidence that does not support the
finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support
the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear
and convincing evidence.
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005) (per
curiam) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex.2002)) (emphasis in J.P.B.).
factual sufficiency review,
[A] court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence
that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear
and convincing.... [T]he inquiry must be "whether the
evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a
firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's
allegations." A court of appeals should consider whether
disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could
not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited
in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction,
then the evidence is factually insufficient.
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266-67 (Tex.2002)
(quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.2002))
(internal footnotes omitted) (alterations added).