United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
case has been referred to the undersigned United States
magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Chief
Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn.
Anthony Good has filed a Motion to Remand. See Dkt.
No. 12. Defendants Fay Servicing, LLC (“Fay
Servicing”), Prof-2013-S3 Legal Title Trust IV, by U.S.
Bank, National Association, Trustee (“U.S.
Bank”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells
Fargo”), Couch Enterprises, LP (“Couch”),
and Aris Cook filed responses in opposition. See
Dkt. Nos. 22, 23, & 24.
has not filed a reply, and his time to do so has passed.
See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(f).
reasons explained below, the Court should deny Plaintiff
Anthony Good's Motion to Remand [Dkt. No. 12].
filed Plaintiff's Original Petition in state court,
asserting claims against Wells Fargo, Fay Servicing, and U.S.
Bank for violating both the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 &
2605, and the Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”),
Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001 et seq., as well as
for wrongful foreclosure and/or suit to set aside
trustee's deed and negligent misrepresentation. He also
asserted claims against Couch for suit to quiet title and
trespass to try title and alleged that he joined Cook as a
necessary party. See Dkt. No. 1-7.
Fargo removed the case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1367(a), 1441, and 1446, with the written consent of Fay
Servicing, U.S. Bank, Couch, and Cook. See Dkt. Nos.
1, 1-4, 1-5, & 1-6. Wells Fargo asserts that this Court
has federal question subject-matter jurisdiction because Good
alleges a violation of RESPA, which “expressly grants
this Court original jurisdiction to hear such a claim,
” such that Good “alleges violations of federal
law, and his right to relief will necessarily depend upon the
resolution of federal law.” Id. at 4.
moves to remand because “Congress never provided
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over RESPA
claims” and “has instead expressly provided for
concurrent jurisdiction in state courts for claims under 12
U.S.C. § 2605” and, “[m]oreover, because
Good's claims arise out of an attempted, improper
foreclosure - an issue traditionally better suited for state
court proceedings, the case is tailor-made for remand under
the abstention doctrine, thereby allowing a Texas state court
to properly adjudicate the wrongful foreclosure of Texas real
property.” Dkt. No. 12 at 2.
defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
that authorize removal are meant to be strictly construed,
and any doubt as to the propriety of removal should be
resolved in favor of remand. See Hood ex rel. Miss. v. JP
Morgan Chase & Co., 737 F.3d 78, 89 (5th Cir. 2013);
In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir.
removing party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction.
See Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414,
417 (5th Cir. 2001).
federal court's jurisdiction is limited, and federal
courts generally may hear only a case of this nature if it
involves a question of federal law or where diversity of
citizenship exists between the parties. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “As a general rule,
absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable
if the complaint does not ...