United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. Miller United States District Judge.
before the court is defendant Texas Steel Conversion,
Inc.'s (“TSC”) motion for partial summary
judgment. Dkt. 10. Plaintiff Jorge Cruz responded. Dkt. 12.
TSC replied. Dkt. 13. Having considered the motion, the
response, the reply, the record evidence, and the applicable
law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be
an employment discrimination case. Dkt. 1. In his complaint,
Cruz alleges TSC employed him for approximately twenty-one
years. Id. at 2. During his employment, TSC Foreman
Doustin Paredes informed Cruz that TSC was investigating Cruz
for misusing his authority by showing favoritism towards
certain employees he supervised and intimidating other
employees. Id. Cruz alleges that Paredes
continuously found “petty ways to discredit
[Cruz's] work.” Id. at 3. When Cruz told
another supervisor of Paredes accusations and actions, the
supervisor allegedly told Cruz that Paredes seemed to be
looking for a way to terminate him. Id.
on Paredes's allegations, TSC fired Cruz on August 29,
2016. Id. Cruz alleges that TSC replaced him with a
younger and less qualified employee. Id. According
to Cruz, TSC terminated him because of his age. Id.
Believing that he was discriminated against, Cruz filed a
charge of discrimination with the United States Equal
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. at
4. The EEOC provided Cruz with a notice of the right to sue.
Id. at 4. Accordingly, Cruz sued TSC alleging the
following causes of action: (1) age discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623; (2) gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e; (3) equal pay discrimination on the basis of age in
violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623; and (4) gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e. Id. at 4-6. Notably, counts II and IV are
instant motion, TSC moves for partial summary judgment and
asks the court to dismiss counts II, III, and IV for failing
to exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt. 10. In his response,
Cruz objects to TSC's summary judgment evidence and
argues that summary judgment is not proper in this case. Dkt.
shall grant summary judgment when a “movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] fact is genuinely in dispute
only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). If
the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of
the non-movant. Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of
Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2008).
argues that the court should grant summary judgment and
dismiss counts II, III, and IV because Cruz did not exhaust
administrative remedies for those causes of action. Dkt. 10.
In response, Cruz objects to TSC's evidence and argues
that summary judgment should not be granted. Dkt. 12-1. The
court will address each argument in turn. Because counts II
and IV are substantially identical, the court will address
those counts together.
Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence
objects to the “statements contained in pages 1-2 of
Defendant's exhibit or appendix.” Dkt. 12-1 at 2.
Specifically, Cruz alleges that the statements “are not
properly verified and are hearsay.” Id. It is
unclear which “exhibit or appendix” Cruz is
referring to. It is also unclear the precise grounds for his
objection. Regardless, the court need only consider
Cruz's own statement in the EEOC charge of discrimination
for the purposes of this motion. Cruz's statements are
statements of an opposing party and not hearsay. Fed.R.Evid.
801(d)(2). To the extent Cruz objects to his own statements
in the EEOC charge, his objection is OVERRULED. To the extent
Cruz objects to any other piece of evidence, his objection is
OVERRULED AS MOOT.
Counts II and IV
argues that the court should grant summary judgment as to
counts II and IV because Cruz did not exhaust administrative
remedies regarding these claims. Dkt. 10 at 5. In his