Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
THE 352ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO.
WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
an appeal from a no-answer default judgment entered in a suit
to partition real property-a residence in Southlake (the
Property)-owned jointly by Appellant Andre Huey-You and
Appellee Clarette Kimp. The default judgment ordered the sale
of the residence, appointed a receiver, and--based on
Kimp's pleadings and the evidence presented at the
default-judgment hearing that Appellant had effected an
ouster of Kimp from the residence and had dissipated monies
owned by Kimp from a Charles Schwab account--awarded Kimp her
share of the rental value of the Property and half of the
amount of Appellant's unauthorized withdrawals from the
parties' Charles Schwab account. In five points,
Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
render the default judgment because, according to Appellant,
only the divorce court possessed jurisdiction; that the trial
court's awards are not supported by sufficient evidence;
and that the trial court abused its discretion by equally
dividing the sale proceeds and by denying his motion to
vacate the default judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
we will affirm.
to their marriage, Appellant and Kimp purchased the Property.
Appellant and Kimp married and then later divorced in August
2014. The divorce decree confirmed an undivided 1/2 interest
in the Property as the separate property of each party.
January 2016, Kimp filed suit to partition the Property and
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Kimp's request for
declaratory relief alleged that she should be entitled to a
disproportionate distribution, in her favor, from the
proceeds of the sale of the Property because Appellant had
effected an ouster of her from the Property and because
Appellant had dissipated or had hidden funds.
Appellant was served by substituted service and did not file
an answer, Kimp filed a motion for entry of default judgment
and an affidavit in support. At the default judgment hearing,
the trial court heard testimony from Kimp and from a licensed
real estate broker and then signed the default judgment. The
default judgment states that the trial court found that it
had subject-matter jurisdiction, that Appellant and Kimp
owned the Property as tenants in common with each jointly
owning a 50% interest in the Property, that the Property was
not capable of division in kind, and that Kimp was entitled
to an order of partition by sale. The default judgment also
The Court further finds that Defendant has occupied the
Property to the exclusion of the Plaintiff, effecting an
ouster of the Plaintiff, who has had no use nor enjoyment of
the property since August 12, 2014[, ] and that the
reasonable rental value of the Property from that date to
present (20 months) has been $3, 900 per month and that it
would be fair and equitable for Plaintiff to be awarded her
share of the rental value, which the Court finds and assesses
at the sum of thirty-nine thousand ($39, 000.00) dollars
through this date, plus an additional $1, 950 per month
beginning May 1, 2016, for every month Defendant continues to
occupy the Property, until it is sold; and
The Court further finds that it would be fair and equitable
for Plaintiff to receive $91, 916.76 from Defendant's
share of any net proceeds of sale of the Property, to
compensate for the loss Plaintiff suffered as a result of
Defendant's unauthorized withdrawals totaling $183,
833.53 from the parties' Charles Schwab account ending in
8516, which was a fraud upon Plaintiff and a breach of
fiduciary duty to not  unfairly dispose of community
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, which the
trial court denied. Appellant then perfected this appeal.
first point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
rendering the default judgment because the court that entered
the divorce decree-the 360th District Court of Tarrant
County-had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter.
a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law
that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
Article V, section 8 of the Texas constitution provides that
a district court's jurisdiction "consists of
exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all
actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where
exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be
conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other
court, tribunal, or administrative body." Tex. Const.
art. V, § 8. Additionally, the legislature has provided
that a district court possesses "the jurisdiction
provided by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas
Constitution" and "may hear and determine any cause
that is cognizable by courts of law or equity." Tex.
Gov't Code Ann. § 24.008 ...