United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Defendant Robert Samuel Farrell's
(“Farrell”) pro se Motion for
Modification of Supervised Release and Appointment of Counsel
(Dkt. #39). After reviewing the relevant pleadings and
motion, the Court finds the motion to should be denied.
April 13, 2006, a grand jury returned a two-count Indictment
against Farrell. Count 1 charged Farrell with Transportation
of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity
on June 13, 2003, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).
Count 2 charged Farrell with Possession of Child Pornography
on June 13, 2003, and continuing up to and including the date
of Indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
26, 2006, Farrell appeared before Magistrate Judge Don Bush
and entered a plea of guilty as to Count 1 of the Indictment,
pursuant to a written plea agreement. On July 27, 2006, District
Judge Michael Schneider signed an order adopting Magistrate
Judge Bush's Findings of Fact and Recommendation finding
Farrell guilty of Count 1 of the Indictment. On January 11,
2007, Judge Schneider sentenced Farrell to 135 months'
imprisonment followed by a 5-year term of supervised release
about June 2017, Farrell started his supervised release. On
January 3, 2018, Farrell petitioned the Court to modify the
conditions of his supervised release (Dkt. #39).
Specifically, Farrell requests the Court grant him access to
the internet (Dkt. #39). On January 22, 2018, the Government
filed its response (Dkt. #41).
courts have wide discretion in imposing special conditions of
supervised release.” United States. v.
Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014). If a court
imposes special conditions, such conditions must reasonably
relate to one of the following statutory factors:
(i) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (ii) the need
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (iii) the
need to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (iv) the need to provide the defendant with
needed training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2);
United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir.
2001)). Further, “supervised release conditions cannot
involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary to achieve the statutory goals.” Id.
to § 3583(e)(2), after considering the factors above,
the Court may “modify, reduce, or enlarge the
conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the
expiration or termination of the term of supervised
argues that “based on recent U.S. Supreme Court
rulings, I [Farrell] petition this court to grant me access
to the internet.” (Dkt. #39). Notably, Farrell fails to
provide the Court with any United States Supreme Court
rulings to support such an argument. Despite this omission,
the Court assumes Farrell is referring to Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017).
Packingham, the Supreme Court decided whether a
North Carolina statute making it a felony for a registered
sex offender to gain access to numerous websites, including
commonplace social media websites, violated the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1733. The
Supreme Court found the statute constituted an