United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendant Infosys, Ltd.'s
(“Infosys”) Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. #9). After
reviewing the relevant pleadings and motion, the Court finds
that the motion should be granted in part.
Erin Green (“Green”) is an experienced attorney.
Sometime before October 2011, Green sought employment with
Infosys. On September 17, 2011, Infosys sent Green an offer
of employment via email (“Offer Email”).
Plaintiff responded via email on September 19, 2011, that he
accepted the offer. Green started with Infosys on October 17,
2011, and signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (the
“Agreement”) in person, as a condition of his
employment on October 20, 2011. The Agreement states
We agree to arbitrate before a neutral arbitrator any and all
existing or future disputes or claims between Employee and
Infosys, that arise out of or relate to Employee's
recruitment, employment or separation from employment with
Infosys, . . . including, but not limited to the following
claims: . . . claims for discrimination, harassment or
retaliation, whether on the basis [of] age, sex, race,
national origin, religion, disability or any other unlawful
(Dkt. #9, Exhibit 1 at p. 22). On June 28, 2016, Infosys
19, 2017, Green sued Infosys for (1) depriving him of his
equal right to work because of race in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, (2) retaliation based on his complaints of race
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (3)
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
et seq., and (4) retaliation based on his complaint
of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000
e-1 et seq. (Dkt. #1 at pp. 21-22). Because of the
Agreement, on August 18, 2017, Infosys filed its Motion to
Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss Green's Amended
Complaint (Dkt. #9). On October 2, 2017, Green filed his
response, including a Motion to Strike Portions of the
Declaration of Rohit Sharma (Dkt. #18). Infosys replied on
October 9, 2017 (Dkt. #19). Green filed his reply (Dkt. #20)
and an amended sur-reply on October 12, 2017 (Dkt. #21).
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) expresses a
strong national policy favoring arbitration of disputes, and
all doubts concerning the arbitrability of claims should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.” Wash. Mut. Fin.
Grp., LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2004).
The FAA, “leaves no place for the exercise of
discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement
has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
asks the Court to deny the motion because he argues the FAA
does not govern the Agreement, and even if the FAA does
apply, the Agreement is not a valid contract. Further, Green
asserts that, if the Court agrees that the claims should be
arbitrated, it asks the Court to abate the current case as
opposed to dismissing it. Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court
to strike certain portions of Defendant's supporting
evidence. The Court addresses each of Plaintiff's
concerns in turn.
The Governance of the FAA
argues that the FAA does not govern the transaction because
Infosys did not prove that any commerce is involved. Infosys
maintains that because this is an employment contract, it
falls under the umbrella of the FAA's broad
interpretation of commerce. Infosys further asserts that
Plaintiff's own complaint demonstrates that he frequently
traveled throughout the United States while working for
Infosys, which proves that commerce is involved in the
is applicable to “[a] written provision in any . . .
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The
FAA defines commerce as “commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations. . . .” 9 U.S.C. §
1. Additionally, the Supreme Court further interpreted the
phrase “involving commerce” as “the
functional equivalent of ‘affecting, ' . . .
[which] signals an intent to exercise Congress' commerce
power to the full.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274, 277 (1995). The Supreme Court
also interpreted “evidencing a transaction” to
mean that the transaction turns out, in fact, to have
involved interstate commerce. Id. at ...