United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KENNETH M. HOYT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Frank Badall is an inmate in the custody of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. He filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus challenging the results of a prison
disciplinary hearing resulting in the forfeiture of 45 days
of accrued good time credit, a reduction in time earning
class, and other penalties. He does not challenge his
conviction or sentence.
case is before the Court on Badall's petition,
respondent's motion for summary judgment, and
Badall's response. Having carefully considered the
petition, the motion, the response, all the arguments and
authorities submitted by the parties, and the entire record,
the Court is of the opinion that respondent's motion
should be granted and Badall's petition should be
petition concerns forfeiture of accumulated time credits,
reduction in time earning status, and loss of privileges. He
does not challenge his conviction or sentence. Therefore, no
discussion of the facts of his crime and trial is necessary.
29, 2016, Badall was found guilty of the disciplinary offense
of possessing tobacco. Badall filed Step One and Step Two
Grievances appealing the result of the disciplinary hearing.
The grievances were denied.
contends that he was denied due process because, he claims,
there was no evidence to connect him to the contraband
tobacco found by prison authorities.
Standard of Review
a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal
force in the context of habeas corpus cases.” Clark
v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, the “evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once the movant presents evidence
demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment, the nonmovant
must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
claims concerning all penalties imposed other than loss of
good time credit are not cognizable in habeas corpus.
“If ‘a favorable determination . . . would not
automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated release,
' Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th
Cir.1995) (per curiam), the proper vehicle is a § 1983
suit.” Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818,
820©21 (5th Cir. 1997).
Badall's reduction in time earning status could possibly
have an impact on his eligibility for release to mandatory
supervision, any potential impact is too speculative to
warrant habeas corpus relief. “[T]he timing of
[petitioner]'s release is too speculative to afford him a
constitutionally cognizable claim to the ‘right' to
a particular time-earning status . . . .. Malchi v.
Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 2000). The
penalties, such as recreation restriction, that have no
bearing on Badall's release date clearly do not
“automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated
release.” Therefore, these claims are not cognizable.