United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Waco Division
PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”), a former student at
Baylor University who alleges that she was sexually assaulted
during her freshman year, brings this suit against Defendant
Baylor University (“Defendant” or
“Baylor”). (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 1-2,
6-7). Plaintiff seeks to hold Baylor liable under Title IX of
the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title
IX”), which provides that “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a); (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 114-31). She requests
a mandatory injunction ordering Defendant to: (1)
“refrain from unlawful discrimination and/or
retaliation”; (2) “undertake and rectify any and
all Title IX violations and/or inequities”; (3)
“refrain from creating and condoning a hostile sexual
harassment and/or discriminati[ng] environment against
individuals on the basis of sex by immediately ceasing
deliberate indifference to sexual assaults”; and (4)
“cease interference with the disciplinary process in
favor of students who were charged with sexual
assault.” (Id. ¶ 145). Currently before
the Court is Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt.
9), through which the university seeks dismissal of
Plaintiff's post-reporting claims and claim for
STANDARD OF REVIEW
to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not
need detailed factual allegations, ' but must provide the
[plaintiff's] grounds for entitlement to relief-including
factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.'”
Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). That is, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A] motion to
dismiss under 12(b)(6) ‘is viewed with disfavor and is
rarely granted.'” Turner v. Pleasant, 663
F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th
enrolled at Baylor, where she was a member of the women's
volleyball team, in the fall of 2011. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶
6). She alleges that she was gang-raped at an off-campus
location by between four and eight Baylor football players on
February 11, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 51, 74, 78).
alleges that her mother met with an assistant football coach
in July 2012; her mother reportedly “did not reveal her
daughter's name” but “did provide the coach
with a list of the players who were involved in
Plaintiff's sexual assault.” (Id.
¶¶ 51, 83). That coach subsequently spoke to two of
the involved players and to other Baylor football coaches,
but allegedly took no further action. (Id. ¶
Baylor football players burglarized her apartment, Plaintiff
alleges, she met with Art Briles-then Baylor's head
football coach-to report the incident and the names of the
players involved. (Id. ¶ 51). She and her
parents also allegedly met with two members of the volleyball
coaching staff, informing them of the sexual assault and
identifying the relevant players. (Id.). The head
volleyball coach reportedly informed Briles and Baylor
Athletic Director Ian McCaw of the same information.
(Id. ¶ 98). Plaintiff left Baylor after the
spring 2013 semester, (id. ¶ 6), but reported
her assault to an individual identified as
“Baylor's [f]ootball [c]haplain” in the fall
of 2013, (id. ¶ 51).
alleges that she was “repeatedly subjected to verbal
abuse and public humiliation” by Baylor football
players following her assault. (Id. ¶ 80;
see also Id. ¶ 51). Specifically, she claims
the football players “harassed both Plaintiff and her
family members via text message” and harassed Plaintiff
verbally both on- and off-campus. (Id. ¶ 85).
Plaintiff avers that she “was forced to face her
assailants” both in the classroom and during volleyball
practice and training sessions. (Id. ¶¶
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex in all federally-funded
educational programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Specifically,
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id. When Congress first passed Title IX more than
forty years ago, it had two related objectives: first,
Congress wanted to prevent federal funds from being used to
support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to
provide individuals “effective protection against those
practices.” Cannon v. Univ. Chic., 441 U.S.
677, 704 (1979); see also 118 Cong. Rec. 5730 (1972)
(statement of Senator Birch Bayh) (“The amendment we
are debating is a strong and comprehensive measure which I
believe is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal
protection as they seek education and training for later
careers. . . . As a matter of principle, our national policy
should prohibit sex discrimination at all levels of
education.”). When private universities like Baylor
accept funding through various federal programs, including by
enrolling students who receive federal funds to pay for their
education, they become subject to the requirements of Title
IX. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 466 (1999).
IX is enforceable through an individual's private right
of action and allows for the recovery of damages. Davis
Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 639 (1999) (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. 677