Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Blue Spike, LLC v. Asus Computer International, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division

March 23, 2018

BLUE SPIKE LLC
v.
ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC.

          ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          ROBERT W. SCHROEDER III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         The above-entitled and numbered civil action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (the “Report”) (Docket No. 37) in which Judge Mitchell addressed three pending motions: (1) Plaintiff Blue Spike LLC's Motion for Default Judgment as to ASUS Computer International (“ASUS”) and ASUSTeK Computer Inc. (“ASUSTek”) (Docket No. 11); (2) ASUSTeK's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint (Docket No. 16); and, (3) Plaintiff s Motion to Strike for failure to comply with L.R. CV-7(a) (Docket No. 26).

         After the Report was published, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed ASUSTeK. Docket Nos. 39 and 40. Therefore, the Court DENIES AS MOOT ASUSTeK's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 16) and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike for failure to comply (Docket No. 26), and DENIES-IN-PART AS MOOT Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment with respect to ASUSTeK (Docket No. 11).

         Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment against ASUS.[1] Docket No. 38. Defendant[2] filed a Response. Docket No. 41. Having reviewed the written objections de novo, the Court concludes that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

         PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS

         Plaintiff has filed two sets of objections to the Report. First, Plaintiff objects to the recommendation that the entry of default against ASUS should be set aside. Docket No. 38 at 3.

         Second, Plaintiff objects to the recommendation that default judgment should be denied. Docket No. 38 at 4.

         I. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report's Recommendation that the Clerk's Entry of Default Against ASUS Should Be Vacated

         Plaintiff argues that entry of default should not be disturbed, and relies on In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prod. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d 576, 594 (5th Cir. 2014) to argue that the Court should have ended its inquiry once it found Defendant's default was willful. Docket No. 38 at 3. Plaintiff emphasizes that“[a] finding of willfulness ends the inquiry, for when the court finds an intentional failure of responsive pleadings there need be no other finding.” Id. (citing In re Chinese, 742 F.3d at 594).

         This argument was previously considered by the Magistrate Judge. Docket No. 37 at 20 n.7. As the Magistrate Judge correctly stated in her Report, in In re Chinese, the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in refusing to vacate a default judgment. Id. “In re Chinese does not discuss whether the entry of default judgment is appropriate.” Id. In its objections, Blue Spike fails to recognize the distinction between vacating a clerk's entry of default, as is the case here, and vacating a default judgment.

         Moreover, Plaintiff cites Rogers v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933 (5th Cir. 1999), in which the Fifth Circuit noted that “the policy of resolving cases on their merits is ‘counterbalanced by considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a weighing process that lies largely within the domain of the trial judge's discretion.' ” Docket No. 38 at 3 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's own reliance on Rogers, though, indicates that vacating an entry of default is squarely within the trial court's discretion. In its objections, Plaintiff does not cite to any case law in which a court has been required to enter default judgment.

         On the other hand, Defendant cites to Hilseweck P'ship v. Eastern Energy Resources, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-186, 2011 WL 3501719 at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2011) and Parker v. Bill Melton Trucking, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2528, 2016 WL 5704172, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2016), to argue that district courts have applied Fifth Circuit law to set aside a clerk's entry of default even though default was found to be willful. Thus, Plaintiff's implication that it is entitled to default judgment because of Defendant's willful default alone is incorrect.

         In Parker, the district court explicitly found that “while willful failure alone may constitute sufficient cause for refusing to set aside an entry of default, the court may continue its good cause analysis.” 2016 WL 5704172 at *3 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court ultimately found good cause to set aside the default because there was no unfair prejudice to plaintiff and because defendant had raised a potentially meritorious defense. Similarly, in Hilseweck, the court set aside the clerk's entry of default because the defendant had met the good cause standard, notwithstanding defendant's willful default.[3] 2011 WL 3501719 at *2. The court found good cause in “the lack of prejudice to plaintiffs, [defendant's] potentially meritorious defense, and the fact that the court is setting aside an entry of default, not a default judgment.” Id.

         Here, the Magistrate Judge also found that there was no unfair prejudice to the Plaintiff, that Defendant had raised a potentially meritorious defense, and that the Court would only be setting aside an entry of default, not a default judgment.[4] Docket No. 37 at 18-26. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found that there was significant financial loss at stake and ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.