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Sparks v. Davis

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

March 27, 2018

ROBERT SPARKS Petitioner,
v.
LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF

          David C. Godbey, United States District Judge

         Robert Sparks petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his conviction and death sentence are unconstitutional due to trial errors, prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Sparks has not shown that he is entitled to relief, the Court denies the requested relief.

         I. Procedural Background

         Sparks was convicted and sentenced to death for the capital murder of his wife and two stepsons in the same criminal transaction. State v. Sparks, No. F-0801020-J (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, Dallas County, Tex. Dec. 11, 2008). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) unanimously affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Sparks v. State, No. AP-76, 099, 2010 WL 4132769, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 962 (2011). During the pendency of his direct appeal, Sparks filed his first postconviction application for a writ of habeas corpus in the state trial court in writ number W08-01020-J(A) on August 25, 2010. (State Habeas Clerk's Record, “SHCR, ” at 5-27). The CCA adopted the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to deny relief. Ex parte Sparks, No. WR-76, 786-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2011).

         Sparks filed his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on June 10, 2013, which was accompanied by a motion to stay these proceedings to exhaust his claim concerning the allegedly false prisoner classification testimony of A.P. Merillat and a related claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Pet. doc. 19; Mot., doc. 18.) Respondent agreed to the motion to stay. (Resp., doc. 27.) The Court found that this agreement complied with Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), and stayed these proceedings to allow Sparks to exhaust these claims. (Order, doc. 33.) Following abeyance, Sparks filed a subsequent state habeas application which was dismissed by the CCA as an abuse of the writ, and Sparks returned to this Court. Ex parte Sparks, No. WR-76, 786-02, 2014 WL 2002211, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2014) (per curiam).

         Following exhaustion, these proceedings were reopened on June 19, 2014. (Order, doc. 37.) Sparks filed his amended petition on August 27, 2014 (Am. Pet., doc. 38), Respondent filed her answer on September 26 (Ans., doc. 44), and Sparks filed his reply on November 17 (Reply, doc. 52).

         II. Factual Background

         The state court described the facts of the offense as follows:

Appellant was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the deaths of Raekwon Agnew and Harold Sublet, Jr., by stabbing and cutting them with a knife, during the same criminal transaction. The record shows that on September 15, 2007, appellant murdered his wife, Chare Agnew, and his 9- and 10-year-old stepsons, Harold and Raekwon, and he raped his 12- and 14-year-old stepdaughters, Garysha Brown and LaKenya Agnew. Some time after midnight, when everyone else in the house was asleep, appellant put his hand over Chare's mouth and stabbed her eighteen times as she lay in her bed. He then went into the boys' bedroom. As Raekwon lay sleeping, appellant woke Harold and took him to the kitchen, where he stabbed him at least 45 times. He then woke Raekwon, took him to the kitchen, and killed him in the same manner. Appellant dragged the boys' bodies to the living room and covered them with a comforter. He then went into the girls' bedroom and woke LaKenya. He pulled her out of bed at gunpoint, tied her up with bedsheets, and told her he had killed her mother and brothers. He showed her their bodies and told her it was her fault they were dead. Next, he woke Garysha and tied her up with electrical cords, and he tied a washcloth around her mouth. He then told LaKenya that in order to save her and her sister's life, one of the girls would have to have sex with him. LaKenya said that she would do it. Appellant took her to the living room and raped her on the living room couch.
When he had finished raping LaKenya, appellant took Garysha to the living room and raped her on the couch, next to her sister. Then, he made the girls stay in the bathroom with him while he took a shower. He apologized to the girls for the rapes and murders. He told them that their mother had been trying to poison him and that her death was their fault. Next, he forced both girls to go with him into the garage, where he tried, unsuccessfully, to change the license plate on his car. He took the girls back to the living room, where he lifted the comforter and showed the girls their brothers' bodies. He remarked that Raekwon was stronger than he had expected him to be. Appellant made the girls walk into their mother's bedroom and kiss her face, and then he put them into the bedroom closet. He started a CD player and told them that help would come when the music ended. He then locked the closet door and moved a dresser in front of it. Finally, appellant left the house.
Appellant drove to his mother's house to borrow her car. He then drove to the home of his former girlfriend, Shunta Alexander, and their teenaged daughter, Brianna. He told Shunta what he had done. He gave her some money for Brianna and remarked that if there was a reward for catching him, Brianna should have it. Shunta begged him to call the police. Appellant called the police on his cell phone and briefly reported that he had killed his wife and two boys and he had left two girls locked in a bedroom closet. He provided the address and stated that he knew the police would trace the call if he stayed on the phone too long. He then hung up, broke his cell phone, and left Shunta's home. Later that morning, appellant's cousin drove him to the Greyhound bus station, where he bought a bus ticket under an assumed name and traveled to Austin.
Appellant returned to Dallas a few days later. He called a police detective and asked him if the police had found an audiocassette tape he had left in the house, which he believed contained a recording of Chare or one of the children admitting that they had been conspiring against him. He thought that this tape would help his case. After his arrest, appellant made a statement to police in which he requested testing for the presence of poison in his body, and he said that LaKenya and Garysha should be polygraphed about whether Chare had been poisoning him. He provided buccal, blood, hair, and fingernail samples to be tested for evidence of poisoning, but the lab that received the samples was not able to conduct the requested tests, and investigators were unable to locate a lab with that capability.

Sparks v. State, No. AP-76, 099, 2010 WL 4132769, at *1-2 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2010).

         These findings are entitled to deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

         III. Claims

         Sparks presents eight claims for relief in the following enumerated categories:

1. Sparks was denied his right to an impartial jury at the punishment phase of the trial when a bailiff wore a necktie bearing the image of a hypodermic syringe that showed his support for the death penalty. (Am. Pet. at 42);
2. (Abandoned.)[1] (Am. Pet. at 57.)
3. Sparks was denied his right to an impartial jury when the trial court refused to grant a mistrial in spite of repeated instances of misconduct by bystanders which took place within the view of the jury. (Am. Pet. at 57);
4. Sparks was denied his right to an impartial jury based on the combined effects of the actions of the bailiff and the bystanders as well as the overall atmosphere surrounding his trial. (Am. Pet. at 61);
5. Sparks was denied his Eighth Amendment and Due Process rights when the State's expert witness, A.P. Merillat, testified to materially inaccurate evidence at the punishment stage of Sparks' trial. (Am. Pet. at 63);
6. Sparks was denied his right to an impartial jury and due process when the trial court denied his challenges for cause to numerous jurors specifically named in the direct state appeal. (Am. Pet. at 109);
7. The Texas death penalty scheme violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by not requiring the state to prove aggravating factors relevant to the mitigation special issue beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may sentence the defendant to death. (Am. Pet. at 137);
8. The Texas 12-10 Rule, and the law prohibiting jurors from being informed that their individual vote that life is the proper sentence will lead to a life sentence, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment as construed by Mills v. Maryland[2] and McKoy v. North Carolina.[3](Am. Pet. at 150); and
9-11. Ineffective assistance of counsel addressed in the foregoing sections. (Am. Pet. at 157).

         Sparks also requests an evidentiary hearing, specifically on his fifth claim (Am. Pet. at 107-09, 158). Respondent asserts that the fifth claim is defaulted and procedurally barred and in the alternative that it lacks merit. (Ans. at 26-46.) Respondent also asserts that the remaining claims lack merit and were properly denied by the state court.

         IV. Standard of Review

         Federal habeas review of these claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). This statute sets forth the preliminary requirements that must be satisfied before reaching the merits of a claim made in a federal habeas proceeding.

         A. Exhaustion

         Under this statute, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on any claim that the state prisoner has not first exhausted in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). However, the federal court may deny relief on the merits notwithstanding any failure to exhaust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2005).

         B. State-Court Procedural Determinations

         If the state court denies a claim on state procedural grounds, a federal court will not reach the merits of the claim if it determines that the state-law grounds are independent of the federal claim and adequate to bar federal review. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). If the state procedural determination is based on state grounds that were inadequate to bar federal habeas review, or if the habeas petitioner shows that an exception to the bar applies, the federal court must normally resolve the claim without the deference that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) otherwise requires. See Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000); but see Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 721 n.14 (5th Cir. 2004) (affording deference to merits finding when state court “invoked a procedural bar as an alternative basis to deny relief”); Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 319 (3rd Cir. 2012) (holding that “AEDPA deference [under section 2254(d)] applies when a state court decides a claim on procedural grounds and, alternatively, on the merits”).

         C. State-Court Merits Determinations

         If the state court denies a claim on the merits, a federal court may not grant relief unless it first determines that the claim was unreasonably decided by the state court, as defined in section 2254(d):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Id. In the context of section 2254(d) analysis, “adjudicated on the merits” is a term of art referring to a state court's disposition of a case on substantive rather than procedural grounds. Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1997). This provision does not authorize habeas relief, but restricts this Court's power to grant relief to state prisoners by barring claims in federal court that were not first unreasonably denied by the state courts.

         The AEDPA limits rather than expands the availability of habeas relief. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. “This is a ‘difficult to meet, ' and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court rulings be given the benefit of the doubt.'” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102, and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

         Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal court is not prohibited from granting federal habeas relief if the state court either arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or decides a case differently from the United States Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Chambers v. Johnson, 218 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2000). Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal court may also reach the merits of a claim on federal habeas review if “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule ... but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408). “ ‘[C]learly established Federal law' for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court's decisions.' ” Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1702 (quoting Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012)). The standard for determining whether a state court's application was unreasonable is an objective one and applies to federal habeas corpus petitions that, like the instant case, were filed after April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997).

         Federal habeas relief is not available on a claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless the record before that state court first satisfies section 2254(d). “[E]vidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review. If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185. The evidence required under section 2254(d)(2) must show that the state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

         V. Analysis

         A. External Influence - Necktie

         In his first claim, Sparks contends that the jury was improperly influenced in the punishment phase of his trial by a necktie worn by one of the bailiffs that displayed a syringe. (Am. Pet. at 42-57; Reply at 1-9.) Respondent argues that this claim was reasonably denied by the state court. (Ans. at 11-15.)

         1. Standard

         A juror is exposed to an external influence when he receives information not admitted into evidence. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987). “Under clearly established Supreme Court case law, an influence is not an internal one if it (1) is extraneous prejudicial information; i.e., information that was not admitted into evidence but nevertheless bears on a fact at issue in the case, or (2) is an outside influence upon the partiality of the jury, such as ‘private communication, contact, or tampering . . . with a juror.'” Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2006). Once the inmate proves that a “private communication, contact, or tampering” is received by a juror, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the contact with the juror was not harmful. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954); but see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (holding “that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias”). The ultimate question is whether the improper external intrusion affected the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993).

         2. State Court Action

         No objection was presented on the record at trial or on direct appeal. During the postconviction habeas review, the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Based on the evidence presented, the state court determined that Sparks had not shown that any juror actually saw the image on the bailiff's tie. (State Habeas Clerk's Record, “SHCR, ” at 157-58.)

         At the state evidentiary hearing, Sparks called the bailiff, Bobby Zoe Moorehead, who testified that he was not in charge of the jury at that time but was seated behind the defendant and his attorneys, was wearing a lanyard in front of the tie that would have covered the image, which was also potentially obscured by the bailiff's coat and the stun-belt box he was holding. (SHRR at 12-40.) Moorehead also testified that he complied with an instruction relayed by defense counsel to tuck his tie into his shirt. (SHRR at 19.)

         Sparks also called his investigator, Bobby Walton, who testified regarding measurements from the bailiff's chair to the jury and that he was able to see the tie and image on the tie at those distances. (SHRR at 40-46.) On cross examination, Walton testified that he did not view the tie on the black background of the bailiff's clothing, did not view it with a lanyard or stun belt box in front, and did not view it while attorneys were sitting at the desk or the defendant with security. (SHRR at 48-50.) He also testified that he did not know the position of the computer and monitor on the desk at the time of trial, but that it could also have affected the jury's view of the tie. (SHRR at 49.)

         The State called Sparks' lead trial counsel Paul Johnson, who testified that when he saw the bailiff's tie with the syringe on it, he said something to the bailiff, asked to talk with the judge, obtained an instruction for the bailiff to conceal the image and told the bailiff, who complied. (SHRR at 55-56.) Johnson testified that he made his objection off the record, rather than on the record, because he didn't see a need for a record of it at that time. “I didn't have any reason to believe anybody else had seen it or noticed it or that it was having an impact or influence on the trial.” (SHRR at 56-57.)

         The State also called Lalon Peale, another one of Sparks' trial counsel, who said that Mr. Johnson was the first to notice the tie and she did not know if anyone in the gallery or jury would have noticed. (SHRR at 71.) She said that there was a lot going on at the same time, but that Mr. Johnson brought it to the court's attention and the bailiff was told to conceal the tie. (SHRR at 71-72.) She thought that there was an objection on the record, but that the appellate counsel didn't find it. (SHRR at 71-72.) She said that the bailiff complied and concealed the tie. (SHRR at 73.)

         The State also called Sparks' mother, Viola Sparks, who had provided an affidavit in support of petitioner's state habeas application. She testified that she saw the bailiff wearing the tie and could see the image of the needle before he tucked it in. (SHRR at 93.) She said the bailiff wearing the tie operated the box that controlled the stun gun and sat behind her son, the defendant. (SHRR at 93-94.) She said from the spot where she testified during the trial, she could see the bailiff wearing the tie if he was standing, but that during her testimony she was focused on the district attorney's questions and could not see the tie over her son and the attorneys. (SHRR at 94.) She also testified that her affidavit that the attorney wrote stated that you couldn't miss what the bailiff was wearing, but she does not know for sure whether the jury would have been able to see the image on the tie from where they were in the courtroom. (SHRR at 90, 95-96.) She also testified that she has problems with memory and gets confused. (SHRR at 96.)

         The State also called Sparks' sister, Perstefanie Sparks, who had also provided an affidavit in support of petitioner's state habeas application. (SHRR at 98-100.) She testified that she noticed the bailiff wearing the tie with the image of the needle on it when a victim's father approached the rail during jury argument, and the bailiffs made people in the audience where she was sitting leave the courtroom. (SHRR at 104-106.) She told Petitioner's trial counsel about it, but could not remember which day it was. (SHRR at 101.) She also remembered that the bailiff later tucked the tie into his shirt. (SHRR at 106-107.) She provided an affidavit that she did not feel it was possible that the jury did not see what the bailiff was wearing, but acknowledged that the jury would have seen the bailiff from a different vantage point than her during the trial. (SHRR at 101-102.) She did not remember whether there was a projector between the jury and the bailiff, and did not remember the bailiff holding a box. (SHRR at 102-103.) She also admitted prior offenses for forgery of a check and securing a document by deception. (SHRR at 103-104.)

         The State also called Andy Beach, the lead trial prosecutor in the trial. (SHRR at 109.) Mr. Beach testified that he remembered seeing the bailiff wearing the tie with the image of a syringe on it during the last day of trial when the bailiff was handling the box that operated the stun belt. (SHRR at 109-10.) Mr. Beach testified that defense attorney Paul Johnson stood up, asked to approach the bench, and went sidebar with the judge to deal with the tie. (SHRR at 110.) The trial court judge took care of it and had the bailiff either tuck in the tie or button his coat to conceal the image of the syringe. (SHRR at 110.) Mr. Beach remembered that this took place early in the day and “well before argument.” (SHRR at 110-11.) Mr. Beach also remembered the ruckus in the courtroom during his closing argument, but did not remember what the bailiff was wearing during that part of his jury argument. (SHRR at 111.)

         The State also produced an affidavit from the jury foreperson that she did not see the tie. (SHCR at 76-77.) “I personally never saw the tie. To my knowledge nothing about the tie or Bailiff Moorehead entered into the jury's deliberations.” (SHCR at 77.) Based on this, other documents in the record, and the evidence at the hearing, the state court found that Sparks had not shown that any juror saw the tie, and concluded that no constitutional violation resulted from the bailiff's tie. (SHCR at 157-58.)

         3. Analysis

         To show the state court's determination to be an unreasonable determination of fact based on the evidence presented to the state court, Sparks argues that it was physically impossible for the jury to have not seen the image on the bailiff's tie and that other people saw it. (Am. Pet. at 48-50, 51-54.) However, none of the court officials-including the attorneys for either side-testified that they thought that the jury could see the image on the tie, the testimony indicated that there were obstacles between the jury and the tie that may have obstructed its view before the bailiff concealed it, and the only evidence from the jury was that it was not seen or considered by them. Even if this could rise to the level of the jury tampering in Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, the first element of this claim-that the jury actually received the external influence by viewing the image on the tie-was not proven. Therefore, the burden of proof could not have shifted to the State to prove that the alleged viewing was not harmful. The state court's determination has not been shown to be incorrect under section 2254(e)(1), much less unreasonable under section 2254(d).

         Accordingly, Sparks' first claim for relief is DENIED for lack of merit.

         B. External Influence - Spectators

         In his third claim, Sparks contends that the jury was improperly influenced in the punishment phase of his trial by the “repeated instances of audience disruptions” at the trial.[4](Am. Pet. at 57-61.) Respondent argues that the portion of this claim presented to the state court-which included only one incident of audience disruption-was reasonably denied, and that the portion not presented to the state court is unexhausted and procedurally barred. (Ans. at 15-24.)

         1. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

         a. Law

         Generally, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief on an unexhausted claim. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b). To properly exhaust a claim, a habeas petitioner must fairly present its factual and legal basis to the highest available state court for review in a procedurally correct manner that allows the state court to consider the merits of the claim. See Carty v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 244, 254 (5th Cir. 2009); Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 1993); Satterwhite v. Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Nickleson v. Stephens, 803 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The exhaustion doctrine demands more than allusions in state court to facts or legal issues that might be comprehended within a later federal habeas petition. The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity between state and federal courts, respect for the integrity of state court procedures, and ‘a desire to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law.'”) (quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (in turn quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982))). In Texas, a death-sentenced prisoner must present his claims to the CCA on direct appeal or in an application for state post-conviction relief. See Bautista v. McCotter, 793 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting procedure in noncapital cases); Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that direct appeal to CCA is automatic under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(h)); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 269 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting death-sentenced petitioner's failure to raise claim on direct appeal to CCA resulted in failure to exhaust claim).

         b. State Court Action

          In his twenty-second point of error on direct appeal, Sparks claimed that “[t]he trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial after a spectator caused a disturbance in the courtroom which had an improper influence on the jury.” (App. Br. at 79.) In support of this claim, Sparks asserted his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by impartial jurors whose verdict is based solely on the evidence at trial and cited that portion of the record of the proceedings during the closing argument when the disturbance occurred and the motion for mistrial made by Sparks' trial counsel. (App. Br. at 79-80 (citing 41 RR at 68).)[5] In this record, the defense counsel at trial asserted that this was the second time that this individual had caused a disruption and described a prior incident during the guilt phase of the trial. The prosecutor also expressed his view of the prior events and the defense moved for a mistrial.

         The trial court denied the motion and Sparks appealed.

         The CCA denied this point of error, in part, because Sparks' counsel failed to preserve the error by first requesting the lesser remedy of an instruction to the jury to disregard the influence as required by Texas law. After discussing the incident, the prior incident, and comparing these facts to precedent, the CCA concluded:

Although the harm, if any, could have been cured by an instruction to disregard, appellant did not request this “lesser remedy.” Further, appellant has not carried his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the outburst interfered with the jury's verdict or posed a reasonable probability of injury to himself. Appellant offers only conclusory assertions that this disturbance violated his constitutional right to an ...

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