United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REBECCA RUTHERFORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Willie Boykins brings this action for judicial review of the
final decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (the “Commissioner”)
denying his claims for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and supplemental security income under
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, pursuant to
Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g). For the
following reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner is
REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed his initial claim alleging
that he is disabled due to a heart attack. Tr. 118 [ECF No.
13-5]. After his application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration, a hearing was held on June 23, 2015, in
Dallas, Texas, before Administrative Law Judge Donald R.
Davis (the “ALJ”). Tr. 95 [ECF No. 13-4].
Plaintiff was born on April 2, 1955 and was 60 years old at
the time of the June 23, 2015 hearing. Tr. 95 & 118.
Plaintiff has past work experience as a security guard. Tr.
285 [ECF No. 13-8]. On August 11, 2015, the ALJ issued his
decision finding that Plaintiff has not been under a
disability as defined in the Social Security Act from his
alleged onset date of March 31, 2013 through the date of the
ALJ's decision. Tr. 87 [ECF No. 13-3].
stated that he agreed with the Disability Determination
Services c0nsultants that Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or a combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in Title 20, Code of Federal Regulations, Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 79 [ECF No. 13-3]. The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) for the following: (1) lift or
carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; (2)
stand or walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; (3) sit for 6
hours in an 8 hour workday; (4) attend and concentrate for 2
hour periods; (5) respond appropriately to change in routine
work settings; and (6) not engage in fast pace, assembly line
work. Tr. 81 [ECF No. 13-3]. The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a
security guard, because this work does not require the
performance of work-related activities precluded by
Plaintiff's RFC. Tr. 87 [ECF No. 13-3]. Plaintiff
appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council, and
on January 9, 2017, the Appeals Council affirmed the
ALJ's decision. Tr. 1 [ECF No. 13-3]. Plaintiff filed
this action in the District Court on February 28, 2017.
Compl. [ECF No. 1].
claimant must prove that he is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act to be entitled to social security
benefits. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563-64
(5th Cir. 1995); Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640
(5th Cir. 1988). The definition of disability under the Act
is “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically-determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292
(5th Cir. 1992).
Commissioner utilizes a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. Those steps are
(1) an individual who is working and engaging in substantial
gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of
(2) an individual who does not have a “severe
impairment” will not be found to be disabled;
(3) an individual who meets or equals a listed impairment in
Appendix 1 of the regulations will be considered disabled
without consideration of vocational factors;
(4) if an individual is capable of performing the work the
individual has done in the past, a finding of “not
disabled” will be made; and
(5) if an individual's impairment precludes the
individual from performing the work the individual has done
in the past, other factors including age, education, past
work experience, and residual functional capacity must be
considered to determine if other work can be performed.
Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022
(5th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)). The
burden of proof lies with the claimant to prove disability
under the first four steps of the five-step inquiry.
Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. The burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the inquiry to prove that
other work, aside from the claimant's past work, can be
performed by the claimant. Bowling v. ...